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Kenneth Minogue

THE NATIONAL INTEREST

—*Trading In Futures* —

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THE NATIONAL INTEREST

NUMBER 26, WINTER 1991/92

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Five Minutes Past Midnight

—*and Welcome to the Age of Proliferation*

Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz

AN H-BOMB in Iraq? Chinese uranium enrichment hardware in Iran? It's just not the same world as that in which the study of disarmament and proliferation began. Generations have passed since the completion of the Manhattan Project—generations not just of people but technologies. Progress, a concept that generally resolves us to endure the terrors that the future holds, is upon us, and with its arrival we find ourselves confronted with that most ancient and malevolent curse: "May you live in interesting times."

In the decade after Hiroshima, the yield of nuclear weapons increased a thousandfold, and today, seventeen years after India proved equal to the task of building a nuclear device using its own technical resources, the threat from weapons of mass destruction continues to grow. Nevertheless, there persists the naive belief that began with the Manhattan Project—that secrets can be kept. Secrecy, however, is incompatible with scientific success. Although a whole generation of world-class scientists—a traitor or two excepted—kept their oaths as to the technical details of the first generations of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, they also helped raise up a new generation of graduate students and post-doctoral fellows who, by the time they matured, collectively knew more than their masters did. What took the Allies 40,000 man-years to do in the 1940s took India perhaps 2,500 in the 1970s.

A generation later still, much that is unspeakably classified in the context of weapons design and fabrication is merely the common knowledge of other disciplines that have undergone a separate evolution in the unclassified world of international scientific endeavor. And circulating today within the scientific community is a wealth of expertise that dwarfs the amount of intellectual currency that existed in the 1940s and 1950s. The number of newly minted Ph.Ds and Sc.Ds entering the marketplace each year is transforming the global R&D scene in ways difficult to comprehend and impossible to reverse.

In the two generations that have grown to adulthood since World War II, the sociology of science and technology has been transformed. A once Eurocentric enterprise has become a global one. In 1939, German was the *lingua franca* of science—of physics in particular. Scientists were far fewer than today. Apart from America, Europe, Japan, and the USSR, few nations could boast of dozens, let alone hundreds, of Ph.Ds in the pure or applied sciences. Whenever individuals of scientific promise

Tom Clancy is the author most recently of *The Sum of All Fears*. Russell Seitz is an associate of Harvard University's John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies; this paper draws on a longer one written under the auspices of the Institute's Changing International Security Needs and America's National Interests Program.

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arose in the British or French colonies, they tended to be educated at those empires' hearts, there to spend their careers rather than return to the impoverished or nonexistent technical cultures of their homelands.

The intervening years have witnessed a transformation of the world of technology. What was extremely demanding then—building a few bombs stretched the "high technology" of World War II to its limits, and beyond—has ceased to be state-of-the-art or even demanding. In the 1940s, the Third Reich's atomic weapons program barely got off the drawing board. Its experimental program ended before a chain reaction was achieved. Yet today, little of the equipment, instruments, and materials (fissionables and explosives excepted) needed to develop the first generation of atomic weapons is alien to the research establishments of a large university or a Fortune 500 company. High technology has become a global enterprise and the scientific database that underlies it has become almost universally accessible.

With the advent of this burgeoning free trade in technical ideas and the people who think about them, we have entered a new era in the history of proliferation. It is cautionary to note that what the Germans could and did accomplish at the limits of their wartime high-technology binge—the V–2 rocket—has been successfully emulated by Iraq and North Korea. Perhaps the most fitting adjective to apply to the scientific and technical resources of most nations, with or without nuclear ambitions today, is "overqualified."

To be safely ignored in the establishment of an anti-proliferation regime, a nation needs to have rather fewer Ph.Ds and engineering diplomas than Venezuela or Bangladesh, and a technical economy incapable of building a diesel engine from scratch. So excellent an education is being afforded to so many from so far afield in the universities of the First World that technical sophistication has become an increasingly global phenomenon. There is little consolation in demography, for while a bare majority of all foreign graduate students stay on to seek their careers in the nations that educate them, thousands return home annually.[1]

Warm, Wet, and Gray

FOR FOUR decades, the United States and Europe have been engaged in exporting to the developing nations the most sensitive of nuclear materials. This uncontrolled trade has grown exponentially, increasing ninefold in the last thirty years and doubling in the last decade. The matter in question is warm, wet, and gray—a small tonnage of human brains freshly armed with doctorates in nuclear physics and all its related disciplines. Most of them go home.

A high-tech cadre of thousands has returned to the Third World with First World advanced degrees. For example, both India and Taiwan now have more than 2,500 American-educated Ph.Ds. Even more remarkable, South Korea is now acquiring more than 1,000 American doctorates *annually*. Similar numbers have stayed behind in the West to participate in state-of-the-art research in disciplines as varied as plasma physics, materials science, chemical engineering, and computer science. The percentage of the world's scientists and engineers resident in developing countries rose from 7.6 percent to 10.2 percent between 1970 and 1980 and today exceeds 13 percent.[2]

More than mere numbers is at issue. The strength of science has grown to a point where a comparative handful of scientists and engineers can successfully pursue tasks that

[1]The authors wish to thank Delores H. Thurgood of the Office of Science and Engineering Personnel of the National Research Council for providing *Summary Report 1990: Doctorate Recipients from United States Universities* (Washington: National Academy Press, 1991), as well as tabulations of Ph.Ds on a nation-by-nation basis for the physical sciences and engineering disciplines that have served as the database from which the statistics in this article are derived.

[2]Jacques Gaillard, *Scientists in the Third World* (University Press of Kentucky, 1991).

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once required the concerted effort of hordes of the best and brightest. Interdisciplinary areas of research are fertile ground for the rediscovery in the open literature of the technical factors that were originally cultivated in secret and kept thereafter in the well-guarded vaults of the superpowers' weapons establishments. Many, perhaps most, of the concepts, techniques, materials, and machines originally developed to enable the production of the first generation of thermonuclear devices have been reinvented, rediscovered, or spontaneously spun off into the world of civilian R&D and purely scientific endeavor.

A great deal of weapons-related information that is not labeled as such is hidden in plain sight within innocent-sounding subdisciplines that are both unclassified and so widely disseminated as to defy any attempt to return their sensitive content to effective regimes of security and compartmentalization. The realm of astrophysics, for example, includes all the intellectual underpinnings of nuclear weapons development, and indeed antedates it. The basic principles of how the sun works, set forth by Bethe and von Weiszacker in the 1930s, gave rise not just to the hydrogen bomb but to the epic task of harvesting fusion as a peaceful source of power.

On the more modest scale of planets, the extreme pressures common to their cores and the ignition of fusion bombs are described by one and the same set of Equations of State—the work of Fermi and Taylor. Static pressures in excess of three million atmospheres, fantasy in 1945, are now reached in diamond anvil cells that fit in a thimble. So today we have robust sub-disciplines of geophysics and astrophysics—the study of the dynamics of asteroid impacts and radiative transport in stars that utilize the liberated (or re-invented) expertise of the weapons laboratories on a daily basis—and those who use such weapons-derived computer codes have at their disposal vastly more computational power than Fermi or Bethe ever dreamed of.

In the aftermath of the information explosion, the component technologies of nuclear proliferation are no longer identifiably labeled as such. What is evolving spans the spectrum of scientific work—but with the advent of computerized databases a macroscope for visualizing such a 360 percent field of view is becoming available on line.

Second-Best Still Works

AS HIGH-technology ramifies, appropriate technologies multiply: the most engaging illusion of proliferation control arises from the temptation to believe that its central goal is to prevent the duplication of *existing* technology. Before the first prototype of a weapons system comes into existence at the level of conceptual design—before its component technologies have been fabricated—one cannot determine which alternate concept for each component will prevail in the long term. The initial selection between competing prototypes, with the winning concepts going on to participate in the inception of the first generation of fission bombs or ICBMs (or whatever), is a process that does not invalidate the concepts that are discarded at that point. It merely reflects the perceived practicality of a particular, infant technology. The fittest idea for such a time and place gets selected on the spot, on the basis of saving as much time as money can afford. But other concepts may prove as fit or fitter in other times and other places.

Rejecting a technique is not the same as falsifying an hypothesis. Thus, while uranium-isotope separation via gaseous-diffusion was the mainstay of the Manhattan Project, what was then an impractical technique of gas-centrifuge separation went on to become a practical source of weapons-grade fissionable materials in the Soviet Union in the 1950s.[3]

[3]The Soviet Union's seizure of German technical personnel after the collapse of the Third Reich led to major improvements in their nuclear program, just as the Manhattan Project benefited from the influx of German refugees in the 1930s. The Nobel laureate Gustav Hertz, who developed the gaseous diffusion process in the 1950s, was taken into custody by Soviet forces in 1945.

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A current example involves the calutron, a bastardized descendant of a Depression-era atom smasher (the original Berkeley cyclotron). Relative inefficiency doomed the early calutrons, and the strength of existing materials limited gas centrifuges in the 1940s. But the Atomic Energy Commission and its successors blithely created a new discipline, materials science, and massively funded it for another half-century. The result: the materials science community naively solved those problems associated with the gas centrifuge and irremediably changed the context of separation technology. This is significant, because such initially dismissed branches of technology as the calutron can take root and flourish in the shadow of their "mature" competitors. Thus the western scientific community was taken by surprise when the calutron, a woefully inefficient device for electromagnetic uranium isotope separation, was reborn in Iraq. This second life testifies to the difference between the undoable and the merely obsolete. At ground zero it matters not if an H-Bomb has fallen from a B–2 or a Zeppelin.

Welcome to the Future

IN THE near future it will be possible to duplicate almost all past technology in all but the most forlorn of Third World backwaters, and much of the present state-of-the-art will be both intellectually and practically accessible. It is no longer safe to assume that looking for the paper trail of a nation attempting to emulate the work of the Manhattan Project will lead us to the laboratories of those with nuclear ambitions. The scope of technical enterprise in today's world prevents a rigid definition of what to look for. The motto of today's ambitious bomb-smiths might be, "These are our weapons technologies—if you don't like them, we have others." Teach a man to make microwave ovens and you've opened the door to radar and calutrons alike. COCOM (the Coordinating Committee on Exports Control) can list and monitor trade in "critical" components; but available tools and materials, and the ubiquity of iron, copper, sand, and vacuum, doom the exercise to futility in the not-very-long run.

This applies equally to other information of military value. Witness the publication in the Indian scientific journal *Current Topics* (April 25, 1991, Indian Academy of Sciences, New Delhi) of both low-and high-resolution satellite images of the Gulf War—despite their being withheld by the U.S. for security reasons. Those who did the withholding evidently overlooked India's possession of a downlink to an earthward-looking U.S. weather satellite, and its own high-resolution reconnaissance satellite to boot.[4]

This is not to suggest that the best efforts of the U.S. or NATO aerospace industries are at risk of obsolescence—India would be hard pressed to deliver a successor to the KH–11 reconnaissance satellite. It does, however, illustrate the already fragile nature of the assumptions that lead to the attempt to deny information to Iraq when satellite data flow unencrypted from orbit twenty-four hours a day. The satellite information could have been had for the asking by anyone on a computer network that, courtesy of DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration) and a host of other federal agencies, has come to span the globe. The new condition of entry to the orbital reconnaissance club is not the capacity to launch a satellite, but access to the Ethernet directory and the necessary subscription fee.

Similarly any effort to keep the microchips vital to *our* technology out of the hands of Iraq and Libya lacks relevance to the question of the evolution of a Third World bomb. The calutron, for example, is nothing more or less than the Mother of All Vacuum Tubes. Any "proliferation-control regime" for calutron-produced U–235 must encompass everything from traffic in vacuum

[4]India is an illustrative case of a nation whose high-tech sector is sufficiently sophisticated to host an indigenous upgrading of a demonstrated nuclear capability to a thermonuclear one.

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pumps, and wire and sheet metal, to the interdiction of hydrofluoric-acid bootleggers and pick-axe miners of pitchblende. The prospects for such a regime are poor. Too much may be made out of mere copper, iron, and vacuum.

Centrifuge-enrichment technology is easy to inhibit by denying critical materials exports, but it is impossible to control. Steel is steel; any post-Bronze Age nation that possesses an iron foundry or steel mini-mill can produce a heat of martensitic high-strength metal as good as that embargoed. If high-strength composites—carbon fiber or kevlar—for centrifuge construction should be preferred to maraging steel, the raw material can be obtained by the ton from the stocks kept by any boatyard that builds competitive yachts.

As for the more sophisticated magnetic materials needed for the gas centrifuges levitated bearings, their embargo can only succeed if accompanied by a product recall encompassing all of the better sort of hi-fi loudspeakers of the last ten years. "Exotic" new materials, whose research is militarily subsidized, very often make their debut not as production-line aerospace components, but as up-scale sporting goods, such as boron fiber fly rods, and carbon fiber skis and tennis rackets. Examples could be multiplied. The point is that expensive materials developed for weapons applications can and do spin off into civilian markets that dwarf their military cousins.

The Russian Yard Sale

WE ARE partly to blame: consider the proliferation risks inherent in our emphasis on classifying data rather than protecting technology from exposure. It is edifying to attend the manufactures' displays that accompany many large technical meetings sponsored by engineering associations or the Department of Defense. There, proudly displayed, are the first fruit of Pentagon R&D—components whose exotic materials and advanced electronic, thermal, and optical performance seem unparalleled in the civilian sector, and which are very often offered before their end-use systems (the B–2 and SDI, for instance) have even been tested or publicly displayed. Silicon carbide laser mirrors or stealth carbon foam, it's all on offer in the West—albeit without reference to what it has been developed for. And now in the East, even more is on sale.

The Iron Curtain did more than isolate the citizens of the Warsaw Pact nations from the Free World. It also functioned as an impermeable barrier, a containment that kept in a mass of militarily important high technology often rivaling the best in the West. Now that containment has been breached, and the most secretive of military powers is spilling its technology into a new and multipolar world where nuclear ambitions have multiplied. Throughout the former Warsaw Pact, we are witnessing the Yard Sale at the End of History. The Soviet Union is selling jewels more precious than the Fabergé eggs of the Romanovs—at distress-sale prices.

To begin with, glasnost is having some curious results. In the course of celebrating the memory of the late Andrei Sakharov, his physicist-colleagues have explicitly revealed some (but not all) of the fundamental tricks of the weapons trade. In *Sakharov Remembered*, V.I. Ritus outlines the foremost of the early breakthroughs on two-stage fission-fusion bombs: the method of increasing the fusion reaction rate by incorporation of depleted uranium into a layered structure containing deuterium and a tritium precursor. When such a composite becomes fully ionized by the X-ray flux of a fast first-stage fission primary (contained in a *holraum* of appropriate geometry made of the right stuff), the radiation pressure is locally amplified by the abundant electrons liberated from the U–238. This increases the concentration of the deuterium nuclei, which increases the fusion reaction rate by an order of magnitude. "Such a method of reaction increase was called 'Sakharization' by our colleagues."

This is not the sort of hoary schematic speculation typical of Howard Morland's de-

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cade-old article "The H-Bomb Secret," but straightforward (albeit antique) thermonuclear bomb design information of a quality transcending the fission-bomb secrets that sent the Rosenbergs to the electric chair. It has been on library shelves for over a year. In another paper, A.I. Pavlovski displays some X-ray flash photographs of how to overcome Rayleigh-Taylor instability by an iteration of implosion components. A third, by Yuri A. Romanov, further outlines the similarities and differences of early U.S. and USSR thermonuclear devices and bombs.

This level of candor may be a source of satisfaction to the curious, but while Drell, Teller, and Bethe remain close-lipped, and their protégés safely within the confines of Los Alamos and Lawrence-Livermore national laboratories, one wonders: what is going to become of the corresponding protégés of Sakharov and his contemporaries?

THE RESPONSE of Soviet laboratories to the outbreak of peace has been even more disturbing. Invoking glasnost and perestroika, they are ready and willing to sell off the fruits of decades of innovation and development for hard currency abroad, rather than seeking means of converting it to civilian use in a land where the ruble is despised. Despite the supposedly continuing vigilance of both the KGB and the military, a virtual sampler of military technology—some of it arising from nuclear weapons research—has been put on the table for Western entrepreneurs and Third World shoppers.

In the aftermath of Chernobyl, the Soviet nuclear power (and plutonium) industry found itself burdened with a generation of reactors no one wanted to operate and a corps of nuclear engineers and designers whose careers were suddenly jeopardized, (along with former counterparts in the defunct Warsaw Pact). In the summer of 1991, the USSR witnessed both a large reduction in the cash flow of many scientific and technical establishments *and* a contraction in many scientists' and engineers' prerogatives: no more cheap cafeterias, company food stores, and free childcare centers. Many institutions seeking to reverse this abrupt decline in the quality of life have established cooperatives to privatize the intellectual property of their researchers, and to seek its practice by joint ventures or licensing abroad. As a result, entities as diverse as national laboratories, military aerospace development centers, organs of the Soviet Academy, biomedical research facilities, and the City Council of St. Petersburg have suddenly circulated reams of abstracts of technical proposals by a variety of channels, ranging from individual scientists turned entrepreneurs to the Minister of Military Conversion.

The consequences of privatizing the component entities of the Soviet military-industrial complex, from basic metallurgical facilities to aerospace centers and nuclear R&D laboratories, may include the proliferation of ideas as well as artifacts and technologies. At one level of the game it is an intelligence windfall, but the de facto declassification of Soviet military high technology will have the effect of making many Western systems comprehensible to outsiders as well. Soviet high technology cannot be compromised without ours falling victim to some extent.

While there is some evidence of restraint concerning state-of-the-art technologies of C^3I (command, control, communications, and intelligence), a few of the systems offered are of a sophistication that have the capacity to change radically the correlation of forces among nations used to depending on the generations of technology available on the fringes of the global arms bazaar. These include a variety of dual-use services and information channels—such as image enhancement, and high-resolution satellite optical and radar imaging—that could seriously effect the outcome of conflicts between states otherwise without access to orbital reconnaissance. It would therefore seem prudent for analysts of low-intensity conflict to keep track of more than weapons systems as the 1990s evolve.

Today it costs roughly $100,000 a year,

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including support personnel and overheads, to employ an American or Japanese scientist. But the institutions employing tens of thousands of displaced Soviet military researchers are growing desperate. The asking price for their services ranges from $500 a month for a group leader with a Ph.D to $100 for a skilled technician. The liberalization of travel and emigration from Russia might allow weapons scientists, once denied any prospect of leaving, to sell their expertise to the highest bidder. One would expect the bids to be sizable. Pakistan, for example, having purchased a weapon design from China, would clearly benefit from the services of those familiar with the materials and techniques of its manufacture. While a former employee of the now mothballed East German reactors should face a reasonable prospect of gainful employment in a reunited Germany that staunchly supports the International Atomic Energy Agency's anti-proliferation regime, he remains the lawful prey of headhunters in the family of states that seeks to circumvent that regime. One truly egregious example of the Soviet crack-up is the International Chetek Corporation—a would-be purveyor of "peaceful nuclear explosives" and *breeder reactors!* This enterprise is a spin-off from the Arzamas-16 nuclear weapons design center.

As glasnost mutates into an unbridled high-tech sell-off, we must revise our perception of how the technologies of mass destruction may soon spread across the globe. For what is on sale is not Manhattan Project surplus, but systems explicitly made for fighting the World War III that never was.

Traffic in Materials

SOME of the architects of the present regime of proliferation controls will protest that such speculations are moot. They will argue that, given iron-clad sanctions against trade in ^{235}uranium and ^{239}plutonium and vigilant monitoring of the technological basis for their enrichment and separation, traffic in weapons-building expertise is unlikely to result in anything being built, because of the sheer lack of the critical materials of construction. But such complacency is foolish.

The common wisdom is that, having been stripped of its uranium and plutonium, waste from spent nuclear reactor fuel assemblies poses only the problem of finding a safe means of long-term storage. However, the waste is still pregnant with elements like neptunium which, despite their never having been used in deployed American nuclear weapons, are every bit as fissionable as the better-known trans-uranic elements.[5]

Thus, by defining the problem exclusively in terms of uranium and plutonium—the historical basis of all past bombs—the IAEA has opened the door to a very curious future. There are no controls on neptunium, tons of which languish in waste repositories around the world. Those repositories are intended to keep humans safe from radiation, rather than radwaste safe from persons bent on mining it for fissionable elements—elements that were originally rejected for weapons use simply because they were uncompetitive with superior fissionable materials, *not* because they will not do the job.

In one of history's more unhappy ironies, those who have objected to international transport of spent fuel for recycling (for fear of putting plutonium at risk of hijacking, or the environment at risk of plutonium contamination) have in fact helped create convenient stockpiles of potentially recoverable weaponizable neptunium and plutonium at sites around the world. Given Iraq's enterprising revival of the uneconomical but viable calutron, perhaps it is time to contemplate anew the Rich Man's Atom Bomb.

Very often we forget how the imperatives of nuclear ambition can warp normative perceptions of safety and cost-effectiveness beyond recognition. Many a terrorist has made his own nitroglycerine. Some of the

[5]And popular too. The neptunium bomb was first theorized by German President von Weiszacker's brother, Carl-Friedrich, in a secret report dated July 17, 1940.

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spent fuel residue is already four decades old and has decayed to a point where its once ferocious radioactivity has fallen nearly a thousandfold. Today, using technologies as diverse as robotics and zeolite ion exchange separation, a group bent on quarrying radwaste for weapons—a patently suicidal notion three decades ago—might live to tell the tale.[6]

Precisely

MORE ominous still is the risk of the qualitative escalation of proliferation, of nations following Iraq's example in proceeding directly to the H-bomb. The assumption that "strategic" yield devices are vastly more demanding technically has been undermined by two factors: first, numerically controlled machine tools of optical levels of precision and almost unlimited versatility; second, the availability of computers and attendant software that bridge the gap between the level of sheer genius needed to innovate thermonuclear devices and the less demanding task of getting them built once their operation is understood from its first principles. This hypothesis has been chillingly corroborated by the UN's recent discovery of Iraq's possession of precision machine tools as well as isotopically purified ^{6}lithium, with evident intent to develop a hydrogen bomb.

When the Einstein-Szilard letter brought the possibility of the atomic bomb to President Roosevelt's attention, the American Physical Society had just 4000 members. About half of this cadre of (mostly) Ph.Ds joined the Manhattan Project, which at its height employed roughly 10,000 scientists with advanced degrees, principally in chemistry and chemical engineering. Some of its veterans have reflected on the acceleration of their research efforts relative to the pace of their pre-war endeavors. They all concur that the program's relatively unlimited budget contributed mightily to its rapid progress. It took a great deal of money, some $2 billion in an era when the largest of industrial research establishments—General Electric or Du Pont, for example—had annual budgets on the order of $10 million. That acceleration has more modern examples, such as the Apollo program in the 1960s and the Iraqi nuclear program of the 1980s. It is a tacit principle of research management that money buys time, and having spent a billion dollars a year for a decade, Iraq's progress should surprise no one.

Technicians are as important to the problem as scientists. Building such devices requires exacting standards of mechanical precision and electronic performance, often reckoned in angstroms and nanoseconds. In the mechanical domain, the advent of digitally controlled machine tools with optical sensors and air bearings has effected a revolution in the quality of precision machining. This has largely trivialized the task of machining components for a first-generation nuclear device. The compatibility of these precision tools with computer-aided design (CAD) and computer-aided manufacture (CAM) software, as well as precision robotic manipulators, substantially lowers the demands on the proficiency and skill of their operators. It also reduces the need for prolonged proximity to potentially dangerous nuclear materials. One built-in deterrent to radwaste bombs—the presumed lethality of the starting material—must be re-examined in the light of machines that produce precision components untouched by human hands. Many Third World nations now produce artifacts as materially diverse as contact lenses and CDs, both of which rival the level of precision of the first generation of thermonuclear devices. Most required manufacturing technology can be had for the asking, and much is in place.

Issues of automation also involve informational components. Linking the output of

[6]Apart from not being, in Oppenheimer's phrase, "technically sweet" in their design philosophy, radwaste bombs repel the mind in terms of their potential fallout. Unfortunately, this may make them all the more attractive to the enthusiastic terrorist.

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a hydrodynamical model with the refinement of a mechanical design is a demanding computer-programming task. It has lately been simplified by the advent of sophisticated computer languages that are both mathematically explicit and increasingly user-friendly. Designs in turn must be interfaced with CAM software, but expertise in that area is becoming as widespread as robotics in the Pacific Rim.

While the role of computer science in weapons design led to the installation of formidable cryptographic safeguards to isolate the powerful computers of the weapons labs from the outside world, the advent of highly secure public-key safeguards in unclassified civilian computer networks has serious drawbacks. Provided with almost unbreakable computer security, the international dispersion of the people and hardware necessary to conduct the conceptual design, modelling, and CAD/CAM cycle becomes a possibility. While vigilance might detect the accrual of expertise necessary for realistic nuclear ambition in a single place, the same human assets scattered around the world might go undetected.

Green Hell

MANY Third World doctorates are in a discipline that did not even exist in 1945: molecular biology. With its advent, chemical and biological weapons (CBW) have become less the poor man's atom bombs than the lazy one's.

The major substantive advantage nuclear weapons possess as instruments of intimidation or defense arises from the universal realization of just how terrible their effects are. Hiroshima endowed nuclear weapons with status as emblems of national power and as the ultimate talisman of military ambition. It also created a powerful taboo against their further use. Yet the residue of repugnance that led even Adolf Hitler to refrain from risking the use of nerve gas, and a return to the chemical warfare of World War I, has decayed to the extent that Iraq has already ventured into the suburbs of the unthinkable.

Unfortunately, so low is the threshold of technical difficulty and so small the critical mass of men and material within the orbit of whatever fanaticism should find such a deed compelling, that it is hard to imagine a world not at risk once more from chemical and biological weapons. The political and military factors that spared the world a failure of CBW deterrence in the Gulf War and the relative success in interdicting trade in nerve gas precursors are of but little relevance. To build an A-bomb requires a cadre of at least a hundred scientists and a budget of many millions spent in exotic ways. But biotoxins can be obtained by a few, directing the labors of unskilled dozens at a task that might cost less than a pound of gold. As the drug war shows, attempts at interdiction are all but hopeless. Nor are complicated delivery systems necessary; think what Mathias Rust, the young West German who landed a plane in Red Square, could have accomplished with a crop-duster.

Nor is there any need for genetically engineered micro-organisms, produced in high-biotech laboratories. Plants and other organisms containing molecules of intimidating toxicity are both numerous and ubiquitous. For example, ricin, the lectin made infamous by an umbrella-gun wielding Bulgarian assassin in London, is a potentially abundant byproduct of the production of castor oil. Worse toxins exist. Even in Burundi or Vanuatu, appropriate technologies of mass destruction are at hand in the state of nature. In order not to be eaten, plants have evolved means of producing chemicals of unsurpassable toxicity—one molecule can kill an animal cell. These substances have legitimate uses in biomedical research, and those learning to manipulate them safely in the laboratory can learn to use them as weapons.

Death of the Illusion

PERHAPS students of proliferation should begin looking over the shoulders of those who study immunology and oncology, for they too are addressing problems of mutation and metastasis; of constantly changing threats and challenges; and

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of how to aid the human immune system in rising to meet them. The growth of technology can be as benign as that of any living tissue, or as malignant as the worst of cancers.

The hermetic secrecy of the Manhattan Project gave way in the 1950s to the public emergence of nuclear science and information technology. Half a century later, there are more secrets than ever inside the weapons laboratories, but few that remain novel to the unclassified realm of science and technology that has been burgeoning uncontrollably on the outside. The continuing inflation of an already sprawling high-technology sector that spans the globe is leading us into a future that may be beyond economic repair. It is one in which the growing similarity of civilian and military technologies may lead to the extinction of their meaningful difference.

Information is the universal solvent of secrecy. And secrecy is not to be regarded as a permanent thing. The more that is known, the less remains that can be kept unknown. With the exponential growth of the technologies of information, the pressure of the known can exceed the strength of a secret technology's containment, and secrets can implode into irrelevance. Two thousand years before Columbus, Heraclitus gave us fair warning: *He who does not expect the unexpected cannot detect it.* Contemplating the realm of science and technology today, and considering the prospect of what intelligence, human and artificial, can accomplish in the century to come, we arrive at the depressing conclusion that the present regime of proliferation control may be among that rare set of entities—a fit object for catastrophe theory.□

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
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The Breaking of Nations

—*and the Threat to Ours*

Graham E. Fuller

THE GHOSTS of global ideological war are now vanquished. Yet we stand on the threshold of a new era of global wars—small ones. The post-Cold War era, contrary to our present expectations and desires, will be marked by a significant increase in conflict and localized war around the world. Neonationalism and ethnic struggles, often attended by religious zeal, will lie at the heart of these conflicts.

The balance of nuclear terror—however hateful it was—provided the underpinning of the world order after World War II. It also imposed a certain discipline on that world order: a general recognition that the world was an exceedingly dangerous place, that the possibility of nuclear war between the superpowers was ever present, and that it most likely would be sparked by some Third World conflict between superpower proxies. While the Cold War exacerbated regional conflicts in one sense, it also set limits to them. The superpowers were not bereft of any sense of caution or responsibility even while conducting the global struggle; both were attentive to the potentially cataclysmic consequences of regional conflicts, and neither could afford to be hostage to the reckless acts of local Caesars.

Now that kind of discipline is gone. Moscow has disengaged from its persistent efforts to plant little red flags all over the global map, thus liberating the United States from the pressure to implant countervailing blue flags. States may now feel increasingly emboldened to act on the international scene with impunity, unconstrained by old superpower interests. Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait is just such a case. With the death of global politics, small countries start to matter a great deal more. Regional politics becomes the primary vehicle of international politics.

At the top of the list of factors contributing to global instability is a new wave of nationalism. I call it neonationalism, for it differs from previous Third World manifestations. Earlier stages of Third World nationalism tended to revolve around the national liberation experience, the zeal engendered by the throwing off of colonial ties, often supported by a hefty dollop of Maoist ideology and Communist support. Neonationalism is the product of more recent decades, going beyond classical nationalism and including separatist subnationalism; that is, the expression of communal/ethnic aspirations of groups within the nation-state that are unhappy with their lot: Shiites in Iraq, Sikhs in India, Uighur Turks in Chinese Turkestan. It involves

Graham E. Fuller is a senior political scientist on Middle Eastern and Soviet Third World affairs at the RAND Corporation. This article is adapted from his forthcoming book, *The Democracy Trap: Pitfalls of the Post-Cold War World* (New York: Dutton, 1992).

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strong new drives toward separatism: the Moros in the Philippines, Georgians in the Soviet Union, Catholics in Northern Ireland, Hungarians in Romania, Biafra in Nigeria, even Quebec in Canada.

Nationalist feelings and aspirations will acquire a new assertiveness, springing from international relaxation of tensions and rising expectations. Many states of the world had little opportunity in the Cold War period to settle old scores or redraw national boundaries after independence. Their nationalism will no longer be directed against former colonial rulers but against an "unjust international order" of winners and losers. Although the West will still undoubtedly come in for its share of attack, these new nationalist movements will take aim at rival proximate nations, or at other communal groups within the same state boundaries.

Democracy and Neonationalism

A WAVE of democratic aspiration is gradually spreading over parts of the world, where power has remained in the hands of authoritarian elites—political or military—since the early days of the independence movements. Today, slowly developing middle classes and technocrats increasingly demand a voice in the conduct of policy. Democracy more than ever before is an idea whose time has come, bolstered both by dramatic political upheavals around the world and by the impact of international media and communications.

But democracy is an instrument as much as a goal, the banner and mechanism by which frustrated elements—often a majority of society—will seek greater voice. When new groups come to power by democratic means—especially majorities previously excluded from the governing process—there is no guarantee at all that they will extend the same rights to former oppressors, minorities, or rival groups. Democracy and free expression will inevitably release new waves of populist feeling no longer constrained by traditional authoritarian rule, expressing itself through impulses of raw nationalism no longer held in check. The more alien the democratic tradition is to the state, the rawer the forms in which neonationalism will express itself. Newly liberated Eastern Europe is rapidly rediscovering its old ethnic causes, which now threaten the very existence of states like Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

Democracy exacerbates nationalist impulses because it enfranchises broad elements of society previously deprived of an active voice in national politics, making them more vulnerable to demagogic siren songs. More significantly, whole new middle classes will demand the right to active participation in administering the state; autocracies cannot shut them out of the ruling process as in the past. New leaderships will prove highly responsive to the nationalist sensitivities of their constituents, particularly in the face of any seeming slights by great powers that dominate the international order. Ironically, the United States is often seen as the first offender in this regard, as the policeman and primary architect of the Western world order and as the cause of whatever inequities that characterize it.

To be sure, democracy also can be a constraining force in international relations. "Democracies don't start wars" is a well-established thesis. But this observation was made primarily about seasoned Western democracies. Newer democracies, like newer nationalisms, will be rawer and more inclined to give vent to aggressive or chauvinistic feelings. India's raucous ethnic politics and Eastern Europe's rekindling nationalist resentments are cases in point. Already in Eastern Europe we see expressions of anti-Semitism and hatred toward other minorities—impulses that were mostly suppressed during the decades of communist rule. And fascistic figures can emerge out of this environment as easily as mushrooms in dark places, figures like Serbia's Milosevic, who can win elections and lead the masses in chauvinist directions. In the next decades, moderated fascism is a more likely alternative to democratic rule than is communism.

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The Quest for Identity

NEONATIONALISM reflects more than the politics of recent decades. Its most characteristic features spring from far deeper roots: the search for meaningful identity in the modern world. Indeed, anomie—alienation and a sense of loss of self-identification—is a problem that affects the entire world, capitalist or socialist, advanced or undeveloped.

Many political observers have marvelled at the persistence, even the resuscitation, late in the twentieth century of feelings of localism and particularism, as among the Northern Irish, the Belgian Flemish, the Basques, the Quebecois, the Palestinians, the Kurds, the Azerbaijanis, the Sudanese Dinkas, the Native Americans, and dozens of other groupings—even resurgent ethnicity within America. This resurgence is related in part to the depersonalization and alienation that modernization produces. As Third World states modernize, massive influences from the developed world endanger traditional cultures. At the same time, the modern Third World state is often in the hands of the most advanced, or powerful, ethnic/religious element within the state, such as the Christians in Lebanon or the Punjabis in Pakistan, and the dominant element threatens the way of life of the remaining groups.

In the more advanced countries, the expanding bureaucratic state itself is busy supplanting the traditional community; it erases local culture even as it provides new social services that, since the dawn of time, have been met by the extended family, the clan, the guild, or the immediate community. However "efficient" the adoption of these social roles by the state may be, it increases the depersonalization of life. The resulting anxiety provides the grist for the mills of extremist nationalist and religious movements.

In the United States itself, and in the rest of the industrialized world, the virtues and certitudes of identity in small-town life have been lost in the city. People crave identity, but where are they to get it? How do we define ourselves? Are we Americans, engineers, Southerners, Christians, Minnesotans, females, North Americans, blacks, San Franciscans, workers, mountain bikers? We can belong to each of these different categories; some impulses are stronger than others in given societies and at given times. We should recognize that neonationalism is not only a Third World aberration but a disease of the modern condition.

The Intermediate Stage

THE LONG-delayed break-up of the Soviet Union has provided the final impetus for the rise of neonationalism. There, the restless Muslim republics—among others—are causing territorial concern both within the USSR and in neighboring Afghanistan, China, and Iran.* Aided by the "demonstration effect"—the contagious spread of the separatist concept—neonationalism is everywhere: the Kurds in Turkey and Iraq, the Berbers in Algeria and Morocco, the Pashtuns in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Sikhs in India, nearly every group and country in Africa. Even Europe itself is the scene of breakaway struggles: the Catholics in Northern Ireland, the Basques, the Turkish Cypriots, the Slovenes and the Croats. . .

Today, we Americans are inclined to believe that the multi-ethnic state is more inclined to produce tolerance and understanding than is the ethnically homogeneous state. Even more to the point, is not the multi-ethnic state most representative of what is to come in the world, given the

*While six million Azerbaijanis live in Soviet Azerbaijan, at least ten million live in Iran, all speaking the same Turkic language. Three million Tajiks live in Soviet Tajikistan, while at least four million live over the border in northern Afghanistan. There are over a million and a half Kazakhs and twelve million Uighurs in China, the latter already restive against Chinese chauvinism and imperialism.

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immense fluidity and mobility of modern populations? The Third World is migrating heavily into the Western world in search of education, jobs, and freedom. Once relatively homogeneous ethnic states like England, France, Germany, Holland, and Italy now find their characters in the process of being transformed by new waves from abroad, producing new domestic intolerance that takes direct political expression.

One wonders, in fact, whether Europe is going to make it in this respect. There is no question that it will be forced increasingly to absorb other nationalities in large quantities, from Eastern Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Third World. Yet Europe, a continent more used to exporting people than to importing them, is not ready for this. Nothing in the cultures of European countries prepares them for either internal ethnic pluralism, or the weakening of national culture. Over the longer run, ethnic hostilities could cripple hopes for an increasingly integrated political union. The Europeans are not ready to give up, or even heavily dilute, their national cultures. France is already deeply disturbed at the prognosis for French cultural distinctiveness and the preservation of unique French traditions in the new Europe. In this respect, Europe is in far worse shape than America, where we already have a well-developed ideology of ethnic and cultural pluralism, even if there are occasional problems in implementing it fully.

Do we believe that multi-ethnic states should be encouraged as we move into the next century? Does the diversity of such states produce a greater richness of life, a greater tolerance and awareness of other cultures, religions, and lifestyles? In America, at least, it does. While a melting pot may not be in the cards for most countries for a long time to come, it may well be argued that at least a federated or confederated structure represents a higher form of political entity—one to which the world should aspire and one that American policy abroad should be dedicated to promote, especially when confronted with situations of ethnic conflict.

But even if one accepts this conclusion, it is also necessary to recognize that nationalist impulses may have to run their full, often ugly, course before they can be contained. Realization of full-blown ethnic self-determination—in the shape of an independent nation-state—may be a necessary stage of development, especially for those groups that have felt historically oppressed and frustrated. Perhaps only after living through such a "cooling off" period can they comfortably acquiesce in some limitation of cultural and political sovereignty within the framework of a larger political association. Such voluntary federation does not come easily if an ethnic group has previously been forcibly contained within a broader multi-ethnic state dominated by another ethnic group. Thus the Soviet Union may have to break up entirely before any of its component parts can eventually come back together under some mutually advantageous, voluntary form of association.

In short, while federalism may well represent the "wave of the future," it is a political form that cannot be force-fed or hastened; indeed, any attempt to do so is likely to be counter-productive. And memories of a hierarchical relationship of "superior" and "inferior" elements in such previous entities must be substantially erased before the new association can begin to work.

Versailles versus Appomattox

HOW WILL America now confront the aspirations of large ethnic groups that seek self-determination in the new world order? The American tradition is deeply steeped in the concept of self-determination; Woodrow Wilson tried to enshrine the principle at Versailles in an attempt to build a new world after World War I. In the early years after World War II, the United States generally supported the break-up of Western empires. But gradually, American enthusiasm for the cause of nationalists waned, partly because of the dismal record of so many of the new states but

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mainly because of an overriding concern with the geopolitical struggle against the Soviet Union.

What posture will the United States adopt now that the struggle is over? Have the gates now clanged down on the creation of new states? Are we to say that such aspirations must be denied, especially if they are expressed by democratic choice? By what reasoning can we deny the Palestinians an independent state on the West Bank? By what rationale can we tell the Kurds to forget about it? What if the huge Zulu population—eight million, or almost three times the population of the American colonies in 1776—wants its own state? Is there some law of economics that says that a state must have so many people or so many resources to be viable? Or does it suffice to say, "Tough luck, your aspirations simply harm the interests of already existing states—especially ones we like"?

The problem becomes even more difficult when we consider the deep American commitment to human rights in the last three decades. When large, separatist national groups attempt to fulfill their aspirations, only to be brutally put down by existing national authorities, what does America do? Can we sit by and watch Palestinians, Kurds, Tibetans, Sikhs, Kashmiris, Eritreans, and others be beaten, imprisoned, and shot? For America simply to urge restraint is no answer. In some cases, greater cultural autonomy might solve the issue, but not necessarily, especially if the aspiring nationality is clear about its aspirations. The United States will not, in good conscience, be able to back foreign governments that fail to respond to such legitimate aspirations.

"Legitimacy," of course, is the sticking point, and precedents for recent American policy are not encouraging. We have interpreted legitimacy largely in accordance with our own Cold War interests, tending to be sympathetic to movements that would weaken the USSR and its allies and to oppose movements that threatened our own allies. Latvians are fine, but not Palestinians; Tibetans thumbs up, but Kurds thumbs down. We have not been entirely cynical, of course. We declined to support the Eritrean Liberation Front in Ethiopia, even when that front was waging war against the Marxist-Leninist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam's Ethiopia, on the grounds that separatist movements in Africa were uniquely dangerous.

IN THE POST-Cold War era, America's faith in democratic principles will be sorely tested as we confront growing neonationalism. We had better be clear about it: democracy will produce *both* the desire for greater self-expression and the electoral vehicles by which to express separatist ambitions. The end of the global ideological struggle will limit American ability to reject nationalist movements on grounds of national security. Now, each case will have to be judged on its own merits, and there will be fewer grounds on which to dismiss it.

Foreign civil wars will be marginally easier to deal with than international conflicts. As Americans we have been particularly susceptible to the argument—Gorbachev used it with Bush—that, after all, America had its own Civil War; Abraham Lincoln went to war specifically to preserve the Union. How can we deny the unionist aspirations of other states to maintain their own integrity?

Lincoln indeed fought four bloody years in order to attain a settlement at Appomattox that preserved the Union. And scars of that conflict are still evident in the harshly vanquished American South today. Is Appomattox still a viable solution for American problems? Could George Bush today call in federal troops and go to war against our own population if, say, the South decided that economically and culturally it no longer wished to remain in the Union? If it undertook a referendum and freely voted for independence? Or if the Spanish-speaking parts of the United States voted for autonomy or separation? Can anyone imagine American troops today killing tens of thousands of Americans, in front of TV cameras, in order

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to prevent regional separation? Merely to ask such questions makes it clear that the Appomattox solution—the use of military force to preserve the Union—is no longer tenable in the United States. Should a new attempt at regional autonomy or separation ever emerge in America, supported by a local referendum, it could no longer be stopped by force from Washington.

Fortunately, we have no regional "homelands" in this country that are capable of expressing autonomous aspirations, with the possible exception of our southwestern Mexican-American regions. We can argue, therefore, that secession is not "thinkable." But why should it not still be thinkable, however improbable? By what criterion will we judge that separatism and regional/ethnic self-determination, freely voted on, is a valid principle elsewhere in the world but not here?

These are not abstract questions, because neonationalism in America is threatening to tear the country apart.

The Lebanonization of America

AMERICAN society has been grounded in the equality of opportunity for all, reinforced by the practice of nondiscrimination. Yet we seem to have lost our bearings in recent decades, falling into a confusion between equality of opportunity and equality of status. In our desire to improve the lives of the less fortunate we create mechanisms that restore aspects of racial discrimination to American life. Highly liberal American universities have been at the center of this experiment, recreating de facto racially segregated dormitories, dining halls, clubs, and even graduation ceremonies. Quota systems lurk beneath the surface in many hiring policies, particularly in federal, state, and municipal governments. We are, in fact, witnessing a premonition of what may in one sense be seen as the "Lebanonization" of America.

Lebanonization is the official enshrining of quotas and entitlements based on many and different religious and ethnic communities. Lebanon, a historic refuge for many of the Middle East's sectarian minorities, had attempted for half a century to maintain a system whereby each group, according to its weight in the population, had claim to different aspects of the state structure. Thus the Maronite Christians, who once enjoyed a plurality in population, dominated the country and were entitled to the office of the presidency. The second-largest historical group, the Sunni Muslims, were automatically accorded the office of prime minister; the Shiite Muslims (who probably possessed an unacknowledged plurality all along) were accorded the office of speaker of parliament. Other cabinet posts were carefully reserved, one by one, for various ethnic or religious groups in the country—the Druze, the Greek Orthodox, the Armenians, and others. Parliamentary positions were similarly reserved with careful apportionment of seats in accordance with ethnic and religious proportionality (although this was based on spurious census figures). Voters cast ballots only for candidates within their own religious/ethnic group.

This system was notorious for its incompetence, inefficiency, and cynicism. Its moribund character was propped up only by Lebanese entrepreneurial instincts and skills. The country's exquisite political balancing act ultimately collapsed in 1975 when Lebanon was dragged into the struggle between other Arab states and Israel.

I certainly do not foresee ethnic or religious war in the United States. The model of Lebanon is presently farfetched, but it suggests the logic of future direction if we are not careful. The 1990 Kennedy-Hawkins Bill in Congress has raised explicit concepts of quotas in private hiring. Dianne Feinstein, an otherwise thoughtful and sensible politician, ran unsuccessfully for governor of California in 1990 on a platform openly calling for quotas, based explicitly on state population census figures, in accordance with which all state jobs were to be allocated. Washington, DC, now implicitly assumes that its mayor

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"must" be black. If a city is predominantly Hispanic, should its mayor be Hispanic? May not a Jew represent black interests in a state? May not a black represent white interests in a city?

The House of Representatives is already designed to reflect the proportional interests of different regions, urban and rural. Should not the House ultimately come to reflect the racial, gender, and religious diversity of America—by the numbers? And what of the White House? Will it eventually go to a different ethnic group every four years on a rotating basis? We already hear talk that we "have not yet had" a Jewish, black, Hispanic, or female president. The logic of Lebanonization is not all that far a jump from some of its seeds in today's reality.

The Soviet Model and Us

THE SOVIET Union and the United States represent drastically opposed versions of a multi-ethnic federation. Immigrants to America did not settle in special areas: there are no ethnic Polish, Irish, or Chinese "autonomous regions." To be sure, there is ethnicity: Pennsylvania Dutch country, the Czech towns of Nebraska, the Cajun and black cultures of New Orleans, the Mexican character of the Southwest, the Scandinavian character of parts of Minnesota. Our great cities still offer Chinese, Japanese, Jewish, Korean, Italian, Armenian, Cuban, Puerto Rican, Russian, Iranian, and Polish enclaves. But these are enclaves of choice, and are constantly breaking down as ethnic elements assimilate and move out into the more general melting pot that has long given up specific ethnic character.

In the Russian Empire—and later, the Soviet Union—on the other hand, normal behavior was for indigenous ethnic groups to stay in their own regions and to discourage the arrival of outsiders into these regions. The only significant exceptions were those ordained by the central government, as when Russian workers and peasants were sent in force into non-Russian regions, both to increase the workforce and to Russianize the region. A reverse process is now underway—the de facto "purification" or ethnic homogenization of national republics as Russians and other minorities are being intimidated by native nationalists into departing for Russia proper. "Russians go home!" is now the cry across most of the ethnic regions of the Soviet Union. An equivalent cry of "Americans go home!" in any part of the United States is inconceivable, except from the justifiably aggrieved Native Americans.

But things may be changing. While Hispanic immigrants (themselves from an astonishing variety of countries) have moved to many parts of the country, there is a growing concentration of the Spanish-speaking population—mainly Mexican—in the Southwest, especially in Southern California and Texas. This ethnic concentration is not surprising; those states represent virtually our only land border with a country of another language. The object of concern is not the growth of immigrants in the U.S., for this is a dynamic factor in American life, whatever its temporary problems are. What is disturbing is the unique coincidence of Hispanic ethnicity with specific regional territoriality and with an ideology of multiculturalism. We may be building toward the one thing that will choke the melting pot: an ethnic area and grouping so concentrated that it will not wish, or need, to undergo assimilation into the mainstream of American multi-ethnic English-speaking life. If we are not careful we may be in the long-term process of moving toward a version of the Soviet model—of building a "Mexican Autonomous Republic."

In addition to quotas, a second assault against the American idea and its values lies in the misguided ideals of bilingual education. The roots of the bilingual fiasco are many. First, there is the concern that ethnic minorities not fall into the permanent underclass, hence the idea of educating them in their own language. Second, there is the idea that bilingual education might correct an insufficient knowledge of foreign languages in

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America. Third, there is an unspoken political agenda. In the developing "quota sweepstakes" of the future, ethnic power will count for a lot; hence there is a desire to preserve ethnic blocs in which bilingual educational programs are a powerful symbol. Already there is a huge bureaucracy of teachers and translators who have vested bureaucratic interests in perpetuating the program.

To those who speak of the value of foreign languages in American life and education, I should point out that I am a true believer (I am, in fact, the author of a book entitled *How to Learn a Foreign Language*). But the language of America is English. It most likely always will be, for there is no other language to challenge it domestically. English is now the world's most prevalent international language as well. Anything that hinders an immigrant's practical mastery of English, especially in primary school, represents damage to that person's future economic and professional viability in America. Basic education must be solely in English and the acquisition of English mastery must be established as a prime goal for the immigrant.

The Future of America

THE CRITICAL imponderable for the future of American ethnicity is the degree to which we will move toward a Lebanese or even a Soviet model of potential territorial ethnicity. We are beginning to see a trend where ethnic communities, even those scattered over the country, seek ethnic "rights" from the government inasmuch as it has deemed the black community deserving of them. If the modern era is characterized by a growing search for identity in an increasingly large, impersonal, homogenized world, ethnicity will continue to rise.

We in America need to be exceptionally mindful of these current trends in ethnicity and the dangers of creating new ethnic—or, worse, regional—enclaves, for that will spell the end of a melting pot that is unique in the world, and one perhaps already ceasing to be stirred. It will mark the distortion of democracy into entirely new channels of sharply competing ethnic interests. While it will not mean the end of democracy per se, it will foreshadow the end of democracy as it has historically existed in America, and with it, the end of a critically important national consensus, our gyroscope of secure national existence for two centuries.

It is hard to imagine that America will be unable to rise to the occasion over the longer run. Increasing immigration into the country will continue to provide a wealth of much of the world's talent. Where will the restless, the ambitious, and the talented go, if not to America? Surely Japan, for all its skills, does not beckon and does not welcome; it is incapable of absorbing vast foreign influxes and providing the framework of freedom, opportunity, and social fluidity that could enable outsiders to succeed. The new Europe offers only small opportunity. European societies are small, crowded, and still very ethnocentric, not necessarily welcoming an influx of foreign talent.

It is America, with all its faults, that is better equipped than any other country to provide the ultimate multi-ethnic model for the world. That is why it is so important—and so dismaying—that we, too, seem to be entering a new phase, one apparently far more resistant to the historic process of ethnic amalgamation than before. Are we to remain a model, or will we too succumb, sacrificing the traditional freedom and vitality of our culture for the rigidities of the new egalitarian state, run by the numbers?□

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Comrades in Arms

The Case for a Russian-American Defense Community

Fred Charles Iklé

THE STRATEGIC relationship now emerging between the United States and Russia opens a new chapter in world history. During most of this century, these two great nations could change their relationship only incrementally, if at all. But since last August, their relations have entered a period of unique malleability, one that offers an epochal opportunity for creative statesmanship.[1]

By far the most promising initiative now would be to inaugurate an American-Russian Defense Community, designed as an evolving program of cooperation that would build progressively closer links between the military establishments of the two sides. Such a relationship with the main heir to Soviet military power would greatly enhance America's security in the coming era, when weapons of mass destruction will spread throughout the world.

As America's foreign policy experts look to the future, they understandably draw on the ideas that served us so well in the recent past. The broad consensus that has emerged on the key goals for the post-Cold War world is constructed entirely out of Cold War concepts. These goals are: to preserve NATO and the alliance with Japan, to continue the policy of peace through nuclear strength, to maintain the "stability" of mutual deterrence, and to redouble our efforts against weapons proliferation. Some want to add a bit of fresh garnish to this platter of old leftovers by postulating an expanded role for the UN Security Council (henceforth supposed to be untrammelled by vetoes). Others draw comfort from the notion that if something like a Stalinist Soviet Union should re-emerge, we could always reconstitute our forces and man the old ramparts again.

Justifiably, warnings of what might go wrong are plenty. From Minsk to Vladivostok, democratic reform is incomplete, the new political structures are fragile, the economy is deteriorating from bad to worse. Attempts might be launched sooner or later to revert to the evil ways of the past. The widespread anxiety about such hazards is now focused on the near term—getting through the Russian winter, avoiding total economic collapse, preventing civil wars among former Soviet republics, and precluding any kind of misuse or accident among the

Fred Charles Iklé was undersecretary of defense for policy in the Reagan administration and is currently a Distinguished Scholar at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.

[1] I am referring here to "Russia" in part because that is the pre–1917 name for the nation that stretched from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea; in part because the Russian Republic, either by itself or in combination with a few other former Soviet republics, will be the most important successor state of the USSR.

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thousands of nuclear weapons. To be sure, traversing the near term is a necessary condition for reaching a better future. But it is not sufficient.

President Bush has moved quickly and prudently to cope with the enormous upheaval in the former Soviet Union, to contain its risks, and to pursue new opportunities. His nuclear initiative in September, in particular, not only reduces present dangers, but opens highly promising avenues for fundamental long-term improvement. The basic transformation of the American-Russian relationship that is so essential for our security, however, cannot be completed within a year or two. Seventy years of Bolshevism and forty years of Cold War have left a hazardous legacy in both East and West—a spiritual, intellectual, and material pollution that will require a purposeful effort over many years to be rendered harmless. The old poisons could become virulent again, like an infectious disease that has lain dormant for a long time.

Danger Signs

LIKE NO other dimension of the emerging American-Russian relationship, the military interaction will remain heavily burdened by the Cold War legacy. On both sides, old habits of the mind, reinforced by old bureaucratic practices, will subtly influence new strategic concepts and new war plans. Throughout the Northern Hemisphere, thousands of military artifacts will remain—armaments, electronic installations, air bases, naval ports, laboratories—that will invest the Cold War apparitions with tangible reality made of hard metal and reinforced cement. Amidst the detritus of the Soviet Union, the Russian Republic is inheriting vast arsenals, huge military forces, and an enormous (although presently crippled) military-industrial complex.

Given this context, we should seek to anticipate how things might go wrong in the evolving military relationship between America and Russia. At first brush, we may find it reassuring to see how military officers from both sides get along with each other. The military harbors less animosity toward its former Cold War adversary than other population groups do. American military leaders are eager to develop cordial and cooperative relations with their Soviet counterparts; to speak to them "as a friend—no longer as an enemy," as General Colin Powell recently told a group of visiting Soviet officers. And the Soviet military has shown that they reciprocate this sentiment.

Underneath this new comity, however, a dangerous dynamic threatens to push America and Russia into a new military confrontation. One way in which this dynamic works is through the growing military strength of other nations that are seen as potential adversaries by Washington or Moscow, and hence as compelling the United States, or Russia, to acquire compensating military strength. For example, many Americans are cautioning against further reductions in the U.S. defense budget, for fear that American forces might not be strong enough later this decade to defeat "another Iraq." Similarly, Russia's new military leaders anticipate that their nation will have to be armed against ever more sophisticated weaponry among (unnamed) nations to the south, and perhaps even against independent armies that are being established by some of the other former Soviet republics. Strategic planners both in America and Russia will surely want to see their own nation's military technology stay well ahead of these potentially threatening new powers.

Alas, with such efforts to arm against emerging "Third World" military threats, America and Russia will stumble into new kinds of arms competition between each other, covering a wide range of weapons developments. And the international arms trade will add fuel to this fire. Because of sharply declining defense budgets at home, arms manufacturers in the United States, Western Europe, and the former Soviet Union are all anxious now to find new markets. The few importers in this buyers' market who are still solvent can demand some of

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the best and latest technologies. It will not take long for nations acquiring such advanced armaments to be seen—either by Washington or Moscow—as new military threats.

The dynamic that levers America and Russia toward a new military confrontation also includes tensions created by secret and possibly illicit weapons developments. In spite of glasnost, the political transformation in Moscow, and the verification arrangements of recent arms accords, the battle between openness and secrecy is far from over—not only in the Soviet military establishment that is being inherited by Russia and other republics, but in the U.S. military as well.

When the detailed verification provisions of START were finally being settled, it was the American negotiators more often than the Soviet ones who insisted on limiting access for the other side's inspectors. Indeed, protecting the secrecy of certain military technologies had a higher priority for the United States than enlarging the agreed scope for verification. For example, the United States sought to protect technological secrets of its radar-evading "stealth" aircraft.

For the Soviet military, shielding its latest technology from American "espionage" may be less important than keeping other kinds of secrets. Quite likely, the Soviet military establishment still keeps some ugly skeletons in its closet. When former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze admitted that the Krasnoyarsk radar station in Siberia violated the ABM Treaty, Soviet military officers still sought to deny culpability. And the story has yet to come out, it seems, on violations of the treaty banning biological weapons.

The old penchant of the Soviet military for pushing to the very edge of what arms agreements allow—and sometimes well beyond—may not have been entirely eradicated by the democratic revolution. Besides, the complexities and ambiguities of recent arms agreements will provide ample opportunity for hard-to-prove cheating. In this environment, the cloak of secrecy will do double duty for the self-styled "patriots" in Moscow. It will shield them from American arms control monitors as well as from budget-conscious economists in their own government. Indeed, in the coming years, some Soviet officers and managers of arms industries may seek to perpetuate old practices of secrecy, not as protection from potential foreign enemies, but to keep their parliament and public in the dark about the burden that their military continues to impose on the nation's economy.

Tensions caused by military secrecy could mar American-Russian relations in many ways. On both sides, it is safe to predict, bureaucracies will show great zest and ingenuity in creating confrontational issues about "espionage" and "cheating." Secrecy is a customary companion of military research projects. And it is to be expected that both the American and Russian military establishments will continue to conduct certain research projects whose purpose, at least in part, will be to stay ahead of the former Cold War adversary.

Nuclear Gridlock

AMONG Americans associated with nuclear weapons research, there is nearly unanimous conviction that the United States must continue to test nuclear weapons, regardless of what happens to nuclear testing in the former Soviet Union. Since the 1950s, Moscow has favored a ban on all nuclear testing, while Washington's position has shifted back and forth between reluctantly considering such a ban and opposing it outright. In prior decades, the American reluctance was due, in part, to the fear that the Soviet Union could easily cheat in ways that would not yield sufficiently unambiguous evidence. Today, the Soviet nuclear weapons establishment is under political pressure not to resume testing for environmental reasons. Should current differences on nuclear testing between Washington and Moscow persist for several years, those in Moscow who want arms spending again to increase will argue that one-sided nuclear

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testing by the United States is beginning to undermine the Soviet nuclear deterrent.

The hoary dispute about nuclear testing is merely a skirmish in a larger battle—the emancipation of nuclear strategy from Cold War thinking. The warp and woof of nearly all strategic thought—not only in the United States and the former Soviet Union, but also in France and Great Britain—remains the East-West enmity of the last forty years. And this strategic thought remains locked into place in each of these countries by their equally dated nuclear arsenals.

To be sure, we have heard some good news lately. President Bush decided in September to withdraw most of America's so-called "theater" nuclear weapons, and President Gorbachev agreed to reciprocate. In one fell swoop, a large artifact in the Cold War museum of nuclear horrors is thus to be dismantled.

What was the purpose of this artifact? The story reaches back to the early 1950s, when the United States began to deploy theater nuclear weapons for two reasons: as a means of nuclear retaliation less massive than the strategic bomber force, and to give the U.S. Army—which was jealous of the Navy's and the Air Force's nuclear missions—its own nuclear arms. To keep a long story short, since the late 1950s, the various rationales for these weapons have disappeared one by one. In particular, the principal target for American theater nuclear weapons—the Red Army—has gone home.

As these changes occurred, those who believed strongly in the merits of theater nuclear weapons reached for a metaphysical rationale: that nuclear weapons based forward on the territory that might be attacked would provide a more credible deterrent than weapons based in the rear. Here is a reminder that military doctrine based on disconfirmed beliefs can survive for decades.

This brings us to the bad news about the role of nuclear strategy in the emerging American-Russian relationship. Even though theater nuclear weapons will cease to burden this relationship, a Cold War gridlock still persists for "strategic" nuclear weapons—the thousands of nuclear arms on missiles and bombers of intercontinental reach.

During the last four decades each superpower built an enormously elaborate apparatus capable of totally destroying the other and designed so that this cataclysm could be irrevocably unleashed within minutes—on purpose, or (perhaps) by accident. The risk that this supposedly stable system might end in the superpowers' mutual suicide has not yet been eliminated. While the combination locks on nuclear weapons that many people now confidently promote might ameliorate this risk, they cannot eliminate it. A safeguard system relying on codes that would instantly have to be passed to thousands of command posts needs to be renewed and tested from time to time. (The Chernobyl reactor *did* have safeguards; it exploded because of a mismanaged test of its safeguard system!)

The dangers inherent in this nuclear legacy will continue to create new tensions in the American-Russian relationship. Whenever one side modernizes elements of its strategic forces, the other side will find reason to worry. Military staffs on each side will continue to perform calculations to estimate whether the Other Side (who used to be The Enemy) could somehow launch a first strike without having to fear massive and certain retaliation. On each side, estimates will also be prepared on the number of minutes within which the retaliatory strike would have to be launched before the codes to unlock nuclear weapons could no longer be transmitted to the missile and bomber crews. Such Cold War imagery is likely to persist, like a genetic defect, long after the conflict itself has ended.

Woe and Wickedness

THREATS from third nations, competition in military research, and contradictions in nuclear strategy all have the potential to ratchet the United States and Russia toward a new enmity. To make matters worse, as these pressures and tensions do their work, they will be exacerbated on occa-

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sion by accidents, mistakes, or mischief—the woeful triplets that always intrude into human affairs.

A future dispute between Washington and Moscow about some secret military research project, for example, might suddenly become inflamed because of an accident that, to Americans, looked like a hostile act planned in Moscow at the highest level—the Soviet shooting-down of a Korean airliner in 1983 comes to mind. Disagreements about a new arms program (ostensibly directed against third country threats) might be aggravated by incidents involving "spies" and denial of legitimate access for arms control inspectors. Such incidents, perhaps started by junior officers, could well be magnified by mistakes higher up in the decision chain.

To make matters worse, scattered amidst all these combustible tensions between Moscow and Washington will be plenty of mischief-makers. Like smoldering embers, Bolshevik hatred of the West will linger on in the minds of many senior officials in Russia. In all the former Soviet republics, the older generation had to spend its formative years in a din of anti-Western locutions, distortions, and lies. One recalls that several years after glasnost had swept such old-think aside, then KGB Chief Kryuchkov and Prime Minister Pavlov still gave speeches bristling with hostility toward the West. Although these two men are facing trial as leaders of the August coup, years from now like-minded Bolsheviks might again—or still—occupy positions of influence in the lands that Stalin ruled.

In 1920, Lenin asserted that "the real basis of contemporary international politics is the coalition of all powerful capitalist countries of the world against Soviet Russia"; and Stalin in 1925 foreshadowed the Cold War era by declaring that "the world is now divided into two camps." Two camps—"us" and "them"—who will destroy whom? Paint these old fighting words with lush new colors of Russian nationalism, omit that tedious Marxist theorizing, and you have the core of a new ideology for Russia's unreconstructed Bolsheviks to rally throngs of discontented youths—that essential ingredient for a political mass movement.

If, sometime during this decade, such a political movement were to become influential in Russia or to gain controlling power, much of the enormous Soviet military establishment would still exist. It will take many years and strong political leadership (both in short supply) to transform a major part of the gigantic Soviet arms industries into genuine civilian enterprises, to deactivate substantial military forces, and to dismantle excess armaments, bases, and military infrastructure. The American-Russian military relationship would therefore have a decisive influence—for better or for worse—if a reactionary political movement in Russia sought to stir up tensions with the United States. Unless most of the Cold War legacy had been cleared away in the meantime, a new Bolshevik-nationalist-fascist movement could readily gain ardent support throughout the Russian military establishment. A long list of growing American "threats" could easily be compiled: continued U.S. nuclear tests, undiminished U.S. naval superiority, expanded deployment of the "stealth" and precision technologies that won the Gulf War, and the survival of NATO and of most U.S. bases that are "encircling" Russia even though the Warsaw Pact has been abolished.

A Gathering Storm

ONE RECALLS that after the First World War, Germany became a democratic nation free of its imperial burdens. During its first four years, to be sure, the new Weimar Republic had a troubled time. It suffered a string of disasters—a Communist putsch, a Nazi putsch, hyperinflation, food riots—the kind of tribulations that people in Moscow are now worried about. During the following five years, however, Germany enjoyed stable democratic government, vigorous economic growth, minimal unemployment, friendly relations with all its neighbors, and a burst of extraordinary cultural creativity. Europe and the world

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seemed at peace. Suddenly, the Great Depression and its wave of massive unemployment tilted the political forces in Germany (and in Japan as well) in favor of an ideology of violence and expansion.

Yet Adolf Hitler could not have consolidated his power, much less launched his sweeping territorial conquests a mere seven years later, had the German military establishment not been so willing and so well prepared to revert to a policy of imperial expansion. Throughout the seemingly peaceful Weimar years, the German military, stuck in their 1914 mentality, saw the world as divided into two camps—and readied themselves accordingly.

History, of course, will not repeat itself—not exactly. And every lesson from history can be contradicted with another one. Should we heed today the lessons from the 1920s, or the lessons from the 1930s? Were France and Great Britain too slow in the 1920s in weaving closer ties with Weimar Germany, especially with its military? Or were they too slow in rearming themselves in the 1930s? If again "the Russians are coming," how should the United States respond?

The Pentagon's answer today is "reconstitution," by which is meant the rebuilding and refurbishing of America's armed forces. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney has rightly emphasized that such a rearmament effort would entail building "wholly new forces" whose equipment and weaponry would have to be developed long in advance. Much of the equipment that played a crucial role in the American victory over Iraq, Cheney pointed out, "was developed 20 or 30 years ago." Unless the Pentagon keeps funding a wide range of research and development projects, the United States will be ill prepared to rebuild its military strength if it had to meet a global crisis in the future.

In this age of turmoil throughout vast reaches of Eurasia, to maintain a capacity for reconstituting military strength is prudent. But to rely on this capacity as the main guardian of America's security and world peace would be reckless. If the storm should gather again, a rearmament program would not offer a safe haven to which the United States could comfortably retreat.

A policy of rearming would have to gain the cooperation of allies, be guided by agreed strategic concepts, and be supported by the American people. Questions regarding nuclear arms and nuclear strategy would arise at the outset. Conflicting ideas about a policy of nuclear deterrence—which originally emerged gradually during the Cold War and hence rarely stirred up public anxiety—would be hurled into the political arena. Some would want to rely mainly on new defensive technologies, others would want to reconstruct a stable balance between offensive forces; some would want to rearm full speed and without any restraints, others would want to negotiate new arms agreements.

Such discord would revive the profound—and justified—fear of nuclear destruction that has lain dormant since the worst years of the Cold War. Washington's political climate would very likely resemble the Vietnam years during the Johnson and Nixon administrations, rather than the Truman and Eisenhower years when the policies of containment and peace-through-strength could be so successfully launched and promoted with substantial consensual support. The nation's resoluteness and confidence would be sapped by recriminations. Americans and their remaining allies would ask how the victory of democracy that ended the Cold War could have been so foolishly squandered. They would blame their leaders for having failed to build an enduring peace with Russia after the attempted coup, during those few years of great opportunity.

Enough of this nightmare! Our opportunity is not yet lost.

The Problem is the Solution

IN 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics expired, and the autopsy revealed that it died of three chronic illnesses. Most visible in the last few months was its death by terminal imperialism. The world's

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last empire could no longer hold its independent-minded nationalities together. The second chronic illness was communism. As the world's first "socialist" state, the USSR was afflicted for over seventy years—longer than any other country—with the economic inefficiency, political stultification, and human cruelty of the communist system of government. The third cause of the USSR's demise was militarism. No other industrialized state in the world has for so long spent so much of its national wealth on armaments and military forces. Soviet militarism, in harness with communism, destroyed the Soviet economy and thus hastened the self-destruction of the Soviet Empire.

Of the Soviet Union's three mortal illnesses, militarism poses the greatest danger of being passed on to the successor states; not because Russians (and Ukrainians, etc.) are a particularly militaristic people, but because militarism has become so entrenched in society. Both figuratively and literally it is cemented into the landscape.

The American-Russian military relationship, therefore, presents the greatest challenge for statesmanship. By contrast, economic relations will have much less sway, either to hurt or to help. To help, American economic assistance can play only a small role, since conditions on both sides preclude "another Marshall Plan." To hurt, economic relations are too crushingly one-sided. We need not fear the day when "Russia-bashers" in Congress accuse Russia of flooding the American market with automobiles or computers. The main economic controversy will be about Russia's debt, while lesser trade conflicts might arise as they do with Brazil, India, and other nations.

Similarly, diplomatic relations by themselves are unlikely to cause a new enmity. Mistakes in diplomacy could bring a new Cold War only if accompanied, or followed, by moves in the military sphere—such as Russian security guarantees or arms shipments to an aggressor nation, Russian covert military assistance to terrorists or troublemakers, hints from Moscow of nuclear blackmail, or an outright attack by Russian forces on another nation.

While the military interaction between America and Russia in the coming years is pregnant with danger, paradoxically it also offers the most promising opportunity for building a solid structure of peaceful cooperation. The new, friendly links between Washington and Moscow are still fragile, without roots in the two governments and overly dependent on changing personnel in positions of leadership. For improved relations to become enduring, they must be anchored in institutions that are endowed with steadiness, influence, and continuity. On the Russian side, only the military institutions can currently meet this requirement. The Foreign Ministry in Moscow lacks power and permanence (which Foreign Ministry, anyhow, the Soviet or the Russian one?), and the trade and financial institutions for the post-communist market economy have yet to emerge from the vortex of change.

Proposals for joint activities and common structures between the American and the Russian military establishments do not have to sail against the wind these days. President Bush, on September 27, proposed to Moscow cooperation on storage, transportation, and destruction of nuclear warheads, and discussions on nuclear command and control arrangements. He also foreshadowed proposals for cooperation on early warning against ballistic missiles. President Gorbachev generally endorsed these ideas and mentioned specifically creating a joint system "to avert" nuclear missile attacks. Senior members of Congress have recommended a joint program for destroying nuclear, chemical, and other weapons, and U.S. assistance on converting Soviet arms plants to civilian production. Representatives from Soviet military industries have approached American government officials and business executives for joint ventures to facilitate such conversion. Representatives from the Soviet space program are exploring cooperation with the U.S. strategic defense initiative. And so on.

In the present atmosphere of good will

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between the two militaries there is no lack of ideas for joint projects. Lacking is a sense of direction—or, more to the point, a sense of destination. Without an agreed destination, all these joint projects will merely provide occasions for good fellowship between American and Russian military people. Without institutional links animated by a common purpose, these fraternal relations offer scant protection against a new enmity. One is reminded of those yellowed photographs from around 1910, depicting German and French, Russian and Austrian generals enjoying lavish picnics together while watching through binoculars their splendidly dressed troops executing a joint maneuver—the better to kill each other in the First World War.

Toward A Defense Community

A CLEAR and ambitious destination should guide the United States and the new Russia in shaping their military relationship. The common goal should be to eradicate the adversarial confrontation throughout the two military establishments. This endeavor will take many years, moving forward step by step through changes in the deployment of forces, their armaments, their exercises and training, and in each side's preparation for war. Great strides have already been made; most significantly, the dismantling of the military confrontation in the center of Europe and, recently, the reductions on both sides in nuclear forces that are kept on alert.

To describe the destination of the evolving military relationship as a "defense community" serves to evoke a useful analogy with the "economic communities" that began to link former enemies in Europe forty years ago, starting with the Coal and Steel Community launched in May 1950 to promote lasting reconciliation between France and Germany. The analogy, of course, must not be pushed too far; and like all enterprises that seek to shape international affairs, the attempt to create an American-Russian defense community might fail.

Failure, though, is more likely for a policy that would cling to the tried and old. Denied a constructive long-term goal, such a policy would lack the calendar to force a process of step-by-step improvement. America and Russia, in their security relationship, would sail ahead without a compass, bobbing and weaving between partnership and confrontation, anxiously focused on some quivering balance of armaments, forever undecided whether to live with each other as friend or foe.

The nuclear arsenals on both sides will provide the lever and the fulcrum to create a defense community. On nuclear arms, Washington and Moscow are accustomed to the idea of cooperation, and America's allies favor, or at least do not oppose, such cooperation. Prudent policy-makers will continue to be burdened with the threat to national survival that lurks behind the continuing "balance of terror." And from time to time, incidents will occur to stir up public anxiety about nuclear war.

The idea that some day, somehow, this latent threat of massive nuclear destruction should be "abolished" is neither new nor the brainchild only of pacifists and left-wingers. When the nuclear age was only nine years old and proliferation had not yet started, even a realist like John Foster Dulles could speak of "nuclear abolition" as at least a distant possibility.[2] Today, in a literal sense, abolition appears to have become impossible. But the political transformation in Moscow has now opened the door to other solutions—although it may not stay open for long. While the United States and Russia cannot abolish nu-

[2]In 1954, Dulles conveyed to President Eisenhower the thought that even if the United States could break up the Soviet control over Eastern Europe and China, "this in itself would not actually touch the heart of the problem: Soviet Atomic plenty." Secretary of State Dulles mused that the only real solution might be "nuclear abolition." John Lewis Gaddis, "The Unexpected John Foster Dulles" in *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*, Richard H. Immerman, ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), p. 55.

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clear weapons, they can overcome their nuclear confrontation; and in doing so, they will go a long way toward establishing a defense community.

Too much has been made of reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, and not enough of the need to reduce the adversarial postures of the strategic forces on both sides. Without a fundamental change in these postures, even the most drastic reductions in the number of weapons would still leave America and Russia in a potentially mortal confrontation. Senior defense officials correctly keep reminding us that Soviet missiles could destroy our nation in thirty minutes. This would still be true if the 4900 nuclear missile warheads permitted by START were halved or even reduced tenfold.

To overcome this confrontation, both sides must abolish the hair-trigger launch procedures of their strategic forces and abandon their constant readiness to unleash nuclear cataclysm. Presidents Bush and Gorbachev have now agreed to take a fraction of their missile forces off alert status, a step decidedly in the right direction. Much more can and must be done. Reductions in alert status already begun can be expanded. Both sides could implement a series of specific measures, in a coordinated fashion, that would make large-scale nuclear attack impossible—short of a clearly verifiable remobilization that would take weeks or months to carry out. The joint warning system suggested by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev would complement such measures. A welcome byproduct of reducing the readiness of strategic forces will be the added protection from civil disturbances in the former Soviet Union that might endanger deployed nuclear weapons.

Nuclear planners schooled in Cold War theories will reject as heresy a nuclear strategy that would be without its thousands of missiles, primed to retaliate instantly against an enemy first strike. The American-Russian defense community, by bringing about a wide-range of military reforms, will make the abolition of the nuclear confrontation both safe and psychologically acceptable. At the end of this road, the remaining, restructured nuclear forces of the United States and Russia will coexist side by side—much like the French and British nuclear forces—without the adversarial concern about the "stability" of mutual deterrence. Are any French generals worried whether their nuclear forces are up to the task of deterring perfidious Albion from launching a first strike against France?

In harmony with this strategic transformation, an old, contentious issue between Washington and Moscow will quietly fade away—NATO's doctrine of using nuclear weapons first to stem a conventional attack by the Warsaw Pact. As the American nuclear advantage kept shrinking, this doctrine kept losing credibility; as the Warsaw Pact collapsed, it lost its purpose; and now, as theater nuclear weapons are being withdrawn, it is losing its chosen instrument.

Instead of the vanished Cold War issue of "first use," the United States, its allies, and Russia will together have to cope with a different and growing problem of first use stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If a "future Iraq" used poison gas or biological weapons against an international peace-keeping coalition, should the United States and Russia respond with a nuclear strike? The answer might not be easy. On the one hand, any use of weapons of mass destruction by some tyrant ought to be deterred; on the other hand, the tradition of not using nuclear weapons since 1945 is of immense value for democratic nations.[3]

THE SCOPE of a defense community linking America and Russia should not be confined to bilateral nuclear issues and to issues raised by the global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The community must also serve to develop a constructive relationship between the conventional forces of both sides. To

[3]This problem has already raised its ugly head during the Gulf War. See McGeorge Bundy, "Nuclear Weapons and the Gulf," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1991).

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this end, continued progress in reducing military secrecy is essential, and progress here can have mutually reinforcing benefits. If the two nations no longer see each other as potential enemies, the need for military secrecy between them could nearly vanish; and if military secrecy between them is nearly eliminated, they will have removed a key source of military tension that could cause a new enmity.

A particularly inspiring purpose of the defense community, both for Americans and for the new democratic forces in Russia, is the promotion of democratic practices and traditions for civilian control of the military. These days, such an effort will find open doors in Russia. Most of the military officers now in charge there want their nation to become a modern state with stable civilian control of the armed forces, and the political authorities in Moscow today, of course, share this objective. For the sake of the Russian people, for the sake of world peace, Russia must not become a "giant Burma"—a huge country with a backward civilian economy and a brutal, highly armed military dictatorship.

To construct meaningful institutional links in the military sphere, Washington and Moscow will have to design projects that can benefit from intensive cooperation and, at the same time, are important for the security of both sides. Some of these projects may be temporary (such as the safe disposal of nuclear weapons) and will be followed by new common tasks. Other joint missions will grow in importance and be long-lasting (such as coping with the continuing proliferation of new technologies for mass destruction).

The common military projects that, collectively, will constitute the defense community must not be confused with contrived clusters of bureaucrats, forever in search of a real purpose but always busy with organization charts and acronyms. A sense of urgency in tackling the most dangerous problems will have to be complemented by a sense for organic evolutionary growth. When the European Coal and Steel Community was created, the founders did not seek to establish a common monetary system—it will be forty years later when (and if) such a system materializes.

At this time, four broad missions of the defense community can be identified: First, eliminating the adversarial confrontation of nuclear forces—above all, the hair-trigger posture of these forces. Second, gradually abolishing secrecy between the two military establishments. Third, balancing measures against proliferation with the need to respect the legitimate sovereignty and independence of all nations. Fourth, cultivating responsible civilian control of the Russian military and—in both militaries—a sense of dedication to make the community serve the interests of both nations.

No Hegemony

THE MORE the defense community can promote democratic, civilian control of Russia's military, the less America's allies and friends, in Europe and in Asia, will have to fear an expansionist Muscovite Empire that would again coerce and invade its neighbors. The concept here for a new American-Russian military relationship stands in total contrast to Franklin D. Roosevelt's ill-fated concept for a security relationship with the Soviet Union after World War II. FDR's concept linked up (by necessity) with a Soviet Union that was advancing to conquer other nations, not with a Russia that had recently withdrawn and set other nations free. It was a relationship that floated on air, without any institutional links. It entailed an extreme tightening, not a reduction, in Soviet secrecy, and thus covered up unending Soviet lying. And worst of all, FDR based his attempted new relationship with the Soviet Union on his trust in Stalin's good will.

After the First World War, leading concepts for securing world peace were equally mistaken. The major powers in the 1920s sought, by negotiating several naval treaties, to stabilize a balance in the global strategic

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armaments of that time—the very purpose of the SALT and START agreements of recent years. After much hostile haggling among technical experts, treaties were concluded that incorporated elaborate definitions and restrictions designed to fix parity (and other ratios) in naval armaments. The goal was to keep the military confrontation peaceful, not to keep the peace by overcoming the military confrontation. Hence, the naval staffs continued to see each other as adversaries (even between the United States and Great Britain!). And seeing each other as adversaries, they modernized their navies and planned for war.

As if to put some icing on this crumbling cake, the major powers of the 1920s tried another concept—renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Eleven years and five days before Hitler started World War II, the American Secretary of State Frank Kellogg and his French counterpart, Aristide Briand, signed with plenipotentiaries from Germany and a dozen other major powers the Kellogg-Briand Pact, which has since become an object of ridicule among historians.

By contrast, Jean Monnet's idea for a European economic community provides a historic example of a successful concept. Monnet's main goal was to start building a viable, meaningful institution to link France and Germany—nations that had fought three wars in the span of seventy years—and to let other European nations join. "The life of institutions," wrote Monnet in 1955, "is longer than that of people, and institutions can thus, if they are well constructed, accumulate and transmit the wisdom of successive generations."

After World War II, meaningful links between France and Germany could best be established in the economic sphere; after the Cold War, links between the United States and Russia can best be established in the military sphere. Economically, Russia is a supplicant. By contrast, in a military concordat with the United States, Russia can play a global role constructively. However, the national interests that the two nations could now pursue in common through a defense community remain strictly limited. When Russia's economic relations with the outside world gain in importance, its principal partners are likely to be Germany and Japan, not the United States. It is inconceivable that the United States and Russia would ever be seized by a convergent imperialist frenzy, to form a Washington-Moscow axis for global hegemony.

The purpose of the American-Russian defense community will not only remain limited, it will remain fully supportive of the enduring national interests of America's allies. Russia and America will want to eliminate the risk of global nuclear war—the paramount interest of every nation in the Northern Hemisphere. And their new military relationship will also serve to prevent military developments between them that would either threaten America's allies or Russia's national interests and territory. These purposes cannot be acheived by some vast multilateral conglomerate, such as the CSCE or the UN.

America's Atlantic and Pacific alliances have emerged from the Cold War as viable and valued security structures for the new era, linking old allies as well as enemies that fought each other in World War II. America's and Russia's armed forces have never fought a war against each other; they fought together as allies in two world wars. Their day has come to work together for the sake of both their nations and the world at large.□

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Beyond the Balance of Power

America's Choice in the Middle East

Martin Indyk

WHEN SECRETARY of State James Baker took to the podium on the final day of the Madrid Middle East peace conference and lectured the Arab and Israeli delegations on how to make peace, he was acting out a new role for the United States in the Middle East. The end of the Cold War and the results of the Gulf War have not only anointed the U.S. as the sole superpower, but have also left it the dominant power in the Middle East and the custodian of that region's balance of power.

Washington thus has a choice to make. It can hope for an indefinite continuation of the favorable balance of power in the region to protect its interests. Or it can wield its newfound influence to restructure regional security arrangements and create a new order, based on deterrence of radicalism but with an additional, more ambitious agenda of a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the control of the Middle East arms race, and the promotion of political and economic development in the Arab world.

Why should the United States bother? After all, American interests in this volatile and bloodthirsty region are now well protected. However, the Rube Goldberg character of the present Middle East balance of power system and Washington's past failure to operate it effectively indicate that this is a far from stable arrangement. The national interest would be better served over time if the United States took advantage of the uniquely favorable circumstances that now pertain in the Middle East to restructure the security system.

Martin Indyk is executive director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This article is based on a paper prepared for the Aspen Strategy Group.

The Four Balances

THE BALANCE of power in the Middle East is actually a complex amalgam of four separate but interlocking balances. First, there is the balance between Israel and the Arab states, which the U.S. is committed to maintain in Israel's favor. This is an inherently difficult enterprise because of Israel's small size and limited resources relative to the Arab world. But it is the only way in which Israel can hope to persuade its neighbors that, as it cannot be destroyed, it must be accepted.

A favorable Arab-Israeli balance has traditionally required ensuring that Israel's qualitative military advantages outweighed the permanent quantitative superiority of the Arabs. But Israel's qualitative edge has proven inadequate to the task, unless supported by a favorable inter-Arab balance. In Washington's view, the proper inter-Arab balance of power is one between friendly conservative regimes—Egypt, Jordan, Mo-

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rocco, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller states of the Gulf Cooperation Council—and hostile radical regimes—Iraq, Syria, Libya, and the PLO. However, in the Arab world the balance is determined less by ideological predisposition and more by calculations of a temporary convergence of interests between Arab states engaged in a struggle for primacy (referred to as "leadership of the Arab world") in the case of the strong, and survival (referred to as "Arab unity") in the case of the weak. This gives rise to the phenomenon of seemingly perpetual and rapid realignment—Arab leaders at each other's throats one day, embracing each other the next.

In the case of the stronger Arab powers, the balance has been determined by the triangular struggle for power between Egypt, Iraq, and Syria: at any particular time, the two weaker powers would tend to align against the stronger. The emergence of Saudi Arabia in the 1970s as an oil power made Riyadh a player in this game of Arab power politics too, but its lack of military strength and political weight have tended to render it less influential and more prone to blackmail. Its preference has been to maintain relations with all sides and attempt to mediate the differences.

THE WEAKER Arab states and the PLO have tried to play the stronger powers off each other, but when the balance tipped in favor of one side, they have tended to "bandwagon"—i.e. to side with the stronger Arab power. In the 1950s and 1960s, hostility toward Israel and fidelity to the Palestinian cause became useful devices for playing the game of Arab power politics. The 1967 war was in large part the product of such a bidding contest. The Arabs' disastrous defeat in that war produced a more cautious approach, with Arab leaders being careful to distinguish between rhetorical hostility and actual behavior.

The nature of the inter-Arab struggle for power has created three difficulties for Washington's efforts to maintain a favorable inter-Arab balance. First, we had to manage the problems generated by the fact that our friends would often take positions on opposite sides of the balance (thus Saudi Arabia and Jordan sided with the Syrian and Iraqi "rejectionists," against Egypt, after Sadat made peace with Israel). Second, the U.S. had to cope with persistent efforts by our Arab partners to bring hostile Arab powers into the camp that the U.S. was supporting (thus Egypt and Saudi Arabia tried to persuade America of Iraq's moderation before the invasion of Kuwait, just as they are assuring the U.S. of Syria's moderation now). Finally, the U.S. often failed to distinguish between rhetoric and reality on the issue of Israel and the Palestinians, thinking that Arab states would restrict their relations with America because of our support for Israel, when in fact their main worry was whether the U.S. would support them in their inter-Arab rivalry.

The third balance of power is between the Arab states and Iran, manifested in the Persian Gulf where Iraq and Iran have vied for hegemony. The smaller Arab states of the Gulf, organized in the 1980s in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), traditionally played the role of the balancer of these two powers. In the days of the pro-American Shah, it was possible to use this balance to complement the inter-Arab balance between radicals and conservatives because of the cooperative relations between Iran and the latter powers (Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the GCC). But the rise of a radical, fundamentalist regime under Ayatollah Khomeini created a new threat to the Arab neighborhood and a realignment of Arab states (only Syria sided with Iran), requiring the United States to support an anti-Iranian balance of power, spearheaded by a radical Arab state, Iraq.

The fourth and last balance of power derives from the central balance between the superpowers. Because of the Middle East's strategic importance to both superpowers—it provides the West's oil and was the "soft underbelly" of the Soviet Empire—the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union found intense expression here,

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with Moscow offering military and economic support to radical regional powers that opposed American interests. This superpower rivalry added another deadly challenge to the task of maintaining a favorable balance, both by fuelling a regional arms race and by threatening to tip the balance in favor of the hostile local powers. It also added another layer of complexity for Washington, since the U.S. often found itself driven by this rivalry to support *both* sides of a local balance of power—by simultaneously supplying arms to Israel and its Arab enemies, for example.

The Last Decade

GIVEN THE difficulty of maintaining the balance of power in favor of pro-Western regional powers, the pre-Gulf War decade of the 1980s seemed to bring some unusual and welcome relief. From the perspective of U.S. interests, it was a period of relative stability compared to the turbulence of the previous decade, when the region became known as "the arc of crisis."

In the Arab-Israeli conflict, the balance of power had been secured by the successful implementation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. This removed Egypt—then the largest and militarily most powerful Arab state—from a potential Arab war coalition against Israel and therefore made it impractical for any other Arab state to contemplate such a war. At the same time, Iraq, having launched an invasion of Iran in 1979, was preoccupied throughout the decade with a war for survival against that country. This removed the possibility of an eastern front Arab coalition of Syria, Iraq, and Jordan confronting Israel. Syria attempted in the name of "strategic parity" to build an indigenous military capability that could match Israel's, but by the end of the decade, the effort had all but bankrupted the Syrian economy and Damascus admitted that this objective was unachievable.

Israel's 1982 war in Lebanon demonstrated the stability of these key elements in the Arab-Israeli balance of power. Although Sadat had been assassinated less than a year before, and the war severely strained relations between Israel and the new Mubarak government in Cairo, the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty held. The Syrian air force and air defense system received a thorough drubbing at the hands of the Israeli air force without precipitating Soviet intervention. This quick and effective demonstration of Israeli superiority neutralized the potential for a full-scale war between Syria and Israel.

Meanwhile, the Arab world stood by and watched while the PLO was defeated on the battlefield and then forced to withdraw from Beirut. This marked the beginning of Arab state disengagement from the conflict with Israel, underscored by the Arab League summit in Amman in 1987, when the Palestinian issue did not make it into the final communique. Although the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza launched their *intifada* soon after, the Arab states gave little political and no financial backing to their cause. Jordan disengaged from the West Bank, the Gulf Arabs cut their financial support of the "confrontation" states, and it was left to the PLO to try to convert the uprising into some political gain.

The inter-Arab balance of power was also stabilized in the 1980s. Egypt, treated as a pariah in inter-Arab politics because of its peace treaty with Israel, was able to regain entry to Arab institutions as an ally of the PLO and a supporter of Iraq and Saudi Arabia against Iran. Inter-Arab politics focused on the Arab-Iranian balance, which threatened to tip dangerously in Iran's favor. Here too, however, the balance was eventually corrected with massive financial and logistical backing for Iraq from its fellow Arab states. Despite moments of considerable concern—when Iran seized the Fao Peninsula, threatened Kuwaiti shipping, and attempted to penetrate Saudi air space—the Iraq-Iran War lurched on inconclusively through the decade, with both sides inflicting significant damage on each other but neither being able to prevail.

The superpower balance in the Middle

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East had also stabilized after the tense confrontations of the 1970s. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provided the Reagan administration with the justification for bolstering its regional capabilities. The Rapid Deployment Force was developed along with new strategic relationships with the Gulf Arabs, Oman, Egypt, Morocco, and Israel. In addition to securing arrangements for military intervention in a crisis, the United States was able to contribute to the consolidation of a favorable regional balance of power on all four levels. Strategic cooperation with Israel, as well as continued military assistance, defense procurement from Israeli industries, and joint R&D projects all served as a force-multiplier, significantly enhancing Israel's ability to deter an Arab attack. Although both Shultz and Baker failed to bring Jordan and Palestinians into negotiations with Israel, the festering Palestinian problem was unable to ignite another Arab-Israeli war.

The inter-Arab balance was also favorable. The Reagan administration's failure to stand up to the Syrians in Lebanon might have weakened the Arab states aligned with Washington and strengthened the radicals in the Arab world. However, the radicals were in no position to take advantage of an apparent lack of resolve by the United States: Syria was bogged down in Lebanon and Iraq's energies went into the war with Iran. The American bombing of Libya in 1986 had a notable deterrent effect on the behavior of those Arab states sponsoring terrorism (Syria and Libya).

The United States intervened to ensure that the Arab-Iranian balance did not tip in favor of Iran. The "Iraqi tilt" in the mid-1980s was inspired by concern that Iran might succeed in spreading its revolution to the oil-rich Arabian side of the Gulf. Intelligence sharing, removal of Baghdad from the terrorism list, the extension of agricultural credits, and the shipping of military related equipment to Iraq while attempting to embargo arms supplies to Iran were all designed to bolster Saddam as the Arab bulwark against Iranian fundamentalism. And when Iran began to threaten Kuwait and the Gulf Arab states, the U.S. naval presence in the Gulf was increased in a successful effort to deter Iran from spreading the war beyond Iraq.

By the time of Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985, the Soviet Union had been marginalized in the region: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan increased the incentives for cooperation with the U.S. among the regional powers, the Soviet Union's only allies were Syria and Libya, and ideological and strategic differences constrained its attempt to build a new relationship with Teheran during the war (Teheran supported the *mujaheddin* in Afghanistan and Moscow maintained a military relationship with Iraq). Gorbachev's "new thinking," furthermore, began to shift Soviet support from the forces of extremism to the forces of regional moderation and stability.

In short, by the time George Bush entered the Oval Office, the Middle East posed few threats to American interests. The Iraq-Iran War was coming to an end, the Soviet Union was turning inward and withdrawing from Afghanistan, and the Arab states were disengaging from their conflict with Israel, leaving the Palestinians to negotiate the best deal they could get. The U.S., it was commonly assumed in Washington, could now afford to reduce its naval presence in the Gulf and concentrate on a low profile effort to "cultivate the environment" for Arab-Israeli negotiations. With dramatic events unfolding in Europe, the Middle East was given a lower priority on the Bush administration's foreign policy agenda—and correctly so.

The Iraqi Challenge

IN THE Middle East, calm should never be mistaken for peacefulness; it is usually only the interlude before the next storm. While the secretary of state was worrying about producing Palestinian delegates for negotiations on elections in the West Bank, an Iraqi threat to the Middle East

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balance of power emerged virtually unnoticed by Washington.

A benign balance was destabilized by the very elements that looked so positive for the balance of power: the end of the Iraq-Iran War and the end of the Cold War. The former left revolutionary Iran militarily and economically prostrate. Although the war had devastated Iraq's economy as well, Saddam Hussein controlled by far the largest army in the Middle East—fifty-five well-equipped divisions and a strategic weapons production capability unmatched by any power in the region other than Israel. Rather than demobilize at least part of his army and concentrate on reconstruction at home, Saddam began to settle scores. He dropped chemical bombs on his own Kurdish population, and then paid back Assad for Syria's support of Iran during the war by providing arms to anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon. In April 1990, he began to focus on Israel, boasting of his binary chemical weapons and threatening to "make fire eat up half of Israel, if it tried [to do anything] against Iraq." But his real ambitions were closer to home. As early as February 1990, Saddam demanded that Kuwait cede the strategic island of Bubiyan; by July he was demanding that Kuwait and the UAE change their oil production policies.

Iraq had emerged as the Arab power aspiring to dominance in all three regional balances. This coincided with the end of the Cold War and the consequent reduction of superpower competition for influence in the Middle East, which should have helped to stabilize the overall regional balance. In fact, the end of the Cold War made it easier for Iraq to exert its dominance.

First, the end of the Cold War removed the Soviet threat from Washington's calculus. This had been the organizing principle for American foreign policy since the end of World War II and, especially after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, had provided the strategic rationale for American engagement in the Persian Gulf. With this danger gone, and developments in Europe demanding Washington's attention, there seemed little reason, and less time, to focus on Saddam's threatening behavior. At the same time, the end of the Cold War advantaged Iraq by weakening its regional competitors: Syria had lost its superpower patron and Iran could no longer rely on Soviet aid in rebuilding itself after defeat. Saddam faced no such difficulties. During the war he had significantly reduced Iraq's dependence on the Soviet Union by securing Western arms and technology and by building an indigenous strategic weapons production capability.

THE IMPACT of the end of these two wars then was immediately to destabilize all three regional balances. On the Arab-Israeli front, Iraq's strategic capabilities and Saddam's threats heightened Israel's concerns about the potential for an eastern front coalition between Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, and exacerbated its fears about new efforts by Iraq to acquire nuclear weapons. No Arab leader since Nasser had dared to threaten Israel with destruction. Now Saddam, fresh from victory over "the enemies of God on the eastern front," was raising the banner of pan-Arabism again and promising to liberate Jerusalem.

Saddam's grandiose threats resonated in the Palestinian street and produced a "bandwagoning" effect on Jordan and the PLO. Wedged between his more powerful Israeli, Syrian, and Iraqi neighbors, King Hussein chose to side with the stronger Arab power. Arafat pursued a similar course, transferring the PLO's military headquarters to Baghdad in April 1990 and taking an increasingly belligerent tone toward Israel and the United States. When the Baghdad-backed, Palestine Liberation Front of Abul Abbas launched a terrorist raid on an Israeli beach in May 1990, Arafat was unwilling to salvage his new dialogue with the U.S. by condemning the raid.

Although these developments ratcheted up Arab-Israeli tensions, a favorable Arab-Israeli balance could still be maintained as long as no major Arab power sided with

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Saddam. Here the inter-Arab balance became a critical determinant of the Arab-Israeli equilibrium. Saddam began to press in Arab forums for new pan-Arab security arrangements. In February 1990, he tried to turn the Arab Cooperation Council (the ACC—grouping Iraq, Jordan, and Egypt) into a security alliance; in May he hosted an Arab League summit in Baghdad whose purpose, he declared, was to deal with "pan-Arab security and threats to it." He argued that the end of the Cold War had produced a dangerous situation for Arab nations because the U.S. had been left as the only superpower. In five years, he claimed, Europe and Japan would emerge as balancing powers; in the meantime, the U.S. would seek to dominate the region, dictate the price of oil, and support Israel's usurpation of Palestinian rights. Saddam's answer was for the Arab world to unite behind his leadership in order to balance American power.

Mubarak's Egypt successfully resisted Saddam's efforts to convert the ACC and the Arab League into his instruments. But what really mattered, in terms of the inter-Arab balance, was Syria's choice. If Damascus sided with Baghdad, then the Arab world was bound for war with Israel; if it sided with Cairo, then Saddam's power would be countered. Assad, always a shrewd calculator of power balances, was not willing to be dragged by his arch-rival into a premature war with Israel in which Syria would suffer most. Besides, for the moment Saddam presented more of a threat to his interests in Lebanon than did Israel. For these reasons, in May 1990, Assad traveled to Cairo in a journey that symbolized his realignment with Egypt, the country he had once travelled to Baghdad to ostracize.

SADDAM, out-maneuvered in inter-Arab politics for the time being, still had one option—to have his way with the Gulf Arabs. Only the United States stood in his way. Saddam now adopted a strident anti-Americanism, demanding that the U.S. Navy be withdrawn from the Gulf and accusing the U.S. of manipulating oil prices in a conspiracy to weaken Iraq and the Arab nations. When he discovered that the United States preferred to appease him, he took advantage of what he perceived as weakness. The invasion of Kuwait may have been generated by Saddam's need for revenue and his desire to convert Iraq's dominance in the Gulf into hegemony in the Middle East, but it was also the logical consequence of the Bush administration's failure to balance Saddam's power.

Why was an American administration that prided itself on a realist approach to world affairs so slow to appreciate the destabilizing impact of the end of the Iraq-Iran and Cold wars on the regional balance of power? Part of the explanation lies in an inattention produced by tumultuous events elsewhere. A second factor was the animus felt in Washington toward the Ayatollah's Iran. The accumulated ill-will caused by Iran's fundamentally anti-American behavior and the fact that a previous attempt at rapprochement with Iran produced the Iran-*contra* scandal made a policy based on the rational calculation of the balance of power difficult for an American administration.

A third factor in the Bush administration's miscalculation was the role of America's Arab friends, who repeatedly urged Washington to avoid confrontation and leave Saddam to their mediation and influence. Given its weakness and alignment with Saddam, Jordan's behavior is explicable and should have been interpreted in Washington as a sign that something was seriously wrong with the balance of power, rather than treated as sage advice. Both Egypt's Mubarak and Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, having assumed that they could handle Saddam on their own, now insist that they were deceived by a Jordanian-Iraqi conspiracy—which only means that Washington should not have been listening to them.

Washington did listen because the willingness to accommodate Saddam had become deeply entrenched in American policy. This was probably the single most important fac-

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tor in the failure to react to the shift in the balance of power. Developed in response to the overthrow of the Shah, the Iraqi tilt in U.S. policy took on a life and logic of its own. And as Iran became more threatening, the rationale became more entrenched until it began to replace reality. Even as evidence of Saddam's destabilizing behavior accumulated, the Bush administration preferred, in the words of NSC adviser Brent Scowcroft, to try to "make this guy a reasonably responsible member of the international community."

In the wake of the war, much attention has been focused on the failure of Ambassador April Glaspie to warn Saddam of the consequences of his aggression. But by that time, Saddam had become so accustomed to American willingness to appease him that he probably would not have taken such warnings seriously. Indeed, he did not take the U.S. seriously even when it deployed 500,000 troops and 1,000 combat aircraft to the Gulf.

The Emerging Post-War Balance

AT WAR'S END, the United States dominated the Persian Gulf. U.S. forces occupied southern Iraq and Saddam's war machine was shattered. At that moment, the United States could have laid down the law to Saddam, the Emir of Kuwait, and the King of Saudi Arabia alike, and reshaped the Middle East order in ways that would have had a lasting impact.

That did not happen. There are many reasons for this failure: fear of the Middle East quagmire, the historical impulse to bring the troops home, the absence of an imperialist urge to establish a Pax Americana. But the most important reason was that the national interest, as defined by the president and his advisers, did not require a more ambitious approach. The Bush administration sought to restore the balance of power, not restructure it.

In the short term, and from a strategic perspective, it is difficult to argue with this approach. American interests in the free flow of oil at reasonable prices and in the security of its regional allies and friends have all been secured by the significant diminution of Saddam Hussein's power. In the Persian Gulf, the destruction of much of Iraq's offensive capabilities now matches the destruction of Iran's offensive capabilities in the Iraq-Iran War. For the time being, the balance of power has been re-established in the Gulf at a much lower level of military capability.

Moreover, the U.S. is now in a much better position to hold the balance and counter any new challenges. Having demonstrated the awesome capabilities of its air power and the willingness to use all means necessary to protect American interests, the U.S. now has a much enhanced ability to deter adverse activity by Iraq or Iran. Although coercive diplomacy failed to influence Saddam's behavior during the post-invasion period, it has worked since the war to enforce Iraq's compliance with the terms of the UN cease-fire. A squadron of stealth bombers has become the 1990s equivalent of a gunboat during the heyday of British imperialism. Furthermore, if the United States is assiduous in negotiating new access arrangements with Saudi Arabia and the GCC, America's deterrent capability will be enhanced by removing any hope by a future aggressor that the weaker Gulf states could be intimidated into denying the U.S. access in a new crisis.

The inter-Arab balance has also been stabilized by the radical reduction in Iraq's power. For the time being, Iraq is incapable of playing a role in inter-Arab politics. It is likely to be ostracized and preoccupied with trying to rebuild its power. This leaves the arena to Egypt and Syria, with Saudi Arabia in the role of balancer. These three Arab powers—the largest, the most nationalist, and the richest—were allied in the effort to defeat Saddam. Immediately after the war, there was some expectation that they would form the dominant axis, bolstering regional security arrangements in the Gulf and moving together into peace negotiations with Israel.

Despite an early agreement in principle

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for the maintenance of an Egyptian and Syrian troop presence in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, however, the Gulf Arabs soon developed second thoughts. In particular, the bargain that would have cemented Saudi-Egyptian relations never materialized. Egypt expected to play a new strategic role in the Gulf as protector—with American backing—of the Gulf Arabs, for which it would receive its due in terms of Saudi aid for the ever-ailing Egyptian economy. The Saudis, however, remembered the proxy war fought in Yemen in the 1960s to prevent Nasser gaining a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula and preferred American to Egyptian protection. Moreover, the high cost of the war had forced the Saudis to borrow on the international capital markets for the first time; they did not want to take on responsibility for the Egyptian economy.

This tension in Saudi-Egyptian relations ensured that Cairo would not be able to extend its influence to the Gulf. Nevertheless, in the wake of Saddam's defeat it still left Egypt with considerable room to maneuver. The return of the Arab League headquarters to Cairo in the wake of the war and the election of Egypt's foreign minister as its secretary-general put Egypt back in the formal position of leadership of the Arab world.

BUT THE key to the stability of the postwar inter-Arab balance was Syria. If Syria remained part of the Egyptian-Saudi axis that had been forged to counter Iraq's power, the destructive aspects of inter-Arab rivalry might be kept in check. Conversely, if Syria tried to rally the Arab radicals behind its leadership, eventually a new radical pole would emerge to challenge the status quo again. In theory, a Syrian-led alliance comprising a post-Saddam Iraq whose leadership was influenced by Damascus and a post-Khomeini Iran, could provide an alternative to Egypt's leadership (especially if it received backing from a Soviet Union dominated by the military). In practice, however, the chances for such an alliance were slim in the short term. Saddam's continued survival not only made a Syrian-Iraqi rapprochement impossible, it also ensured the further weakening of Iraq's military capabilities as the allies persisted in gaining control of Saddam's remaining offensive capabilities. With the failure of the August putsch and the break-up of the Soviet Union, Assad could not depend on a Soviet change of course. In these circumstances, remaining in the Saudi-Egyptian camp held the greatest prospect of gain in a postwar era of American dominance.

An even more compelling reason for Syria to remain in the pro-Western camp was the impact of the war on the Arab-Israeli balance of power. The balance had shifted in Israel's favor. Assad had now lost both his superpower patron and the potential to form an eastern front coalition with Iraq against Israel. The only way to balance Israel's strength in the short term was to improve relations with Israel's superpower patron.

If Assad can succeed in building an American stake in Syria, at a minimum he might be able to replace what he lost with the demise of his own patron—a guarantee of superpower intervention to restrain Israel. Beyond that, he might be able to secure continued American acquiescence in his takeover of Lebanon, turn Damascus into the focus of American diplomatic activity, and gain access to Western aid and technology. At best, he might succeed in weakening Israel by driving a wedge between Yitzhak Shamir's right-wing government and a Bush administration that is no longer prepared to give Israel the benefit of the doubt. However, Assad knows that he can only begin to achieve these advantages if he agrees to further engagement in the Arab-Israeli peace process. His apparent willingness to do so, evident in his grudging acceptance of direct negotiations with Israel, should be seen for what it is—a tactical shift brought about by the impact of the defeat of Saddam Hussein on the Arab-Israeli balance of power. Despite this, and because Syrian engagement also opens the door for Palestinian and Jordanian involvement in the peace process, it may yet

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provide the impetus to a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli negotiations.

American efforts to maintain and promote these favorable developments in all three regional arenas will also be boosted by the shift in Soviet policy toward the region. Moscow's willingness to follow our lead in the peace process, though not decisive, can help to convince recalcitrant Arabs that the alternatives to peace negotiations are unpromising because they will no longer attract the support of the Soviet Union. More important, Soviet cooperation in the promotion of arms control arrangements for the region may help prevent a new round of the Middle Eastern arms race with its inevitable emphasis on weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

The war has produced two other positive elements in the regional balance that can help to bolster the favorable trends. The first is the renewed role of Turkey as a factor in the strategic equation. Situated on the borders of Syria, Iraq, and Iran—the region's three radical states—Turkey had previously been reluctant to bring its power to bear. President Ozal's decision to side with the coalition was highly controversial among Turkey's political-military elite and has yet to be vindicated. But Ozal seems determined that Turkey will play a more active and positive role in the region. Enhanced strategic cooperation with Ankara can therefore help to contain Iraq in the short term and may prove useful in countering Iran or Syria should that become necessary.

Similarly, more constructive behavior from Europe and Japan in support of American-led efforts to promote Arab-Israeli negotiations, regional economic development, and arms control arrangements is also evident in the wake of the coalition's success in the war against Saddam. These external powers had previously complicated Washington's strategy by providing alternative sources of arms, aid, and political support: Iraq's strategic weapons systems were built with vital assistance from European and Japanese companies; the PLO gained much of its international credibility from European responsiveness. For the time being, they seem more willing to follow Washington's lead in the peace process and lend their support to arms control efforts.

America's Choice

GIVEN all these circumstances, it is difficult to argue that American strategic interests require the pursuit of more ambitious objectives that run the risk of prolonged engagement and ultimate failure. However, the favorable post-war balance is a snapshot of an ever-changing scene. Saddam is down but not yet out, and is clearly prepared to go to any lengths to retain his nuclear capabilities. He will try to conserve and rebuild his power as quickly as he can. If he succeeds, he will exact his revenge on all those whom he considers responsible for his setbacks. Although his behavior has managed to consolidate international support for strict enforcement of controls on Iraq's strategic facilities, it is no longer possible to have complete confidence in the ability of inspectors to ferret out all his programs. And if the resolve of the international community wanes, Saddam will immediately exploit the opening. The price of Saddam's survival is eternal American vigilance.

While keeping Iraq weak, the U.S. will also have to be watchful of Iran, which could exploit our now obsessive focus on Saddam to rebuild its own position of influence in the Gulf. At the moment, Iran is still in poor shape and recognizes American dominance in its region. Its primary concerns are to rebuild its strength and ensure our departure from the Gulf. It will probably try to achieve these objectives through accommodation, first with the Gulf Arabs, then with Europe and eventually with the U.S. Through this process, the U.S. may be able to defuse the radical impulses of the clerical regime in Teheran, but there is an equal prospect that this policy will fail. The United States would then need to be very wary of an Iraq-Iran rapprochement, on the basis of their common concern to remove the American presence from the

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Gulf. Just as the Reagan and Bush administrations allowed their antagonism toward Iran to blind them to the rising danger of a powerful Iraq, so too is it important to avoid allowing an obsession with Saddam to blind American policy-makers to the dangers of the balance in the Gulf tipping in favor of a revisionist Iran.

A similar lesson applies to dealings with Syria. Assad's desire for better relations with the United States is a direct product of his inferior position in the postwar regional balance of power—just as Iraq turned to the U.S. when it found itself threatened in its war with Iran. If, in the service of Syrian involvement in the peace process, the United States allows Assad to build his power over Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians and drive a wedge between the U.S. and Israel, it will have undermined Israel's deterrent capability and allowed the Arab-Israeli balance of power to become destabilized. In short, American policy toward Syria needs to be based on the recognition that Assad must be contained rather than embraced.

If the U.S. is to remain merely the custodian of the recreated status quo, these kinds of efforts will constantly be required to counter the rise of radical regional powers. The history of U.S. policy toward the region suggests that this is neither an easy task nor one the U.S. is well suited to fulfill.

The current auspicious circumstances are unlikely to last for long—there is simply too much money, too many arms, and too many sources of instability. Moreover, maintaining the Middle East balance of power may well be too complex a task for Washington. As recent history suggests, the interlocking nature of the various balances of power in the region produce competing and contradictory imperatives for U.S. policy. We are also engaged in maintaining a balance in which our friends are preponderant, rather than a balance in which no one power is dominant. This is the only way to maintain stability in a strife-torn region. But the very process itself generates instability because the preponderance of the U.S. and its regional allies inevitably leads others to try to correct the imbalance.

Furthermore, the local parties do not seem to follow or respect the rules of the balance of power game. Kuwait, for example, should have sought American protection long before Saddam invaded, while Egypt and Saudi Arabia lobbied the U.S. to continue appeasing Iraq when they should have been seeking to deter this threatening power. Indeed, the most rudimentary respect for the balance of power should have produced greater prudence by Saddam in challenging the United States and Israel.

The point has often been made, and it has substance, that as a fundamentally liberal superpower, the United States is not well suited to play the game of European-style power politics. Policy is simply too vulnerable to domestic demands, too susceptible to simplistic Arabist notions of the way the Middle East operates, too averse to working with unsavory regimes, too cumbersome to be able to switch sides when the balance shifts, too influenced by competing priorities, and too much subject to an uncertain attention span.

For all these reasons, the success of a balance of power approach on America's part is bound to be short lived if it is not bolstered by a more ambitious effort to encourage the restructuring of the Middle East order. The United States is now in the fortunate position of being able to use its dominance to achieve this higher purpose. The regional powers currently recognize the U.S. as the preponderant power and seek our good graces. All of our friends in the region have been strengthened by the war's outcome; all our enemies have been weakened.

WE FACE a choice. We can preserve our strategic interests by attempting to quarantine the region, or we can undertake a more arduous effort to begin the transformation of the Middle East from a balance of power system to one based more on notions of collective security.

The latter approach generates an ambi-

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tious agenda: the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the control of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, support for greater political participation in Arab states, and encouragement of Arab governments to deal with the basic needs of their constituents. A settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is also essential to that new order, but it should not take precedence in American policy over these other issues on the mistaken assumption that a Palestinian solution alone would remove instability in the region.

Given our dominance in the region and the lack of any alternative for the patronage-hungry regional powers, it will not take too great an effort to set this restructuring underway. The Madrid Middle East peace conference is but the first example of the opportunities for such an approach.

It will, however, require the sustained attention of Washington. This is not so much a question of financial resources—this time it may be possible to persuade Europe and Japan to foot the bill since they will benefit greatly from a new Middle East order. Nor is it necessary for the president to be directly engaged. Secretary of State Baker, as diplomat-in-chief, wields sufficient authority in the new era of American dominance to get the job done with only occassional presidential involvement. But it will require the Bush administration, and its possible successor in 1993, to resist powerful pressures to focus attention solely on domestic issues. It will require a more ambitious agenda for the Middle East than merely settling the question of who rules in Nablus. If this proves beyond our capacity, we should at least be aware of the road not taken—so that some five years from now, when the balance of power in the Middle East is again disrupted, it will be remembered that there was a time when the United States was in a position to restructure the regional order and chose not to do so.□

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The Once and Future Europe

—Anthony Hartley

THE QUESTIONS most often asked about the European Community concern its future. Analysts usually interpret what it is today in the light of what it might, or should be, tomorrow. Yet surely, the approach should be the opposite: a future Europe can only be foreseen if we can identify what the present Europe is. It is deceptive to decide that a European federation is just around the corner and to support this by a selective display of federal characteristics. It is even less justifiable to deduce the coming of European federalism from the need for it. A confusion between aspiration and fact has bedeviled discussion of the European Community's progress and introduced into the argument an illegitimate type of historical inevitability. Yet the destiny of the Community remains problematical—perhaps more so than ten years ago.

Political structures are influenced by their past. Citizens and statesmen are at liberty to reject the solicitations of history, but it still nudges them in one way or another. History has played a part too in the elaboration of the idea of a European Common Market and Community, and, if consulted, can remind us that the central political fact behind the Community—indeed, its proximate cause—has been a Franco-German relationship that has varied over the years as to the motivations of the countries involved and the balance of power between them. The idea of a united Europe was put forward as the solution to a problem created by a secular Franco-German hostility, and behind it lay complex considerations of power. To begin by recalling briefly some aspects of this past is one way into an understanding of what remains an enigmatic enterprise, hardly adequately described in the words of the Treaty of Rome as "ever closer union."

Anthony Hartley, former editor of *Encounter*, is a contributing editor of *The National Interest*.

First Drafts

IN THE nineteenth century the idea of a common market or customs union impressed itself upon Europe as a result of the successful German *Zollverein* (1834). Although this economic re-assembling of Germany's scattered territories was not, so historians tell us, responsible for eventual German political unity—that was the doing of Bismarck and Prussia's capacity to channel the forces of German nationalism—it certainly had political implications. Writing in 1843, Friedrich List, the great German "national" economist, argued that the union would be incomplete as long as Austria (and also Hungary) were not included in it. He saw this economic expansion as serving the migration of German-speaking settlers down the Danube

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valley.[1] List also believed that France's differential tariff system with Belgium was aimed not merely at increasing French exports, but also at the establishment of France's political influence over that country ("to draw Belgium more and more into its net"). Economic power carried with it a hint of political domination. The *Zollverein* may not have been responsible for German political unity, but after 1871 it did appear as the first step toward it.

It is not surprising, therefore, that in the period before the First World War some Germans should have seen a European *Zollverein* as a solution to the constraints on Germany's economic expansion and an alternative to what they saw as an approaching war. Germany's economic problem was that, without a sufficient colonial empire, its potential for industrial expansion was squeezed between the great economic blocs: the British Empire, Russia, and the United States. Wilhelm II himself was an advocate of a "United States of Europe against America."[2] But the most persistent and talented proponent of a European *Zollverein* was Walther Rathenau, later foreign minister under the Weimar Republic and finally to be assassinated in 1922 by right-wing terrorists. In August 1914 (!) he sent the imperial chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, a plan for a customs union between Austria-Hungary, Belgium, France, and Germany.[3] For Rathenau this project would have offered not only a solution for Germany's economic problems, but also an opportunity for reconciliation with France: "If Europe's economy fuses into a community, and this will happen sooner than we think, its politics will also fuse."[4] This point of view was shared by Kiderlen-Wächter, a pre–1914 foreign minister who believed that a rapprochement with France could be a first step in organizing the European powers against a threat from the United States or China.[5]

Views on which countries might belong to such a union differed. One variant included all the Balkan countries plus Turkey. Rathenau himself concentrated on West and Central European states, though he excluded Britain, which he considered a global power in the same category as America and Russia.

Two interconnected ideas emerged from these proposals: first, a *Zollverein* to ease Germany's economic constraints, and second, a consequent reconciliation between France and Germany which would avoid the danger of a European war. However, this vision of Europe's future was not without ambiguity. Its meliorism was tempered by power politics. For such a community, tailored to meet German economic requirements, would necessarily place that country in a more favorable position vis-à-vis France. The transfer of German ambitions from the military to the economic sphere not only made them more realizable, but also, by separating France from its allies, Britain and Russia, would have dissolved the coalition against Germany. Politically, a continental European customs union was a way of isolating France.

Rathenau's pre–1914 community was stillborn. But his ideas and the reflections they suggest have contemporary relevance. During this period, too, purchases by German steel magnates of iron mines in French Lorraine (and even in Normandy) were drawing attention to that complementarity of French iron ore and German coal which, forty years later, was to be the basis of the European Coal and Steel Community.

After the end of the First World War conditions were, if anything, less favorable

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[1]". . . only through Austria can Germany in the future attain the possession of the Danube mouth, through which this continental waterway would, for the first time, gain its true value." Friedrich List, *Schriften, Reden, Briefe, Band* VII (Berlin: 1931), p. 186.

[2]Walther Rathenau, *Tagebuch 1907–1921* (Düsseldorf: 1967), p. 157.

[3]Ibid., p. 185.

[4]Walther Rathenau, *Schriften, Band I (Berlin: 1918), p. 278.*

[5]See Fritz Fischer, *Krieg der Illusionen* (Düsseldorf: 1969), p. 202.

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for ideas of European union, despite widespread pacifism and the efforts of European federalists led by Count Coudenhove-Kalergi. German governments were under constant pressure to agitate for the revision of the Treaty of Versailles. France continued to fear a German onslaught, conscious of its own demographic and industrial weakness. Poincaré's occupation of the Ruhr and France's intransigence over reparations worsened the climate of relations between the two countries.

However, by 1925 France's foreign minister, Aristide Briand, had become convinced that a fresh start must be made, and "had finally concluded that no kind of future security could exist for France without a stable Europe—and that a stable Europe depended on German participation."[6] At a meeting with Germany's foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, in Thoiry, just over the French border from Geneva, Briand offered to discuss all contentious questions existing between France and Germany. He asked whether Germany was ready for economic cooperation with France (support for the franc), if these problems could be solved: "He was thinking not only of the return of the Saar territory, but of ending the whole occupation of the Rhineland."[7]

These prior questions, however, proved all too difficult. France talked of European solutions and Germany replied with demands for the revision of treaties. By the time Briand made the speech at the League of Nations in September 1929, in which he proposed a United States of Europe, Stresemann was dying. He had only time to welcome an idea whose primary function he saw as "the rationalization of European means of production." In any case, such a scheme could hardly have been realized in a Europe where the great "crash" had already taken place and the rise of the Nazi Party in Germany was underway.

Briand had explained his plan in a memorandum on "The Organization of a European Federal Union." He proposed the establishment of a "common market" to bring prosperity to the countries of the union, but, though the emphasis was on economic cooperation, Briand also felt that some political structure was necessary. Its nature, however, remained vague. All this was not unlike Rathenau's scheme, but the political motivation behind it was very different. Rathenau had seen European union as a means to peaceful economic expansion for Germany; Briand was concerned with disarming German resentment. He saw that postwar Europe was characterized by an imbalance of power between France and Germany. His aim was both to give satisfaction to German aspirations and to limit their scope. As for Stresemann, he was interested above all in ending the occupation of the Rhineland, reuniting the Saar to Germany, and obtaining a revision of the Treaty of Versailles. In the event, the Briand-Stresemann dialogue secured neither a prosperous Europe nor a reconciliation of national antagonisms.

Both Rathenau and Briand were concerned with the assertion of their own country's position in Europe by political and economic (as opposed to military) means. Behind Rathenau's project lay the wish to further a nonviolent form of German expansion; behind Briand's, the need to defend a French political supremacy which had become untenable by the ordinary means of power politics. Unspoken but implicit in a Franco-German embrace was the question of who would emerge as the dominant political force in Europe. In the 1920s it was France's potential weakness that engendered the Briand Plan. Stresemann hinted at this when he said that he was willing to stabilize the franc, but not Poincaré.[8]

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[6]P.J.V. Rollo, *Britain and the Briand Plan: The Common Market That Never Was*, Inaugural Lecture given at the University of Keele, December 6, 1972, p. 9.

[7]See Stresemann's own notes of the meeting in *Akten zur Deutschen Auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945*, Series B 1925–1933, *Band* I2, pp. 192 and 203.

[8]Ibid, p. 190.

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The Postwar Community

AFTER 1945 the idea of a European Union was quickly revived, with backward glances at the missed opportunity of the Briand plan. Economic unity was felt to be a precondition for European recovery, and the Marshall Plan had already pointed the way and indicated American support for such a solution. Purely idealistic factors also played their part. In particular, a strong current of European Catholic social thought, operating through small committees and discussion groups, was concerned with bringing about a "reconciliation" between a devastated and divided Germany and the rest of Europe, especially France. This appeared to be the only way of establishing a permanent peace in Europe, and it led naturally to the idea of a united Europe. These efforts received support from the Papacy.

In 1946 Pope Pius XII praised the example of the Swiss federation—a country that found "the vigor and creative power" of the "national idea" in the "cordial emulation and collaboration of its different national groups."[9] Indeed, at the time of the European Defense Community Treaty, Vincent Auriol, then president of France, was to detect clerical influence behind the move toward Europe, writing in his journal that "the Church has made the triple alliance Adenauer-Schuman-Gasperi, three tonsures beneath the same skull-cap."[10] But interesting though these debates may be, there is no evidence that Catholic influence played a decisive role in the initiation of any move toward European unity. Catholic thought, however, *was* to leave its mark on some of the policies of the European Community, particularly in the area of social ideas, and also provided some of the phraseology adopted into general European use.[11]

At the beginning of European construction, with the Schuman plan, the decisive considerations were, once again, those of power politics. France saw in the European idea a means of obtaining economic advantage and insuring its own security vis-à-vis an eventually resurgent Germany. The newly installed government of the Federal Republic of Germany welcomed an opportunity to break out of the quarantine imposed on that defeated country and to regain some freedom of action for its foreign policy. By this time, too, Franco-German reconciliation in some form of European organization had become a necessity of the Cold War. For it was clear that effective resistance to the Soviet military threat could only be assured with the help of a German army. German rearmament would be a politically risky operation unless it could be carried out within a European framework. Any delay in integrating West Germany into an American-Western European alliance would run the risk of counter-offers from the East (possibly including reunification), which might prove more attractive to German public opinion.

Thus, from the beginning, the idea of a European Community had American support, given for strategic reasons and steadily maintained until the 1990s. For the United States such a Community was an additional means of making Western Europe secure, an economic and political infrastructure to the European end of the North Atlantic alliance. On the European side, on the other hand, there were those who envisaged a

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[9]Quoted in Philippe Chenaux, *Une Europe Vaticane? Entre le Plan Marshall et le Traités de Rome* (Bruxelles: 1990), p. 26. Chenaux gives a full account of these discussions among Catholic intellectuals.

[10]Vincent Auriol, *Mon Septennat 1947–1954* (Paris: 1970), p. 380.

[11]The word "subsidiarity," for instance, used by the European Commission to mean a principle by which certain matters should remain reserved to national governments, is taken from Pius XI's encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* (1931), where it is defined as follows: ". . . it is an injustice, and at the same a grave evil and a disturbance of right order, to transfer to the larger and higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies."

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Europe that could hold its own place in the world alongside the United States and Russia.[12]

The urgency of integrating the German Federal Republic into the Western alliance made a European solution of the German problem the only feasible one for France. Considerations of a purely defensive kind bulked large in French minds. Jean Monnet in his "*note de réflexion*," presented to French ministers along with the Schuman plan, had terrified them with the prospect of France's isolation in the face of a West Germany rearmed, economically powerful, and having its own direct links to the United States and Britain. The European proposal was presented as a means of reconciliation with Germany and of diverting its energies in a peaceful direction, but also as a mechanism for controlling German policy.

From Bonn's point of view, this was a most acceptable arrangement, since it signified the possibility of throwing off the restraints of Allied occupation, an acknowledgement of the Federal Republic's legitimacy, and some freedom of maneuver for West German foreign policy. Bonn could now pursue its own interests, admittedly within the limits created by, first, the Soviet threat and the consequent dependence on the United States, and, second, an association with France within the European Community—a partnership politically advantageous and economically profitable.

However, as the Quai d'Orsay was not slow to perceive, especially during the period of de Gaulle's direction of French foreign policy, the combination of these two factors made it easy for France to take the lead within the Community and, if need be, to exert pressure on Bonn. As long as the German Democratic Republic competed for legitimacy with its western rival, West Germany always had to be sensitive to any indication from Paris that France might be considering a bilateral negotiation with the Soviet Union or recognition of East Germany. This was the central political fact of the European Community until 1989. It was also one that served to tie France to the Community. Had the apparent rupture of June 1965, after which France adopted a policy of the "empty chair" in Brussels, been carried to its logical conclusion, a powerful lever would have broken in the hands of French diplomacy.[13]

Until the end of the 1980s Franco-German cooperation, with West Germany deferring to French leadership, continued to be the main internal political relationship of the European Community. The disparity of economic strength between the two countries was balanced by the persistent weakness of Bonn's foreign policy position. It was always possible, however, that changes in European politics—above all, in Eastern Europe—might bring this favorable conjuncture to an end. Georges Pompidou was to give as his reason for wishing British membership in the EC a desire to prevent

[12]Schuman shared this aspiration. See Raymond Poidevin, *Robert Schuman: Homme d'Etat, 1886–1963* (Paris: 1986), pp. 240–241. Interestingly, Adenauer too thought of Europe as a "Third Force," using the phrase in the press conference he gave after his acceptance of the Schuman plan. See Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Adenauer: Der Aufstieg 1876–1952* (Stuttgart: 1986), p. 714.

[13]An example of the tensions resulting from this situation can be seen in what happened after the signature of the Franco-German friendship treaty in 1963—the high point of relations between de Gaulle and Adenauer. By 1964, with Erhard chancellor and Schröder foreign minister, Bonn was pursuing a more "Atlantic" policy. De Gaulle's response to this was to discuss the "German Problem" in terms that suggested a settlement reached over the head of the Federal Republic. The Russians, however, were not interested in his ideas. West Germany, under a new south German chancellor, Kiesinger, reverted to a Francophile policy. There were, of course, limits to France's influence on West Germany. Bonn could never be pushed into following Paris' lead against the United States.

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France being left alone with an increasingly powerful Germany.[14]

Germany's Europe

OF THE THREE plans for the political and economic integration of Europe described above, only the Schuman plan was carried through. All arose out of attempts to solve the problems inherent in the relationship between France and Germany. The immediate motivations differed, according to the balance of power and the relative political strength of the countries concerned:

1) *The Rathenau plan*: a) Germany's need for peaceful economic expansion and markets to compete with the world economic blocs; and b) reconciliation with France to avoid war.

2) *The Briand plan*: a) France's need to contain an economically and (potentially) militarily more powerful Germany; and b) Germany's wish to escape from the conditions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles.

3) *The Schuman plan:* a) France's need to resolve its relationship with a Germany (the Federal Republic) which the Soviet threat was bringing back into international affairs as a rearmed ally of the United States, and to establish a framework that would limit the options open to German policy; b) the German wish to increase the Federal Republic's legitimacy and freedom of action; and c) American support for a scheme that would further the economic recovery of Europe and help to consolidate the Western alliance against the Soviet Union.

Thus until the reunification of Germany, following on a change in Soviet foreign policy, the European Community was based on the Franco-German relationship and a German deference to French wishes—these less and less clearly expressed as time went on—which increasingly failed to correspond to the real facts of power.

Looking back over these three projects it is possible to see in perspective the change that German reunification has brought about in Europe. Not only is a reunified Germany much stronger—in population, in potential economic power—than other European states, but the change in foreign policy carried out by President Gorbachev and the Soviet evacuation of the Eastern European glacis mean that Bonn no longer has reason to fear an attack from the east. It is no longer possible to put pressure on Germany by exploiting its need for backing against the Soviet Union. France, therefore, no longer has any hold, other than cultural and sentimental, over Germany's actions. The position now resembles that envisaged in the Rathenau plan: German leadership in Europe providing the possibility of industrial expansion and increased political influence. France, on the contrary, risks being cut off from the German support that, in the past, enhanced its influence.

The Franco-German relationship created a balance of power within the European Community—an equilibrium which, in turn, existed within a wider balance between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact. This has now been upset. Where before there was a rough balance, there now exists an unquestionable German superiority. The major political convenience for France of the European Community has disappeared. For the first time the Franco-German relationship is no longer the central political fact in Europe. For Germany, as we shall see, not only the relationship with France but the European Community itself is beginning to take second place to the management, by German diplomacy, of the chaotic situation on its eastern frontiers.

President Mitterrand's reaction to these new and (in Paris) unwelcome developments has been to advocate binding the European Community more closely together by means of greater institutional integration. There has

[14]In fact, the first striking instance of German self-assertion had occurred during France's monetary crisis in the autumn of 1968, when the *Bundesbank* refused to revalue the deutschemark to avert the devaluation of the franc.

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been much talk by convinced "Europeans" of "tying" Germany into Europe—a phrase that carries with it a whiff of constraint. In the past, however, it has not been EC membership that has limited German political freedom of action, but the existence of a rival German state and the threat from the Soviet Union. To speak of "tying" Germany into Europe is now an empty phrase; it would make as much sense to suppose Britain and France "tied" to German policies in Eastern Europe. Supra-national institutions work in two directions, but, most obviously, to the advantage of the strongest state within them. An organization like the European Community does not abolish the facts of power or political competition between states, it merely channels such competition through agreed negotiating procedures.

OF COURSE, there are still constraints on German policy—some three hundred thousand of them, roaming in a ragged and demoralized condition over the eastern *länder*, an as yet unvanished Soviet military presence—and, as long as they exist, the new Germany could be vulnerable to Russian pressure. The Moscow coup caused more alarm in Bonn than in any other capital, and for good reason. Now, with the Soviet Union apparently dissolving into its constituent republics, fears of a Russian military threat can be laid to rest for the moment. However, the seismic events in the Soviet Union might end in anarchy or civil strife whose impact would be felt throughout Eastern and Central Europe. Germany must do what it can, by diplomacy or economic aid, to avert the impending chaos. But such efforts risk costing Bonn a high price. Chancellor Kohl's insistence on the urgency of economic aid for the Soviet Union and the need for other countries to do more stems, no doubt, from the well-founded fear that Germany may be left alone to foot the bill for the rehabilitation of the Soviet economy. That Germany might also hope to enjoy most of the profits from a recovery of the Russian market is a point less frequently made. These problematical aspects of German relations with the Soviet Union will be settled bilaterally. The other member-states of the European Community can hardly do much to influence the outcome. Chancellor Kohl, after all, neither consulted nor informed his allies and partners in NATO or the EC before concluding his Moscow agreement on German reunification or the German-Russian "Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation."

Germany's preoccupation with a new form of *Ostpolitik* appears to be carrying it into a "special relationship" (i.e. a relationship not shared by its Community partners) with Russia. This is not an arrangement of the Rapallo kind, to be used as a lever against the Western powers, but rather an intimacy and an apprehension. The intimacy arises from a protracted period of negotiation over a wide spectrum of problems, the apprehension from fear of the consequences of revolutionary upheaval in the Soviet Union. Of course, there are opportunities as well. Germany is the country best suited to help the Soviet Union and its former client states with their economic problems. German industry must inevitably be drawn into the economic power vacuum beyond the Oder-Neisse line. There will be possibilities for the opening up of new markets and the foundation of new enterprises. No one knows that terrain as well as German bankers and businessmen. All this must concentrate German minds on the East.

There would be nothing surprising or sinister in German moves to extract advantage from geographical proximity to Eastern Europe. But such a policy places Germany in a position that is, objectively perceived, different from that of its Western European EC partners. It is probable, therefore, that a new eastward orientation, motivated by political attentiveness and economic advantage, will cause Germany to place less emphasis on the Europe of the Twelve or, what amounts to the same thing, to further the emergence of a Europe extended to the East. At the center of this wider Community, Germany could then pursue a traditionally Bismarckian policy of

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balance between East and West. Such appears to be the vision of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Germany's perennial foreign minister, whose plans for a "European Security Council," if realized, would have more in common with President Gorbachev's "common European home" than with the "deepening" of EC institutions recommended by Jacques Delors.[15]

Since reunification, German foreign policy has gained in independence and self-confidence. There have been several symptoms of this. Germany is showing increasing reluctance to accept France's view of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), in particular as regards political control of the European Central Bank.[16] In EC discussions on the Yugoslav crisis, Germany, which had previously supported the majority view that it was desirable to preserve the unity of Yugoslavia, changed its policy suddenly and drastically by proposing the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. This may have been realistic—Germany has a better knowledge of Balkan states than do Britain and France—but the point is that prior to reunification Bonn would not have shown such a cheerful willingness to differ from all other member-states.[17] During the Gulf War, Germany for the first time risked seriously offending Washington through its refusal to send troops to support the American intervention against Iraq. True, the decision was accompanied by legalistic excuses, but it would not have been taken ten years ago.

GERMANY, of course, has not been alone in its development of a more specifically national foreign policy. In all the recent discussion of a "common foreign policy" for Europe, it is often forgotten that, for many years, such a policy did exist: resistance to the Soviet political and military threat and support for the Atlantic Alliance. Even the decade of Gaullist policies in France hardly made much difference to this. Now the pressure from the East has disappeared and, with it, the unity it imposed.

The major countries of Western Europe now appear far more divergent in their foreign policies than was the case a decade ago. Britain's "special relationship" with the United States, by no means dead as recent events have shown, is balanced at the other end of Europe by Germany's expanding ties with Eastern Europe and Russia. Italy has been active in Mediterranean affairs and has recently been fishing in the troubled waters of the Balkans, seemingly under the influence of its romantically inclined foreign minister, Gianni de Michaelis. As for France, during the Gulf War President Mitterrand rejected the alternative "Third World" policy advocated by his minister of defense, Jean-Pierre Chevènement, but it seems likely that, with France's loss of influence within the European Community, this option for French foreign policy will once again find left-wing and Gaullist supporters. Even Denmark, when it was a question of the Baltic states, was prepared to go ahead with recognition in advance of EC consultations. In addition, a

[15]A real constraint on German policy is the need for a continuation of the American nuclear guarantee. However, it remains a matter of speculation what role this will play in a Germany whose public opinion is becoming more and more pacifist.

[16]In France, too, hesitations over EMU are appearing. In an article entitled "The EMS against France," one of *Le Monde*'s economic experts asks whether France is not paying too high a price for its participation—paying, in fact, some of the costs of German reunification.

[17]Nor would we have seen President Mitterrand warning Chancellor Kohl during their July meeting at Bad Wiessee that we are no longer in an era when empires "shared out the Balkans," or German journalists asking an irritated French president whether he was trying to "encircle" Germany! See *Le Monde*, July 25, 1991. One of the oddest features of the Yugoslav crisis has been French suspicions of German (but also Austrian and Hungarian) motives. It is as though France still regarded the federal government of Yugoslavia as a potential ally in a renewed Little Entente!

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number of EC states have signed treaties of friendship with the Soviet Union, without consultation either within NATO or the EC and with little regard for the implications of some of the wording contained in the agreements.[18] The relaxation of tension in Europe has released the countries of the Western alliance into disparity.

The multiple possibilities and alignments now open to European countries, released from the previous East-West polarization, bear some resemblance to pre–1914 Europe, if only because many of the old pieces are back on the board. Similarly, the state of the European Community, considered in terms of its internal political relations, is more like the Rathenau plan than the Briand or Schuman versions. This is a Community that could be dominated economically by Germany which, as Professor James Kurth has written recently, is now the "gatekeeper between the European Community and *Mitteleuropa*."[19] It is also a Community that the collapse of Russian power has left open-ended to the East.

For the first time, the future of the EC will not be determined by the relationship between France and Germany. It is the development of relations between Germany and Russia/Eastern Europe that will be decisive in shaping the continent. But this new conjuncture, unlike the Franco-German axis, has no causal relationship to the Europe of the Twelve. It does not support it and may, indeed, be disruptive of it. Germany's new orientation toward the East can only encourage the extension of the Community in Central and Eastern Europe. The candidatures of other countries like Austria, Sweden, Norway, and Finland must also be favorably regarded by Germany, since they fall within the sphere of German economic influence and can provide wider markets for German manufacturers.[20] The issue of the present European debate on the priority to be given to the "widening" or "deepening" of the Community seems likely to be determined in advance. Despite attempts in Brussels to put off the evil day by devices like the so-called "European Economic Space," "widening" seems to be upon the Community before it wants it, and whether it likes it or not.

After the various European plans of Rathenau, Briand, and Schuman, German reunification marks the foundation of a different type of Europe, removed from the old Franco-German base, a politically wider and more problematical association of states, whose future institutions and competence are not easy to predict. This is a Europe freed from the discipline of the Cold War, and it seems probable that, while it will gradually achieve a greater degree of economic integration, it will not become the political Third Force desired by ardent "Europeans."

A Germany whose public opinion is increasingly attracted by "national pacifism" will bring to its leading role within the European Community little in the way of decisive

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[18]The countries concerned are France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The texts of the treaties are to be found in *The Soviet Agenda for Europe: An Occasional Paper*, from *International Currency Review* (London: 1991). These agreements envisage a Europe where the main forum for the discussion of the problems is the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The Europe in question is very much that of President Gorbachev's "common European home."

[19]See Kurth's brilliant article, "The Shape of the New World Order," in the Summer 1991 issue of *The National Interest*. Whether, as Professor Kurth thinks, the future "*Mitteleuropa*" will have its own distinctive form of society, characterized by a rejection of liberal capitalism and an acceptance of Catholic social teaching, seems to me more doubtful.

[20]The present position is that five countries (Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, and Turkey) have made formal applications for membership. Two more (Finland and Norway) are likely to follow soon. Eastern European applications are expected within the next two years from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

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political leadership.[21] It will be concerned with what is happening on its eastern border, and here it will largely go its own way (as in Yugoslavia). But it will leave global policies to the United States. The "*ohne mich*" with which the German government greeted the Gulf Crisis was, in that sense, a moment of truth. Germany cannot "lead" Europe in the way that France once did but can no longer. Its interest is in a wide and level playing-field for German industry and, if, as Professor Kurth believes, "the German conception of the international economy will become primarily a continental, rather than a global, one," then Germany will strive to create a protected market for its heavy capital goods, so far as this is compatible with continued good relations with the United States.[22]

Nor is the new European conjuncture likely to resemble the closely knit Europe of Brussels blueprints. The present intergovernmental conferences may produce documents for signature at the December Maastricht summit, but however optimistically these may be described there will hardly be much of substance in terms of common foreign policy or common defence. With "widening" receiving encouragement from events in Eastern Europe and German reunification, growth on this scale in the Community's size will render much of the present European decision-making machinery obsolete. Even in the execution of its economic policies the EC faces an administrative crisis. If it attains a foreign policy, this will be entangled in, and limited by, the Bismarckian network of pan-European treaties planned by Herr Genscher. The identity of the Europe of the Twelve is gradually being dissolved into a pan-European association of states, a loss of specificity that can only be accelerated by the erosion of the Common Agricultural Policy and the virtual disappearance of the European Common External Tariff in successive rounds of international trade negotiations in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The last two or three years represent a major turning point in European history. After the successive plans for European unity, which have been elaborated throughout practically the whole of the twentieth century, events have suddenly redefined the Europe that is to be united and the nature of its unity. The odds now are that this will take the form of a looser and wider confederation of states whose immediate historic role will be to link Eastern and Western Europe and, finally, to bring Russia into that concert of nations. That Germany should be the chief instrument of this transformation and eventual reconciliation is a paradox and an atonement. Rathenau might have understood this new Europe better than Briand or Schuman, and it will hardly be welcomed by believers in European federalism. Still, it is taking shape before our eyes.□

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[21] Such a policy would accord with Germany's traditional preference for restricting competition through cartels. On the other hand, protectionism and exclusion of others from Eastern European markets might lead to nationalist reactions, and not only in Eastern Europe. The so-called "Pentagonale"—grouping Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, and the northern republics of Yugoslavia—seems to have a hidden agenda, directed against preponderant German economic influence.

[22] On this topic see Mark Almond, *National Pacifism: Germany's New Temptation*, European Security Study No. 12 (London: Institute for European Defence & Strategic Studies, 1991).

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We are US

The Myth of the Multinational

Ethan B. Kapstein

IN PUBLIC debate of policy issues it has become commonplace for the anecdote to replace data, the witty phrase to replace analysis. Intellectual fads overwhelm cumulative research, and normative assertions precede observation. Searching for the television camera and radio microphone instead of the truth, policy analysts are all too willing to generalize from isolated cases.

A striking recent example is Robert Reich's compellingly titled article, "Who is US?"[1] Reich asserts that large corporations have lost their national identity, as these profit-maximizing firms go abroad in search of markets, employees, and new technology. As proof of this broad assertion, he cites a number of specific cases, including IBM, where foreigners make up 40 percent of total employment, and Du Pont, where "180 Japanese scientists" are working in Yokohama to develop "new materials and technologies." Reich concludes that ownership and control over multinational corporations have lost importance, and that "American-owned corporations . . . have no special relationship with Americans."

Ethan B. Kapstein is co-director of the Economics and National Security Program at the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, Harvard University, and assistant professor of international relations, Brandeis University. His most recent book is *The Political Economy of National Security: A Global Perspective.*

This analysis, of course, has a long pedigree in the "interdependence" literature that goes back at least to the early 1900s. Such theorists of interdependence as Norman Angell posited that the deepening of economic transactions among the advanced industrial states would lead to the erosion of national boundaries; this early view exploded with the First World War.[2] During the late 1960s and early 1970s Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye identified a "modernist school" of interdependence theory, which held that changes in technology were creating a "global village," a "world without borders."[3] Many authors during this period spoke of the "cosmo-corp," and books with titles such as *Global Reach* became best-sellers.

Some critics of this view called it "globaloney," and suggested that state actors continued to exercise considerable authority over the behavior of even the largest corporations.[4]

[1] *Harvard Business Review* (January-February 1990).

[2] *The Great Illusion* (New York: Putnam, 1911). For a pre-World War II argument along similar lines, see Eugene Staley, *World Economy in Transition* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1939).

[3] *Power and Interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., Inc., 1977).

[4] For one of the classic critiques, see Kenneth Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindleberger, ed., *The International Corporation* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970).

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In one of the most influential articles on transnationalism of that era, Samuel Huntington argued that the phenomenon of global business expansion after World War II had actually *increased* the power of states. As firms expanded beyond their national territory, they needed access to foreign countries, a right only national governments could grant. Since governments retained a monopoly over corporate access to the domestic market, this gave them considerable authority in negotiations with transnational corporations. Indeed, according to Huntington, governments could exploit the capabilities of the firms to meet national policy objectives.[5]

The power of the home country over the multinational has not diminished; if anything, it has continued to increase. Corporations have not become anational, multinational, or transnational; they remain wedded to their home governments for both political and economic reasons. The question "Who is US?" is an interesting one, but it is not asked by business executives.

To be sure, the foreign activities of large corporations pose some special problems for governments, and public officials remain concerned with export controls, technology transfer, and foreign investment. In search of profit, private firms will sometimes act in ways that the home government does not like; in any relationship, one side will exhibit behavior that the other party does not appreciate. But these examples do not undermine the inextricable link that exists between firms and their home country.

INDEED, the very firms that are seen as being anational often act in explicit support of state functions and needs. The gathering of economic intelligence, the promotion of national values and symbols, and the building of economic alliances may reflect the explicit desires of advanced industrial states. The benefits provided to home governments by large firms must surely overwhelm the costs associated with their international business; if they did not, social scientists really *would* have a puzzle to explain.

In general, large corporations are not only aware of the identity of their home country, they wish to maintain a close relationship with the government. Only the state can defend corporate interests in international negotiations over trade, investment, and market access. Agreements over such things as airline routes, the opening of banking establishments, and the right to sell insurance are not decided by corporate actors who gather around a table; they are determined by diplomats and bureaucrats. Corporations must turn to governments when they have interests to protect or advance. In the words of Raymond Vernon and Louis Wells, "Accordingly, we find the U.S. Ambassador to Liberia inviting the Liberian government to deal gently with the U.S.-owned firms in that country; and the Japanese government assuring Indonesia of certain aid projects if Japanese firms receive rights to a source of hydropower for an aluminum smelter."[6] When talks on debt restructuring take place, the pre-eminent actors are states, not banks. In its singular ability to tax and to make laws and treaties, the state remains the large corporation's worst adversary and most critical ally.

Americans often tend to view the world in their own image, and the question "Who is US?" is indeed distinctively American. I have never heard colleagues from Japan or France or Germany ask a similar question of *their* corporate identity. They seem to know who they are. Nor have Japanese officials recently been heard to complain that Honda and Sony have lost their national character, despite substantial investments in the United States. Does anyone seriously doubt that Siemens is German, Dassault French? Yet both these firms have significant foreign activities, and they are both lodged within the European Community, the strongest of all multinational organizations. It seems that some

[5] "Transnational Organizations in World Politics," *World Politics* (April 1973).

[6] *Manager in the International Economy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1981).

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Americans, especially those who spend their waking hours in universities, are doomed to struggle with a perpetual identity crisis. As Karel van Wolferen recently wrote in these pages, "Theories of a global, borderless economy and of economic interdependence only console those who seem unaware of the political forces at play."[7]

These comments suggest that the question "Who is US?" is misguided; most of us know who we are, and the numbers prove it.

Some Surprising Numbers

GOOD SOCIAL science is often inspired by an analysis of data. And, an analysis of American data on both inward and outward direct investment and on the activities of "transnational" firms generates many interesting questions, but "Who is US?" is not one of them.

American firms invest overseas, and foreign firms invest in the United States. In both cases the numbers are small from the perspective of GNP. In neither case do they suggest the "transnationalization" of the American economy.

In 1900, about 7 percent of America's GNP was invested overseas. At that time, many foreigners feared the launching of an "American invasion." They need not have worried. Today, somewhat less than 7 percent of GNP is invested abroad; the number has hardly changed in almost a century.

Regarding the alleged takeover of America, Reich reports that "foreign direct investment has been climbing dramatically in the United States; last year it reached $329 billion." How big is this number? In absolute terms, it is somewhat larger than the defense budget—which translates approximately to the 7 percent of GNP that seems to be a ubiquitous number in this context.

Indeed, despite the Reagan-era budget deficits, and the fears of a Japanese takeover of the United States, the foreign investment figures, though rising throughout the 1980s, have remained rather small. Of course, this is not surprising when you consider the size of the American economy relative to that of all its major competitors—for example, the $5 trillion U.S. economy is 2½ times larger than the Japanese economy. The types of investment may have changed over time, as have the investors (we don't find many Englishmen investing in railroads or the whaling industry any more), but at the aggregate level, the numbers hardly suggest a foreign takeover, and from a historical perspective foreign investment has actually *decreased* in importance for the American economy.[8]

With the end of the Cold War, it has become increasingly popular to point to Japan as the source of all American woes. It is frequently asserted that "America is for sale" and that the Japanese have purchased our nation on the cheap, given the value of the yen. Such arguments greatly exaggerate Japanese investment in the United States, from the perspective of each country. Japanese activity has indeed risen in the United States: in 1989 the Japanese executed over 2,000 direct investment transactions with a total value of some $32 billion.[9] For the United States, Japanese direct investment that year constituted somewhat over 2 percent of GNP, which hardly suggests a takeover.

Yet another concern of the "Who is US?" crowd concerns foreign takeovers of American business. The numbers are surprising here as well. The General Accounting Office reports that foreign mergers and acquisitions have actually *declined* in the United States since 1980, when they peaked at 12 percent of all such activity. Transactions *among* U.S. firms have far-outpaced activity *between* Americans and foreigners.

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[7]"No Brakes, No Compass," *The National Interest* (Fall 1991). Van Wolferen articulates the strongest case I know concerning the links between the Japanese state and Japanese corporations.

[8]See Mira Wilkins, *A History of Foreign Investment in the United States to 1914* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).

[9]Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Investment, September 1991.

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All these numbers would seem to support the conclusion of a recent United Nations report that "the transnationalization of United States firms peaked somewhere between 1965 and 1975."[10] That is to say, prior to this period a trend can be observed in which the stock of foreign direct investment held by American corporations was continuously increasing relative to domestic investment; after 1965 a plateau was reached and since the early 1970s the trend has reversed; over the past decade the relative importance of domestic over foreign assets has actually increased.

The domestic to foreign employment ratio lends further support to this analysis. In "Who is US?" Reich devotes a substantial amount of his attention to the alleged globalization of the corporate workforce. But the proportion of foreign to domestic employees in American manufacturing firms peaked in 1977 at about 25 percent, and the number has declined since that time to about 23 percent. Multinationals based in other major home countries have even lower percentages of foreign workers. Less than 8 percent of the workforce employed by German multinationals is foreign, and the number for Japanese firms is about 2 percent.[11]

Regarding the American workforce, only a small percentage is employed by foreign firms. According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, 2.1 million Americans were employed in foreign-owned manufacturing plants, or about 7 percent of all manufacturing employees. (In "Who is US?" Reich, without providing a source for the number, asserts that 3 million Americans are so employed). Another 2 million are employed in foreign-owned service industries and again the number is significantly below 10 percent of the total.

The importance of the home country is further suggested by corporate earnings. To be sure, several American-based multinational corporations now earn a significant share of their profits, if not the majority share, from their overseas operations. But in almost every case the United States remains the single largest market and profit center. Of the 100 largest corporations in America, foreign sales as a percentage of total sales peaked in 1980 at about 33 percent; the number has since declined to about 25 percent. For the 50 largest firms based in Japan, foreign sales accounted for just 8 percent of total sales.[12]

In sum, only the most xenophobic among us would find cause for concern in the aggregate data on multinational corporations. This is not to minimize the serious economic problems that face the United States; the country *does* have many such problems, including a desperate need for more investment. However, the numbers suggest that the problems must be largely of our own making since the American economy remains, for better or for worse, largely American.

Firm Strategy

THERE IS now a substantial literature on the operations of large corporations. Far from suggesting that these firms have evolved into transnational actors without any national identity, this body of work points to the enduring importance of the home country. As Philip Wellons has pointed out in a study of international banking, "The home's impact is much more pervasive and important than the impact of other governments. . . . Home governments affect the banks' relations with competitors . . . other governments, and other borrowers."[13]

Indeed, there is substantial evidence that large corporations are becoming *localized* rather than *globalized*. That is, instead of establishing transnational structures with global ownership, global employment, and global products, they are becoming increasingly sensitive to state policies. A Harvard

[10] *Transnational Corporations in World Development* (New York: United Nations, 1989).

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

[13] "International Debt: The Behavior of Banks in a Politicized Environment," *International Organization* (Summer 1985).

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Business School study found that "the most important force for localization has been the reactions of national governments." It points out that even the Reagan administration, "one of the strongest advocates of free trade," enacted a number of policy measures aimed at greater regulation of international business. These regulations "defined necessary levels of local content, technology transfer, and a variety of other conditions."[14]

One might argue that this localization trend will only work to obscure further the identity of multinational firms. If firms are responding to the demands of a home government and several hosts at the same time, then it might well be asked "Who Is US?" Home governments, however, will not permit firms to make foreign investments that are perceived to be detrimental to the national interest. States possess both formal and informal means to block such investments. Of course, an investment made today may *over time* have consequences for the home government that were not originally foreseen; such could be the case with contemporary interest in investing in the Soviet Union. But mistaken policy should not be confused with an absence of policy.

The business literature suggests that both inward and outward foreign investment decisions are not made solely in response to market opportunities, but in response to government policies as well. During the 1960s, it was official U.S. policy to discourage foreign investment by American multinationals in order to keep capital at home, and a number of onerous restrictions were placed on private enterprise. During the 1980s, the government moved to block inward foreign direct investment in some sectors of the economy, particularly those related to the "military-industrial complex." Governments prevent the export of many goods and services, and technology transfer is generally regulated. As Vernon and Wells have concluded, "the scrutiny of home governments is becoming increasingly common" in corporate life.[15]

Some analysts have responded that the multinational enterprise can simply circumvent government regulations by going offshore. They should consult a good lawyer. The United States government has put into place an elaborate set of laws controlling both the onshore and offshore activities of American-owned corporations. Further, the United States has demonstrated its ability to punish severely foreign firms whose activities are deemed to be at odds with the national interest; witness Toshiba's sale of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union and the penalties it subsequently faced. Access to the American market is a powerful incentive for good behavior on the part of corporate actors; denial of that market is a heavy penalty.[16]

The literature on business strategy, then, also argues against the proposition that multinational firms have lost their sense of allegiance. If anything, they are becoming increasingly sensitive to national concerns in a myriad of issue-areas, from affirmative action to technology policy to the environment. Again, most firms know who their home government is, and they recognize the importance of maintaining a good relationship with it.

THE PRECEEDING sections have utilized aggregate data and the general business literature in suggesting that most firms know who they are. But since the main weapon in the arsenal of the "Who is US?" group has been the anecdote, it may be useful to provide some specific examples here as well. I would argue that these are "easy" cases from the "Who is US?" perspective, and "hard" cases for those of us who continue to believe in powerful states. The cases are drawn from banking—arguably the most

[14]Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, *Managing Across Borders* (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1989).

[15]*Manager in the International Economy.*

[16]See, for example, Jeffrey Bialos, "The Detection and Disclosure of U.S. Export Control Violations: Management Choices and their National Security Ramifications," (Washington, DC: Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 1989).

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global of all industries—and remote sensing, an area in which no state seems in control of its territory.

Banking

OF ALL economic sectors, none would appear so global as finance. As Professor Stephen Kobrin of the Wharton School of Business has argued, "The financial market is global in the sense that transactions are linked in an electronic network and borders and territoriality are virtually irrelevant." Citing such acute observers of the international business scene as Walter Wriston and Keniche Ohmae in support of this view, Professor Kobrin concludes that "government control over flows of funds and thus the value of currencies or monetary policy is very limited."[17]

Once again, there is a long pedigree for the contention that finance is global, and not subject to any government. In his classic 1944 work *The Great Transformation*, Karl Polanyi reminded his readers that the greatest of all banking families, the Rothschilds, was held out during the nineteenth century as the exemplification of the interdependent world economy. "As a family," he wrote, "they embodied the abstract principle of internationalism; their loyalty was to a firm." But in fact, their "independence sprang from the needs of the time."

Such is the case with international banks today, though their ties to home governments and countries are so strong that it would appear to be stating the obvious. First, each international bank has a central bank that acts as its lender of last resort, and a national supervisory authority that acts as the primary regulator of its activities. It is doubtful that the management of Continental Illinois Bank or the Bank of New England asked "Who is US?" as their institutions tumbled toward bankruptcy.

Second, in most important international financial negotiations states, not banks, determine policy. The Plaza Accord, which is widely held as being influential in bringing down the value of the dollar in the late 1980s, was negotiated by ministers of foreign affairs and the treasury, not by private banks. The problem of Third World debt, in which debt restructuring has become the rule, is managed largely by state actors and international organizations. Finally, in terms of market access, it is states that establish the rules of the game; market opening in Japanese financial markets was due to heavy political pressure by the United States, not by the dictates of modern financial engineering.

Third, in many countries banks are state-owned, or the capital markets are highly controlled by state actors. The major French banks (e.g. Crédit Lyonnais) are owned by the state, as are those of such developing countries as Brazil. Within Western Europe, access to stock markets is rigidly controlled by governments; free-market Britain (the free market itself being a consequence of state action) is the exception, not the rule. Within and between states, the heavy hand of government is found throughout the financial marketplace.

Finally, to follow on the preceding point, in most industrial countries the largest borrower on the capital markets is the state. Over 80 percent of the debt outstanding in Britain, 75 percent in France, 65 percent in Japan, and 55 percent in the United States is held by the government.[18] Indeed, a recent agreement reached by the central bankers of the Group of Ten industrial countries, the so-called "Basle Accord," provides a new set of incentives for international banks to hold government debt.[19] In finance, no actor is more important than the state.

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[17]"Transnational Integration, National Markets and Nation-States," (Working Paper, Reginald Jones Center, The Wharton School, August 1991).

[18]Michael Sesit, "Industrial Nations' Appetite for Debt Surged 15% in '90," *Wall Street Journal*, September 30, 1991.

[19]See Ethan B. Kapstein, *The Basle Accord: Origins and Implications* (Princeton: Princeton Essays in International Finance, 1991).

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To be sure, the BCCI scandal would indicate that "rogue empires" exist in the financial world, just as pirates, mercenaries, and criminals continue to operate. But if the existence of the state is in doubt, just ask the depositors of BCCI in some fifty countries who woke up one morning in July to find their accounts frozen, the result of a coordinated action on the part of central bankers under the leadership of the Bank of England. These individuals are now dealing with state officials in making their claims.

It is somewhat surprising to find the "cosmo-corp" intellectuals still using international finance as their primary example of globalization and of the state's demise. Indeed, probably no economic sector is more rigidly controlled and regulated than finance. Domestically, every country has a central bank and major supervisory authority. Internationally, a host of formal and informal organizations supervise and—when deemed necessary—direct world financial flows (do you believe the Third World would have received any money at all since 1982 had it not been for the state?). In short, finance is too important for public officials to leave in the hands of bankers.

Remote Sensing

IN THE GLOBAL world of high technology, you don't get any higher than remote sensing by satellite. As Stephen Kobrin asks, "What do borders mean when the United States or the Soviet Union can scan any territory in the world?" He argues that, owing to new satellite and data technology, "it is virtually impossible for any government" to control the flow of information across borders; indeed, the idea of borders, which cannot be seen from on high, is rendered meaningless.

A recent analysis by Professor Stephen Krasner of Stanford University, however, suggests the conclusion that remote sensing takes place because powerful states wish to engage in this activity, and they permit others to do so as well.[20] If the United States wanted to prevent the gathering or transmission of information by satellite, it could easily do so by shooting the satellite down, or by "blinding" a remote sensor.

Nor need we be so melodramatic. Krasner argues that, from the beginning, the United States has reaped economic and political benefits from remote sensing. In so doing, "it backed the development of local receiving states and made the raw data secured from its LANDSAT available to all comers at affordable prices." The United States thus used the technology to promote alliance relationships; in short, remote sensing supported the traditional objectives of American economic and foreign policy.

The examples of remote sensing and banking suggest that even the easiest cases for the "cosmo-corp" believers break down upon close examination. In each sector, the state looms large, a discovery that should not be surprising. After all, both finance and high technology are of vital interest to governments. While most industrial states have placed renewed emphasis on market mechanisms in recent years, they have certainly not surrendered their authority over the economy. It is a long way from deregulation to "Who is US?"

The past decade has been a troubled one for the American economy. Strong growth during the Reagan era was coupled with growing budget and trade deficits. A recent cyclical recession has been harsh for many regions and has endured longer than most economists predicted. Clearly, a profound sense of insecurity sweeps the land when it comes to the nation's economic future.

This insecurity was brilliantly captured by Robert Reich with the question "Who is US?" In an age when every home is filled with Japanese products, when individuals invest their pensions in international stock funds, when universities are crowded with foreign students, it is easy—and perhaps beneficial to

[20] "Global Communications and National Power," *World Politics* (April 1991).

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some degree—to question our national identity.

But it is unlikely that, even with the end of the Cold War, we will soon witness a "great transformation" to a single, integrated world economy where borders are no longer meaningful. Indeed, one could also imagine that economic conflict among the leading industrial powers will increase, as economic security replaces military security as the primary goal of state actors. Further, as the war with Iraq recently demonstrated, there is still plenty of firepower in the international system. The state may be anachronistic, but we have yet to develop an alternative form of societal organization that is able to provide its members with both wealth and power.

Corporations certainly recognize the importance of their home state as much as any other societal actor. In most cases, the home country provides the single largest source of employee talent, of earnings, and of investment opportunities. In negotiations over market access, the corporation must rely on the state to advance its interests. Firms retain a national identity because they must, even if that identity is kept hidden at times from their critics.□

The Noblest Pain

Although most liberal philosophers of the nineteenth century opposed cruel exploitation of the *dark masses* by imperialism, in no case did any of them think that black, Indian, or Asian men could ever have states, parliaments, or armies—they were completely Eurocentric.

That, I suspect, changed with the Russo-Japanese war of 1904. The fact that an Asiatic nation defeated a great European power must have produced an electric shock in the minds of many Indians, Africans, and others, and given a great fillip to the idea of anti-imperialist self-assertion and national independence. In the twentieth century, no left-wing movement succeeded in Asia or Africa—in Indo-China, Egypt, Algeria, Syria, or Iraq—unless it went arm in arm with nationalist feeling.

Non-aggressive nationalism is another story entirely. I trace the beginning of that idea to the highly influential eighteenth-century German poet and philosopher Johann Gottfried Herder.

Herder virtually invented the idea of belonging. He believed that just as people need to eat and drink, to have security and freedom of movement, so too they need to belong to a group. Deprived of this, they felt cut off, lonely, diminished, unhappy. Nostalgia, Herder said, was the noblest of all pains. To be human meant to be able to feel at home somewhere, with your own kind.

Each group, according to Herder, has its own *Volksgeist*, or *Nationalgeist*—a set of customs and a lifestyle, a way of perceiving and behaving that is of value solely because it is their own. The whole of cultural life is shaped from within the particular stream of tradition that comes of collective historical experience shared only by members of the group.

Isaiah Berlin, from "The Ingathering Storm of Nationalism"
New Perspectives Quarterly, Fall 1991.

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The Clairvoyance of Rebecca West

Robert D. Kaplan

Rebecca West, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* (current printing, New York: Viking Penguin, 1982 [original printing, New York: Viking, 1941]). 1150 pp., $16.95.

"I HATE the corpses of empires, they stink as nothing else," declared Rebecca West in *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*. The empires that Dame Rebecca had in mind were those of Hapsburg Austria-Hungary and Ottoman Turkey, whose common border still divides, both literally and figuratively, Croatia and Serbia.

Which is to say that the hatred between Croats and Serbs is not a normal ethnic hatred. It has no blood and soil basis: the two groups emerged from the same Slavic tribe that migrated into the western Balkans in the sixth and seventh centuries. They speak the same language, Serbo-Croatian. Unlike the Arabs and Jews and the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, Croats and Serbs have until recently disputed no substantive piece of territory: the battles now waging are over enclaves, more of which straddle the Croatian-Bosnian frontier than the Croatian-Serbian one. And until the end of World War I, Croats and Serbs generally got along. This is a hatred without a long past, born solely of the collapse of empires; in other words, of historical process. Dame Rebecca put it thus: "I had come to Yugoslavia to see what history meant in flesh and blood."

The British author travelled to Yugoslavia nearly fifty-five years ago, in the spring of 1937. The flood waters of Hapsburg and Ottoman domination had just receded, and the Croats were now chafing under Serbian rule, administered from Belgrade. Dame Rebecca observed that Croats and Serbs were so obsessed with their new-found hatred of each other that they not only blocked away the outside world, with its encroaching Nazi threat, but many other normal human emotions as well. This made them no longer real people, but "shadows" in her eyes. Dame Rebecca stayed just six weeks in Yugoslavia and afterward produced an account of half-a-million words. When *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* was published in two hefty volumes in 1941, the *New York Times Book Review* considered it to be the acme of the travel genre. It was the most important of Dame Rebecca's twenty-odd works of fiction and non-fiction in a career spanning some seven decades.

Now, after five years of Nazism and forty-five years of communism, this fault zone between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires is back about where it was when Dame Rebecca first observed it. In terms of fundamentals, there is nothing about the current Yugoslav crisis with which Rebecca West, who died in 1983, would not be intimately familiar. While many policy analysts have been skimming the surface of the issue, seeing it through the ideological guise of "free-market and independence-minded Croats" versus the "still-communist Serbs," Dame Rebecca had long ago plumbed its deepest depths, discerning precisely why people who basically look the same, speak the same language, and do not occupy much of each other's land despise each other with a ferocity that would quite impress Israelis and Palestinians.

Dame Rebecca travelled throughout Yugoslavia, from north to south, visiting Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro in that order. Slovenia is missing from her otherwise

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all-encompassing travelogue. This, I believe, is deliberate. She obviously viewed the Slovenes as essentially a Central European people. From 1335 until the end of World War I, with the exception of five years of Napoleonic rule, Slovenia was an integral part of the Hapsburg Empire, surrounded by other Hapsburg lands, and as much influenced by the German speakers to the north and the Mediterranean world of Italy as by its Slavic sister state of Croatia next door—itself a nation with strong, organic links to Central Europe. The Slovenes, always a numerically small people, who today number under two million, were thus able to submerge their national identity inside that of Hapsburg Austria for seven centuries, while experiencing almost nothing of Byzantium or the Ottoman Sultanate—the two traditions that are crucial to the formation of what might be called a Balkan mentality.

HIDING in the northwest corner of Yugoslavia, the Slovenes have been dour bystanders to the political and ethnic conflicts tearing at this sprawling conglomeration of peoples. It was Slovenia's very peripheral status that caused it to be invaded by the federal Yugoslav army last June, and allowed it to sneak away peacefully from the federation afterwards. Because it was small, Slovenia appeared an easy target. Moreover, since Slovenia had no border with Serbia, there was a relatively insignificant legacy of hatred between Slovenes and Serbs. Thus the Serbian-dominated federal army could attempt a "clean" attack without setting off the kinds of intercommunal atrocities familiar to Lebanon and Northern Ireland—which would surely have ensued had the federal army launched a full-scale invasion of Zagreb and the Croatian heartland (so far it hasn't quite). But as soon as this supposedly clean and easy invasion met stubborn resistance, Slovenia's independence was a concession that the Belgrade Serbs could make without threatening the core area of their domain.

Slovenia, in other words, has always been a Yugoslav sideshow. Croatia is where matters truly become vicious and complicated, which is why, after a lengthy prologue covering the journey to get there, the Croatian capital of Zagreb provides the backdrop for the first few chapters of *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*.

In the hands of a master, the travel genre is the most serious form of writing, in which landscape and architectural descriptions, coupled with an adventurous story line, merely provide the texture for interwoven essays about the art, history, and politics of a particular region. The best travel writing is therefore like a long cable from a seasoned area specialist based in a distant capital: it translates the "local color" in a manner that answers the outstanding questions about a place. Though fifty years old, *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* continues to be the best cable we have regarding today's Yugoslavia. What follows is a brief extrapolation of its political contents.

Superficially, Croatia is definable as a Central European nation. Its history is predominantly Hapsburg. Though the language is Slavic, the script used by Croats is Latin. The religion is Roman Catholic. But, unfortunately, all is not as simple as that.

Croatia, unlike Slovenia, is a flat marchland. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman Turks occupied it. And when the Turks withdrew, they pulled back only to Croatia's southern border with Serbia, where the Sultan's forces remained a threatening presence for another two hundred years. Not only was Croatia a salient of Hapsburg Austria against the Turks, it was also one of Roman Catholicism against the Eastern Orthodox Church. In a manner similar to German-speakers living in the frontier zones of western Poland and southern Austria, who became "super-German" nationalists as a response to their tenuous position on the rim of the Slavic world, the Croats became super-Central Europeans and super-Roman Catholics to compensate for their dangerous proximity to the oriental Balkans, ruled by Turkish Muslims and inhabited by Eastern Orthodox Christians. Notice that

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although the Serbs were fellow-Christians, this mattered less to the Croats than the fact that the Serbs' brand of Christianity, Eastern Orthodoxy—a legacy of Greek Byzantine civilization—was a faith associated with the "barbarous East."

But the Croats and Serbs still managed to coexist peacefully until the end of World War I. This was because they were each inhabitants of separate empires, within which their immediate problems and resultant passions were channelled. Though proud of its Austrian cultural connections, Croatia was, nevertheless, basically a colony of Austria-Hungary, which exploited the Croats the way it did all its other subjects. Only in light of the horrors of Nazism and Communism does Hapsburg rule appear beneficial and tolerant in Croatia, or any place else for that matter. As Dame Rebecca summarizes:

> This family, from the unlucky day in 1273 when the College of Electors chose Rudolph of Hapsburg to be King of the Romans, on account of his mediocrity, till the abdication of Charles II, in 1918, produced no genius, only two rulers of ability in Charles V and Maria Theresa, countless dullards, and not a few imbeciles and lunatics.

There were Croatian peasant revolts, which the Hapsburgs put down by mass executions and devious stratagems like giving the Serbian minority in Croatia special privileges in order to incite the Croats against the Serbs. This worked only up to a point. In the latter part of the nineteenth century, with their immediate passions directed against the Hapsburgs, the idea of a "South Slav" (Yugoslav) federation with the Serbs, independent of Austria-Hungary, held significant attraction for the Croats, much as by the time of Rebecca West's visit they preferred to forget it.

AIDING THE Hapsburg Court's effort to incite the Croats against the Serbs was the Holy See in Rome. The Vatican went so far as to denounce the Zagreb Bishop at the time, Josip Strossmayer,

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because he dared to promote openly the ideal of "Christian unity" between the Catholic Croats and the Orthodox Serbs. Dame Rebecca records that Strossmayer was despised in nineteenth-century Vatican circles because, in their eyes, he was "lamentably deficient in bigotry." But it was the Hapsburg Empire's demise and the creation of the new state of Yugoslavia following World War I that made the Vatican a truly important and, as it would turn out, a truly tragic factor in Croat-Serb relations.

HOWEVER uplifting the ideal of a south Slav federation may have looked from the standpoint of Hapsburg tyranny, the reality quickly turned into something the Croats could not abide. Their political ties to Central Europe suddenly cut, the Croats found themselves the junior partners in an unwieldy, predominantly oriental federation stretching all the way to Greece and Albania, and ruled by the Serbian royal house of Karageorgevitch. "We Croats look toward Vienna, that is our world, not toward some backward capital like Belgrade," is a refrain heard not only in Dame Rebecca's day, but in our own. But as she explains:

> The greatest stimulus to anti-Serb feeling has lain outside Croatia, in the Roman Catholic Church itself. . . since the war of 1914 it has become more and more terrified of Communism. Can the Roman Catholic Church really be expected to like Yugoslavia? To like a state in which Croats, who used to be safely amalgamated with Catholic Austrians and Hungarians, are outnumbered by Orthodox Serbs, who are suspected of having no real feeling of enmity towards Bolshevist Russia?

Rarely has a travel writer proved so clairvoyant. A few months after the author's visit to Zagreb, Alojzije Stepinac was appointed Zagreb archbishop and the most painful, still unresolved chapter in the Roman Catholic Church's encounter with Nazism began.

The atmosphere in Croatia then was already infected. Three years previously, in 1934, the Croatian *Ustashe* (Insurrectionists), Europe's leading terrorist organization which had grown up out of the Croat reaction to Serbian rule, assassinated the Serbian King, Alexander I Karageorgevitch. To this troubled situation, Archbishop Stepinac brought three liabilities: political naivete, a Cromwellian obsession with public morals that distracted him from more immediate issues (such as the coming war), and a belief that, given the proper circumstances, "Serbia would be Catholic in twenty years." Elaborating, Stepinac said:

> The most ideal thing would be for the Serbs to return to the faith of their fathers (Catholicism). . . . Then we could at last breathe in this part of Europe, for Byzantinism has played a frightful role. . . in connection with the Turks.

When in 1941, on the heels of the German and Italian invasion of Yugoslavia, the Nazi-puppet state of Croatia was proclaimed by the fascist *Ustashe*, Stepinac was openly "joyful." He declared, "It is easy to see God's hand at work here." As late as 1942, when Croatian fascists were throwing Serbian women and children off cliffs in neighboring Bosnia, and organizing mass conversions of Serbs to Catholicism moments before executing them, Stepinac announced that "the whole civilized world is fighting against the terrible dangers of communism."

After that, however, the record becomes increasingly ambivalent, as Stepinac, faced with the consequences of what he himself had been advocating, went through a spiritual crisis. By the end of World War II, Stepinac began to emerge as something of a minor hero, who, having finally realized his mistakes, bravely defended the rights of Orthodox Serbs, as well as those of Jews and Gypsies. Unfortunately, this was all too little, too late.

When Tito came to power, he attempted to use Stepinac's record of collaboration with the *Ustashe* in the first years of the war as a means to blackmail the archbishop. Tito made Stepinac an offer: subjugate the Church to the new communist regime and everything will be forgotten. Stepinac refused. The archbishop was subsequently tried in a

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Stalinist kangaroo court and convicted as a war criminal. Yugoslav communists then proceeded to arrest and torture hundreds of Croatian Catholic priests. For Tito—half-Croat, half-Slovene—persecuting the Croatian Catholic Church was good politics, as it ameliorated his relationship with the dominant Serbs, who, having ruled pre-World War II Yugoslavia and having formed the backbone of the anti-Nazi resistance, were unhappy with their reduced political role in Tito's new regime.

Stepinac was a complicated man with a complicated wartime record. His peasant prejudices and lack of political judgement led him into a disastrous relationship with the *Ustashe*, but he confronted his own self and went on to fight evil. Had he been given a fair trial, the air between the Croats and Serbs after the war might have been partially cleared. Instead, Tito's show trial polarized the issue, making Stepinac into a martyr—a "beloved saint"—for the Croats and a war criminal for the Serbs, "the priest who baptized with one hand and slaughtered with the other." (In fact, Stepinac, located in Zagreb, had no control and only imperfect knowledge about what local priests and *Ustashe* units were doing in Bosnia, where the atrocities were being committed. But Tito's prosecutors cared little for such details.)

Thus the intercommunal passions born of imperial collapse that Rebecca West observed in 1937 were detonated by the Nazi occupation and then permanently hardened into stone by Tito's police state mechanism. After the war, the Croats, emboldened by the Vatican's uncompromising stance—not just toward communism, but toward any soul-searching or self-appraisal whatsoever regarding the relationship between Croatian priests and the pro-Nazi *Ustashe*—viewed communist Yugoslavia as a Serbian-led conspiracy against the Croatian nation. The *Ustashe* movement was revived, albeit not to its pre-war level. Croatia, on account of its fiery, canalized passions, had become, unwittingly, indistinguishable from the rest of the Balkans.

The Serbs also felt oppressed by Tito, but in a different sort of way. As Dame Rebecca recalls in page upon page of lusciously described history, the Serbs, like the Greeks and the Arabs, were heir to a great historical legacy that, when contrasted with their present decrepitude, made them a romantic and overly sensitive race, with chips aplenty on their shoulders.

In the early fourteenth century, when across the Adriatic the sun was barely rising on the Florentine Renaissance, medieval Serbia was the most powerful, storied, and artistically developed state in southeastern Europe. Its armies were poised to conquer Byzantium, its kings as clever, fascinating, and bawdy as the Roman Claudians and the English Tudors, and its art ahead of the Italians. Then, in 1389, the Ottoman Turks smashed through medieval Serbia and all of this greatness came to an abrupt end. The next time Serbia breathed was five hundred years later, when the Serbs wrested local control away from the Ottoman Sultans in the middle of the nineteenth century.

While Italy and other nations kept developing, Serbia sank into backwardness. The period after World War I represented a brief renewal for the Serbs, who once again governed a large region through their own kings. Then came the hammer blows of Croatian resistance with its *Ustashe* component, the Nazi occupation and subsequent slaughter of perhaps hundreds of thousands of Serbs in Nazi-supported, *Ustashe*-manned death camps. And finally the rule of whom the Serbs might consider the last Ottoman sultan: Tito.

THE CROATS, precisely because they were fortunate enough to be ruled by the Hapsburgs rather than the Ottomans, were everything the Serbs resented. Tito poured acid into Serbia's wounds by decreeing that the great medieval Serbian kings—Milutin, Dushan, and Lazar—were, by communist definition, "imperialists" guilty of "reactionary nationalism." In addition, Tito gave the Muslim Albanians local control in Kosovo, the southern part of Ser-

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bia where the most glorious chapters in Serbia's medieval history had been written. To the Serbs, this was as if the Ottoman Sultanate had risen from the dead, as the Albanians had been converted to Islam and first settled in large numbers in the Kosovo area by the medieval Ottoman army.

Yes, Tito brought the south Slavs together. But at a price too terrible to be worth it. History's judgment on Tito will be almost as negative as its judgment on other communist rulers in Eastern Europe. During World War II, he was a hero by accident only: had Nazi Germany not invaded the Soviet Union, Stalin's communist allies, including Tito, would doubtlessly have collaborated with Hitler. Tito was a south Slav patriot to the extent that he murdered Croats and Serbs regardless of their ethnic identity, if they were not communist. Smashing the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia and forcing the Serbs to spit upon their own history, Tito's price for south Slav unity was far too high, and the reckoning has now come due.

Despite anticommunist upheavals everywhere else in Eastern Europe, including even Albania, Titoist communism has soldiered on in Serbia simply because the local party there deftly turned itself into a vehicle of nationalist hatred against the Croats and Albanians. This is why Serbian communists require a civil war to survive. The moment a peace mechanism starts operating in earnest, the last ideological remnant of Tito in Yugoslavia will begin collapsing.

While communism is breathing its last in Serbia (and in Eastern Europe therefore), the Roman Catholic Church is a more vital force than ever in neighboring Croatia. This is because Catholicism, both as a moral basis for living and, to use Elias Canetti's phrase, as a "crowd symbol" of Croatian nationhood, was what gave Croats the psychological strength to endure four and a half decades of post-Nazi, totalitarian rule under Tito and his successors.

As in Poland, Croatian Catholicism is a vast universe encompassing many trends. Rebecca West intuits this brilliantly by making the Church the focal point of her study of Croatia and by seeing the Church in both the most negative and most positive terms, with barely a hint of contradiction. Thus, while blaming the Holy See for the hatred between Serbs and Croats, she is also able to exclaim, after visiting the Zagreb Cathedral on Easter Eve, 1937, that "there was an intensity of feeling that was not only of immense and exhilarating force, but had an honorable origin, proceeding from realist passion, from whole belief."

THE ROMAN Catholic Church is now at an unprecedented crossroads in Croatia. Vis-á-vis communism, it has been—exactly as in Poland—a lone refuge in the darkness. But unlike the Polish church, its historical record is riven with charges of complicity with the most appalling evil. With communism's collapse, that record is sooner rather than later going to come under close scrutiny; not just by Serbs and other victims of *Ustashe*-run death camps, but by various liberal elements in Croatia itself. As long as communism blanketed Eastern Europe, the Vatican was viewed entirely positively, as a defender of human rights. This trend continued through the anticommunist revolution in Poland and other countries, because the Church's historical record in those places harbored relatively few embarrassing skeletons.

The same could be said of the Hapsburg Empire, which has also been written and spoken about in gushing tones as a beacon of multi-ethnic tolerance and stability prior to the nightmare of Nazism and communism. However, the record in Yugoslavia for both the Vatican and the Hapsburgs is far from positive, and it is now Yugoslavia—whose unraveling and reformulation will take years to resolve—that is going to occupy a prominent position in media coverage of Eastern Europe.

The Balkans, in other words, must not be confused with the Baltics, whose political landscape has been friendly to conservative ideologues. The Balkans' oriental tapestry of ethnic problems, further burdened by the collision and overlapping of empires, makes it

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a mine field for those with moral and political certainties to promote; since nothing in the Balkans, as the situation of the Vatican demonstrates, is black or white. This may explain the remote attitude with which the Washington policy establishment observes fighting between Croats and Serbs, despite it being an armed conflict near to the heart of Central Europe: because it provides no ammunition to either the political Right or the political Left in America, the Yugoslav crisis arouses little interest here. The Left looks foolish on account of its romance with Tito, and the Right—if it is smart—will not embrace the "free-market Croats," who have yet to exorcise the ghosts of their own *Ustashe* past. The Balkans, rather, is where area specialists are valuable; those who can distinguish the merely gray from the somewhat grayer strands. *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* accomplishes this task, and is by necessity therefore over 1,100 pages long.

AFTER VISITING Croatia and Serbia, Rebecca West journeyed on to Bosnia and Hercegovina. As Bosnia's northern part contains a mixed population of Croats and Serbs, it is, in political terms, an extension of the Croat-Serb dispute, only more bloody and confused. Just as border-area Germans are super-Germans and Croats super-Central Europeans and super-Catholics, the Croats in Bosnia who live alongside the Serbs are super-Croats, as their Serbian neighbors are super-Serbs. Gavrilo Princip, the terrorist who murdered Archduke Franz Ferdinand, was a Serb from Bosnia. Dame Rebecca explains how Bosnian-Serb hatred of the Hapsburgs—and by extension of the Hapsburg-influenced Croats—grew organically from the Hapsburg takeover of Bosnia in 1878. This specific hatred ignited World War I. In addition, the worst World War II atrocities in Yugoslavia occurred in Bosnia, as well as the fighting in 1991 (the disputed Krajina region in Croatia abuts Bosnia).

The principal difference between the violent chaos of 1914 and of 1991 is that no great power has an alliance with either the Serbs or the Croats, so what is happening now will continue to happen only in the Balkans and spread no further. Neighboring Italy and Austria are economically and politically robust enough not to be destabilized by refugees. So for Western Europe, Yugoslavia—despite its proximity—is likely to be more of a public relations problem than a strategic one: the very fact of a civil war on the continent being a sign of Europe's inability to project power.

Europe's difficulty, in this case, stems partly from the way that several European states are historically bound-up in the Croat-Serb dispute. The indictment of Hapsburg Austria in *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon* shows why earlier talk of Vienna as a venue for Yugoslav peace talks was laughable. Italy, an adjacent Catholic nation associated as it is with the Vatican, is also distrusted by the Serbs. And the Germans, who have the most economic clout in the Balkans, simply cannot get involved: "History [World War II] forbids it," explained German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The irony may be that the United States, which has no real stake in what happens in Yugoslavia and is pushing Europe to share the power burden on the continent, will wind up helping to broker a final peace deal a few years down the road, as it has done in Angola and is attempting to do in the Middle East.

YUGOSLAVIA's southernmost region of Macedonia provides the climax for *Black Lamb and Grey Falcon*. "Macedonia was the most beautiful place that I had ever seen in my life. . . Macedonia is the country I have always seen between sleeping and waking," writes Dame Rebecca. It is in Macedonia where the book's title is fully explained. The "black lamb" was an animal Dame Rebecca saw slaughtered in a Muslim fertility rite in Macedonia, leading her to say: "All our western thought is founded on this repulsive pretense that pain is the proper price of any good thing." While the "grey falcon" stands for humanity's tragic response to the sacrifice of the black lamb. In a Serbian

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poem, the prophet Elijah, disguised as a falcon, gives a Serbian general the choice between an earthly kingdom and a heavenly one. The general chooses the latter, erecting a church instead of preparing his army, so that the Turks defeat him. In other words, the author rages, paraphrasing the pacifist's secret desire: "Since it is wrong to be the priest and sacrifice the lamb, I will be the lamb and be sacrificed by the priest."

Thus the issue is not whether good should confront evil, but how good should confront evil. Rebecca West's answer is by way of the baroque style of her book, whereby every church and mountain vista, and every person met along the way, becomes an excuse for an exposition into some aspect of history or local myth. Study the language, culture, and history of a place, and always keep your strategy attuned to those realities, she seems to repeat, over and over again. This book is a plea for knowledge over mere opinion. Yugoslavia, because it completely resists simplification and condensation on op-ed pages, is potent ammunition for this argument.

Macedonia is where Yugoslavian territorial and linguistic disputes dissolve into utter formlessness. Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbians all seriously doubt the very existence of Macedonia, assuming it is really a westward, northward, or southward extension of their own homelands. Bulgarians doubt the existence of the Macedonian language, claiming it is really a western Bulgarian dialect. Macedonians, for their part, claim not only the Macedonia that presently exists within the confines of the "Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia," but parts of Bulgaria, Greece, and Albania too. Everyone's map is different from everybody else's. No region of Europe has the abstract potential for violent anarchy and redrawing of borders as does Macedonia. For Rebecca West, Macedonia is the ultimate metaphor for the Balkans. We shall see.□

Robert D. Kaplan has reported extensively on the Balkans for the Atlantic *and the* New Republic, *and has recently completed a book*, Balkan Ghosts.

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Books

Classy But Shaky

Kenneth Minogue

Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992). 400 pp., $24.95.

FRANCIS Fukuyama has certainly added a touch of class to international punditry. Both his original essay and now his new book have introduced a sophisticated Hegelian concern with the dynamics of self-consciousness to the familiar mix of inductive generalization and qualified extrapolation more commonly found in the genre. And it is part of the success of his argument about the end of history that it is invariably greeted at first with incredulity, even disdain. Surely it is absurd to think that the flow of historical events is just going to dry up! Such incredulity, however, merely lures the critic deeper into the thesis. "History," it is explained, does not mean history, but rather a developmental process deeper than the events studied by historians. Well, yes, mutters the critic, but surely we cannot tell what the future will hold. No indeed, agrees Fukuyama (with a certain degree of wobble), but we may have grounds for thinking that we have reached the edges of an epoch, and may henceforth be able to know at least the *kinds* of things that can happen. It may be possible at last to entertain a kind of cosmic optimism: Freedom, in a certain sense, has irreversibly established itself in the world.

The significance of Fukuyama's new book, then, lies not merely in his resuscitation of old philosophical themes, but also in the dialogic character he brings to areas previously dominated by a banal and arid positivism. He has added a new dimension to our understanding of international affairs. Dimensions, however, can be disorienting things, and my view is that, while greatly refreshing political discussion, he has been seriously misled at both the philosophical and predictive levels of his argument. The basic issue can in fact be initially stated without raising the philosophical question, and that is where I shall begin.

FUKUYAMA works backward from the collapse of communism. What it means, he argues, is that modernization in economics and liberal democracy in politics are the culmination of human history. There can no longer be any serious Luddism which would reject the project of improving human life by utilizing technology and opening up the exchange of goods and services on an international scale. Less plausibly, he argues that liberal democracy is now the only civil condition that will satisfy the aspirations of mankind. The collapse of communism means that the whole world will become a kind of America and (as David Stove said in his comments on the original Fukuyama essay) no more Colonel Qaddafis, only Colonel Sanders everywhere and forever. Occasionally Fukuyama glances nervously over his shoulder at Islam, and the word "provisional" dominates the last paragraph, but these shufflings are mere self-protection. It is the bold thesis that matters.

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The thesis rests on two mechanisms. What sustains the argument about modernity is the familiar idea that once people learn the power of natural science they will use it. Such powerful knowledge cannot be unlearned, short of cosmic catastrophe. One of the five sections of the book recounts the familiar idea that "modern natural science regulates the direction of economic development by establishing a constantly changing horizon of production possibilities." The growth of modern economies runs in a dictatorial manner; indeed, in some circumstances, democracy may be a positive drag on prosperity. Some other mechanism is thus necessary in order to understand the second thesis—namely, why liberal democracy is the culmination in politics of human aspiration.

Fukuyama derives this mechanism from the philosophical fable about lordship and bondage that Hegel inserted into *The Phenomenology of Spirit*. Man is distinguished from other sentient creatures by self-consciousness, the exploring of which constituted, if anything did, Hegel's central preoccupation. A self-conscious creature demands recognition by others of his kind, and Hegel's version of the state of nature stories found in earlier political philosophers has two original men trying to impose on each other recognition of superiority.

> PERSONALLY, I cannot help imagining them as a couple of grunting samurai. The loser in this struggle is reduced to slavery, the winner is the lord—whose victory turns out to be vain because it is only recognition by equals that can give him a sense of worth. The slave in time attains his own sense of worth through working on nature. History is the process by which, through the many vicissitudes of civil history, this essential dilemma generates the modern state of Hegel's own time, in which all men become free by way of a citizenship granting equal rights to all. An important episode in this story is the spread of Christianity, which first explores the idea of a worth to be recognized and valued in all men, even if at first only in a subjective form.

The quick and easy way to vulgarize Hegel is to bring this fable into direct conjunction with actual historical events. This is what Marx did in construing industrial workers as "wage slaves" and it is what Fukuyama does in following the view, attributed to "Hegel-Kojève," that the French Revolution implemented here on earth the Christian vision of a free and equal society:

> In making this revolution, the former slaves risked their lives, and in so doing proved that they had overcome the very fear of death that had served originally to define them as slaves. The principles of liberty and equality were then carried to the rest of Europe by Napoleon's victorious armies.

The first step in making some sense out of this ripe piece of French intellectual nonsense is to detach Hegel from Kojève. Hegel was a subtle and serious philosopher; Kojève a Left Bank Marxist intellectual who, in his lectures on Hegel's *Phenomenology*, cut a swathe through French intellectual circles in the 1930s and after. As might be expected of a thinker deeply imprinted by Marx, these lectures focused above all on the lordship and bondage story. One can see the secret of his power in such remarks as the following, which Fukuyama quotes:

> If idle Mastery is an impasse, laborious Slavery, in contrast, is the source of all human, social, historical progress. History is the history of the working Slave.

> THE MIND immediately recognizes such statements as vacuous; it is then explained, however, that the crucial terms—slave, history, progress—must be redefined, and what pops out is a plausible banality: Work rather than violence makes the world go round. This kind of thing is what often passes for thought on the Left Bank. Fukuyama is overimpressed by it, but what matters is what he makes of it.

Hegel did indeed look to the French Revolution as a beacon of freedom in his youth; later he characterized the revolution-

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aries as men disastrously impelled by a kind of "Hindu fanaticism" to identify the world with abstract universals. In the Declaration of the Rights of Man he saw a codification of one of the essential features of the modern state. Freedom had at last been achieved by all. And Napoleon's world-historical importance was as destroyer of feudal survivals and diffuser of modern ideas. It was not Hegel, however, who brought his philosophical fable about lordship and bondage into abrupt juxtaposition with the events of his own lifetime. It would have made no sense. The men who made the French Revolution were slaves in absolutely no sense whatever. Hegel, like all modern political philosophers, knew perfectly well that freedom can never be created by an uprising of slaves.

All slaves can actually do is recreate their slavery. Resentment of and rebellion against their condition in no way supplies the cultural conditions that would allow them to build a free condition of things. This point is of the first importance for both Hegel and Fukuyama. In creating a universal history, Hegel tried to incorporate the non-Western world, but his treatment of China, India, and Africa is the least plausible part of his developmental sequence. He hops from one to the other, but his hopping is driven by no serious dialectic. It is only as we move on from the Greeks that we get anything seriously developmental. In the despotic world of the East, Hegel remarked in a famous phrase, only one is free. For this very reason, these despotisms seem to revolve in an endless cycle of decadence and regeneration, and thus generate no serious reason for the move to slave-owning societies in which some are free. Hegel's project of a universal history revealing the story of *all* mankind as a progressive development is probably impossible. What it certainly does is reveal its ethnocentricity, both in taking it that the project of the whole of humanity (rather than merely a few Europeans) was achieving freedom, and as a consequence in tagging the grand civilizations of the East on to the story as mere prolegomena to the real development.

Fukuyama follows his German masters—Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche—in this point as in others, in telling us that "the silliest argument" against the possibility of democracy spreading throughout the world consists of pointing to the absence of democratic traditions. There is no people or culture, he triumphantly points out, that did not start out with "strongly authoritarian traditions." He claims that this is no less true of Europe than elsewhere, but he is wrong. The barbarian tribes who invaded the Roman Empire had in many cases free and consultative ways of arranging their affairs. This was notably true of the Franks, and also of the Anglo-Saxons. The English, who are an emblematic people in the history of freedom, at no recorded point were a collection of slaves who rose up and took power from masters. Rather, they evolved and cultivated a free form of society over many centuries, and in some degree the same was true of all Europeans. The growth of cities and the creation of a bourgeoisie is an important part of this story. Fukuyama has in part been misled by the bastard expression "authoritarian," which muddles the practice of recognizing authority (without which no freedom can exist) with an imperious manner of command appropriate to a despot. Masterful characters are everywhere; despots are not.

THIS MISTAKE is embedded, then, in his version of the Kojèvian caricature of Hegel, whereby the French and American revolutions stand for the slaves rising up and creating popular sovereignty and the rules of law:

> The inherently unequal recognition of masters and slaves is replaced by universal and reciprocal recognition, where every citizen recognizes the dignity and humanity of every other citizen, and where that dignity is recognized in turn by the state through the granting of *rights*.

Let us leave the historical crudity aside, however, and concentrate on the actual plausibility of the claim that universal citizenship, as enshrined in the practices that follow from

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a declaration of rights, is the final culmination of mankind's blind struggle to reach a civil condition in which each of its individual members receives adequate recognition of his humanity. It will be immediately obvious that it is only in the West that this basic drive for recognition has generated the developmental process that has taken Europeans through the classical and feudal worlds and culminated, notionally, in modern liberal democracy.

Fukuyama argues then (with a little wobbling at the end) that the modern development of rights signals an irreversible change in political practices. I do not believe that it does, and I think we can see why if we begin by remembering the curious history of the very idea of rights. In the eighteenth century, rights were immensely *à la mode* in radical circles, only to be dismissed with contempt among nineteenth-century socialists and evolutionary thinkers. Rights were then rejected as part of bourgeois ideology, enshrining the demands of an alienated individualism. They did not begin to regain their intellectual cachet until well into the twentieth century. They then became to democratic politicians what sweets are at children's parties—things to be tossed to the masses as certain to give pleasure and yield popularity.

This remarkable career gives us a clue to what is going on at the deeper levels of contemporary politics. The basic underlying drive in modern political activity is to create an ideal community—a *telos*—such that, once it has been achieved, no basic conflicts will be left as occasions for deadly quarrels. This end of politics will be the end of history and (as Nietzsche-Foucault have argued) also the end of man, for the heroic and morally interesting misfit we know today will have been replaced by a completely socialized creature. This *telos* may be established in the name of humanity, or rationality, or perhaps in terms of ideals such as justice or peace, but it must be animated by a single homogenizing principle, for if there were more than one principle, contradictions would certainly arise. Communism seized one rhetorical advantage by describing this *telos* in the vaguest possible terms—it was merely going to be a *real* community.

Now what collapsed in Russia and Eastern Europe was one particular unified version of this grand project. But it is by no means necessary that the *telos* must be achieved by the frontal attack of some grand mobilizing project. It might well arise also as the outcome of the cooperative endeavors of some set of people (administrators, for example) whose tendency is always to *rationalize* and manage human activities. Hence we may suitably call this tendency "rationalism" and there is a precedent for the name in the work of Michael Oakeshott and F.A. Hayek.

Rationalism has a metaphysics of its own, which is Platonic. It construes the world in terms of form and matter, idea and substance. In politics, the form is the *telos* and people are the "matter." Although Plato is evidently the progenitor of this way of thinking about politics, it is a view seldom far from the surface of Western politics. It is in Machiavelli, for example, and in Hobbes in a different form. Rationalism, then, is the purposive politics appropriate to movements seeking to transform the status quo, and proletariats of one kind or another are the matter which it seeks to mobilize or shape into whatever happens to be the chosen *telos*.

MARX IS, of course, the greatest modern exponent of this way of thinking. In his vision of communism, individuals are absorbed without remainder into the abstract universal of the community. As he remarks of death, in what I take to be his only comment on the subject, it is no more than "a biological accident." Human beings are thus taken to be no more than the biological substratum of social forces.

But the same Platonic assumptions are being made when social engineers set out to perform the operation known as "changing social attitudes," or when they treat people as the "resources" of the state. A fabricator using material will, of course, discard whatever is unsuitable to his purposes, and rationalists who have achieved the total and un-

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constitutional power which a revolution yields have not been slow to discard human beings who are, as it were, "surplus to requirements." These are merely the melodramatic cases, however, and rationalists among us are more likely to be of the relatively casual kind, devoted to imposing some specific bit of a *telos* upon us. But such limited ambitions, when combined together, begin to adumbrate a fully harmonized society.

The basic division in politics, then, is not between such doctrinal surface phenomena as communism and liberal democracy, but between different views of what a human being is. In rationalist terms, human beings are "matter" suitable for transformation into a *telos*, and the reason the idea of rights went into eclipse for more than a century was that the formal rights enshrined in the famous eighteenth-century declarations were taken to be barriers (admittedly of a pretty rough and ready kind) protecting the individual from any possible collectivist project. Their return to favor signals the popular discovery that many new kinds of rights can be promulgated that have the immense rhetorical advantage of both appealing to the powerful individualist sentiments of people in modern liberal societies, and also adumbrating the ends of some element of the collectivist *telos*. For rationalism is a chameleon. It adapts to threats by changing its appearance. In earlier forms, for example, it appeared as a belief in central planning. The intellectual collapse of that version of the project has now produced a remarkable enthusiasm for the free market—just as long as it is a "level playing field" with all the inequalities removed. Rationalism merely shifts its ground and continues to nibble away at our autonomy.

These considerations help to bring out the fact that Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy has been fatally infected by a number of current confusions. The reason is that he has no real conception of individuality. He talks, for example, of "the highly atomistic economic liberalism of the United States or Britain, based exclusively on rational desire. . . . " He muddles self-interest and selfishness in telling us that Hegel, by contrast with Hobbes and Locke, provides us with a self-understanding of liberal society "which is based on the non-selfish part of the human personality." He even thinks that the "genealogy of modern liberal societies in the consciousness of the slave rather than the master . . . is today manifest in the spread of compassion and steadily decreasing tolerance for violence, death, and suffering." This is to draw a Nietzschean conclusion from a Hegelian premise. It is at moments like this that a certain impatience with Fukuyama's practice of dealing in packaged historical composites like liberalism is hard to avoid. The German roots of his theory have obscured his understanding of Anglo-Saxon realities.

THEY DO indeed supply him with something like a theory of individualism, and it is the central concept of his argument. That which is self-conscious in the individual is here construed in terms of *thymos*, the term that Plato used to describe the specific character of the defenders of his *Republic*. The word is generally translated as "spiritedness" and the virtue it generates for Plato is courage. Fukuyama identifies as *thymos* that part of the individual which craves the recognition of others. His thesis, following Hegel, is that nothing short of citizenship in a universal society will satisfy this demand, and that this craving was extensively frustrated by the inevitable subservience of most people in historical societies. On this specific point he is clearly on shaky ground for reasons we have already mentioned. The thymotic passion for civil recognition has never surfaced independently in non-Western societies. Perhaps it is something non-Westerners will want once they know about it. Or perhaps not. But Fukuyama also tells us that *thymos* lies at the heart of the work ethic, and that the Japanese "salaryman" has a thymotic attachment to his group. What he has to say about the importance of *thymos* is often convincing; his view that it must issue in the universal state, however, merely generalizes Western experience.

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Indeed, not even the experience of the West as a whole. For *thymos* is an assertive, outgoing human drive. It turns out to cover a great many things. It is, basically, the universal desire to be recognized and valued, which is here specified as *isothymia*. But it also includes the passion of the master to be recognized as superior. This is what appears as pride or glory in the literature, and Fukuyama calls it *megalothymia*. He is thus uncertain as to whether *thymos* can be satisfied with equal recognition, or whether it requires superiority. Kojève took the view that "the universal and homogeneous state would be the last stage in human history because it was *completely satisfying* to man." This seems unimaginable. But, however *thymos* is conceived in this argument, it is invariably assertive, and thus distinct from the individuality of Anglo-Saxon thought, which is generally understood in terms of protected space rather than outgoing assertion.

FUKUYAMA tells us that Hegel would never have endorsed the views of "certain liberals in the Anglo-Saxon tradition" who believed that the only role of government is to facilitate the freedom of individuals "to pursue their selfish private interests." Now it happens that the term "selfish" at this moment is commonly used to attack the attitudes of the rich during the 1980s. Fukuyama recognizes, however, that the typical entrepreneur takes his risks not merely to satisfy desires but primarily out of the thymotic impulse to excel. The terms "thymotic" and "selfish" must thus be recognized as at least substantially overlapping.

He is thus to be found attacking individualism in its Anglo-Saxon version and defending it in its German version. He does this to such an extent as to Hegelianize the American political vocabulary. Admitting that the founders talked of freedom in Lockian terms, he nonetheless finds in the vocabulary of "dignity" a Hegelian element lurking behind American political justification. Now the significance of this intellectual leaning comes out in a kind of Hegelian messianism:

> The fact that modern education teaches the ideas of liberty and equality is not accidental; these are slave ideologies that have been thrown up in reaction to the real situation in which slaves found themselves. Christianity and communism were both slave ideologies. . . that captured part of the truth. But in the course of time the irrationalities and self-contradictions of both were revealed. . . . The collapse of Marxist ideology in the late 1980s reflected, in a sense, the achievement of a higher level of rationality on the part of those who lived in such societies, and their realization that rational universal recognition could be had only in a liberal social order.

The Roman god Janus was a recognition by the Romans that everything faces both ways. He ought to be installed as the god of trends and tendencies. Anglo-Saxon individualism rests on a certain skepticism; the German ideas that Fukuyama has used believe themselves to possess "the truth" and a "higher form of rationality." The reality is that we are surrounded by paradoxes. Marx-Kojève believed in a future which they knew would bore them stiff. The mechanism of science, which here appears as a steamroller of progress, has at least two alternative futures. It may in time simply break down by generating so many system failures or side effects of the kind familiar to us in agriculture, or medicine, or modern transport. Or, by way of giving us biogenetic powers over future generations, it may take the kind of speculation we find in Fukuyama onto a quite new plane. Again, liberal democracy as satisfying the human drive toward universal recognition rests upon very shaky foundations even in America itself, and even Fukuyama has doubts on this score. Will group *megalothymia* in the form of nationalism dominate the future? It seems very clear that no philosophical machinery can answer such questions.

It can, however, raise others. The most obvious limitation of Hegelian philosophy in this area is that its power of explanation ebbs away the moment it extends itself beyond the West. Hegel made a heroic stab at including

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Asia and Africa in his universal history, but it is unmistakably the weakest part of the enterprise. But we in the West have now actually succeeded in incorporating the outside world into a Westernized global system. We have now taught them our tricks; the question is what the rest of the world will do with them. The end of history is certainly the end of something, and there is no mistaking the pessimism such an ending induces in those who recognize it.

Do we perhaps resemble the old Roman Empire, which precariously, for a time, incorporated many foreign elements but eventually fell to the barbarians? Can the end of history perhaps be the end of the historic destiny of the West? I do not believe in such grand epochal sketchwork, but that would seem to be the most likely conclusion to emerge from this particular bit of philosophical machinery.

The End of History and the Last Man is for all its faults, an important book. Some of it is merely a conventional tour of the modern world, and much of its philosophy is done with the broadest of brushes, but it is not trivial. Above all, it might bring us back to important issues of reality, and even perhaps save political theory from endless wanderings in the utopian world of social justice.□

Kenneth Minogue is a professor of political science at the London School of Economics and author of Alien Powers: The Pure Theory of Ideology.

Johnny, We Hardly Knew Ye

Robert D. Novak

Michael R. Beschloss, *The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963* (New York: Harper Collins, 1991). 816 pp., $29.95.

NEARLY three decades after his assassination, 1991 was a very bad year for John F. Kennedy. The best-selling, well-reviewed *A Question of Character* by Thomas Reeves took a revisionist view of Kennedy's fabled thousand days, questioning the slain young president's morality and values from a left-of-center vantage point. *The Crisis Years*, though it attracted less notice, may prove more devastating to Kennedy's reputation.

That is because the young historian Michael Beschloss carries less ideological baggage than Reeves in considering Kennedy. As in his *Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U–2 Affair* (1986), Beschloss combines a stylish narrative with rigorous historical standards and dogged research. Though this is not a polemic, Camelot emerges tarnished from a long and detailed account. What seemed to many of us thirty years ago to be disciplined patriotism emerges from Beschloss' remorseless prism as vain posturing. The young, charismatic president who captured the imagination of the nation seems here to more closely resemble the caricature sketched by his Republican detractors of the time.

For a reviewer who as a young journalist was awed by Kennedy and has long cherished his memory as a vanished model of what a Democrat ought to be, Beschloss' account destroys illusions. Even though the author marshals his evidence without much preaching, Kennedy appears vain, shallow, disorganized, petty, undisciplined, deceitful, and frivolous. Elected after a campaign in which he accused Dwight D. Eisenhower of reacting to Soviet moves, Kennedy comes out as not only less prudent than the old general but as a counter-puncher, confused and dismayed by Nikita Khrushchev's roundhouse swings.

By telescoping this long account of a

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brief presidency's foreign policy, it may be possible to convey the book's impact. One Kennedy mistake leads to another, until nuclear warfare is confronted in the Cuban Missile Crisis—the climax of his presidency a year before his death.

IT BEGAN in his campaign for the 1960 Democratic presidential nomination with what Beschloss calls Kennedy's "gaffe" in suggesting that President Eisenhower send "regrets" to Khrushchev for Gary Powers' U–2 flight. To erase the image of softness (fostered not only by his eventual Republican opponent, Richard Nixon, but by his Democratic opponent, Lyndon B. Johnson), Kennedy moved to the right so effectively that he seemed a more rigorous cold warrior than Nixon. Thus began a pattern of striking poses for political consumption that guided every policy.

Kennedy set the tone in his Salt Lake City campaign speech, describing a "struggle for supremacy between two conflicting ideologies: freedom under God versus ruthless, Godless tyranny." He consistently exaggerated Soviet military and economic progress, calling the Republicans "the party which gave us the missile gap." This muscular rhetoric continued after his election. "For a decade," Beschloss writes, "no president had spoken in such apocalyptic terms."

Most effectively, Kennedy taunted the Republican administration for failure to move against Fidel Castro in Cuba—a tactic that set into motion a nearly calamitous chain of events. When he entered office, he found to his dismay a planned invasion of Cuba backed by Cuban exiles, who in turn were backed by U.S. air power. He was dismayed because, as this book makes clear, the hard line of the 1960 campaign was for political consumption only. As described by Beschloss, Kennedy feared "Khrushchev would feel compelled to retaliate by moving against Berlin," putting the new president in a dilemma: "He would be forced to renege on the Western commitment, be called an appeaser and watch NATO collapse, or else call Khrushchev's bluff and possibly pull the two great powers into nuclear war."

Kennedy's decision tells much about his foreign policy, which followed neither his tough public rhetoric nor the conciliatory posture of United Nations Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, but was influenced by both. His decision on Cuba, as framed by Beschloss:

> He did not want to be indicted for softness on Communism. Nor did he wish to inflame Latin America, the Third World and Stevenson liberals by approving an all-out invasion. He was anxious that American action against Cuba not trigger a Soviet action against Berlin. Wishing to intervene without paying the price of intervention, he therefore ordained an operation too small to succeed and too big to hide America's involvement.

The resulting disaster at the Bay of Pigs left the Soviets pondering the indecisiveness of their new adversary, leading Khrushchev to bully Kennedy at the Vienna summit with threats to "normalize" divided Berlin, as he never could have intimidated Eisenhower. A stricken Kennedy returned home to repudiate the non-existent missile gap and belittle Soviet pretensions of nuclear parity. That, in turn, forced Khrushchev's hand.

Under pressure from both the Kremlin and the Chinese for a harder line, Khrushchev responded by granting the East Germans long-sought permission to build the Berlin Wall. Beschloss makes an excellent case for Kennedy's "complicity" in the wall's construction as an "interim solution" to Berlin. "The President's effort to evade criticism for encouraging or allowing the wall by making no statement after it rose and scarcely mentioning the subject in public for the rest of his life was hardly in the tradition of great leadership," Beschloss writes. His famed "I am a Berliner" speech in West Berlin in 1963 marked the first and only time he publicly condemned the wall, two years after the event.

When Khrushchev responded to the U.S. denial of U.S.-Soviet parity by breaking his word and unilaterally resuming nu-

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clear tests, Kennedy laid out in public the full details of U.S. nuclear superiority. "Khrushchev had fashioned an illusion of Soviet strength most of all so that the United States would treat his country as an equal," Beschloss writes. "Now Kennedy seemed to have deliberately chosen to humiliate him. . . . "

Khrushchev's solution was to alter the balance of power by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy's personal weakness at Vienna (the Soviets are described as "amazed" that Kennedy was so "scared" by Khrushchev's "theatrical bellicosity") led to the miscalculation that the president, once he discovered the missiles, "would be paralyzed by the same fear of Soviet retaliation in Berlin that had impelled him to accept humiliation at the Bay of Pigs."

The president's warning against offensive weapons in Cuba was "too late to stop Khrushchev's Cuba operation" but was "so precise" that it forced "a full-fledged confrontation" that nearly triggered nuclear war. Kennedy's famous address to the nation in October 1962 "was designed to divert attention from his private belief that the missiles did not seriously increase the Soviet military danger and the fact that he had not warned against them until it was too late."

The agreement to remove missiles from Cuba, based on the secret protocol of taking U.S. missiles out of Turkey, was a stunning Kennedy victory in the realm of American public opinion. But its hidden costs were high. "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again," Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov warned after the agreement. Khrushchev's fall was now sealed, and the arms build-up by his successors ushered in two decades of superpower tension.

After the missile crisis, the highlight of the president's remaining year was his American University speech which was supposed to signal a swing to the left for his second term. Called by Beschloss "easily the best speech of Kennedy's life," it was "light years from [his] Salt Lake City jeremiad of the 1960 campaign and his muscle-flexing inaugural address." Warning of a nuclear holocaust, Kennedy declaimed, "Let us re-examine our attitude toward the Cold War."

But what did it really mean except a different brand of rhetoric? The speech and his private comments that he would withdraw from Vietnam once safely re-elected have led to the theory that catastrophic war for the United States would have been avoided had Kennedy lived. But Beschloss is skeptical. After the 1964 election, "Kennedy might have worried that cries of 'Who Lost Vietnam?' would have undermined" his programs and political prowess. In fact, the deep Vietnamese involvement was a product of Kennedy's perceived humiliation at Vienna, where he is quoted telling associates: "Now we have a problem trying to make our power credible, and Vietnam looks like the place." This clouding of a coherent foreign policy by Kennedy's personal and political agenda permeates *The Crisis Years*.

BESCHLOSS knows a great deal more about Kennedy than about Khrushchev, despite the recent opening of Soviet sources. Nevertheless, for all his bluster and his Cuban missile blunder, Khrushchev's goals seem far clearer than his young adversary's: to spread communism around the world while reversing the economic stagnation even then afflicting the Soviet Union by shifting spending priorities away from the military. Prior to Cuba, says Beschloss, Khrushchev "had convinced most of the world of Soviet military superiority without having to pay for it."

In contrast, Kennedy looks rudderless. What seemed to many of us as a welcome vigor after the perceived torpor of the Eisenhower years does not fare well under the scrutiny of an objective historian. The entire fabric of Kennedy's foreign policy is woven in reaction to the initiatives of Khrushchev, though the Russian was the weaker adversary.

In the wake of the Bay of Pigs, the president turned to his brother Robert, a total neophyte, as a foreign policy lieutenant he could trust. The attorney general pursued a

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back-channel relationship with a Khrushchev aide and continued it even after it was clear that this procedure was dispensing disinformation that kept the U.S. off balance. The Kennedys did not fill in the State Department, which they considered the enemy, on the back-channel talks. Nor did they fill in the public on much of anything. The president lied about the Vienna summit, saying there had been "no threats of ultimatums by either side" and never mentioning Khrushchev's demands on Berlin. He publicly denied he had decided to disengage from Laos. He misrepresented the terms of agreement ending the Cuban Missile Crisis, including the secret concession on Turkey.

The tribal affinity of the two brothers led to a highly personalized outlook on world affairs. When the Bay of Pigs exploded, Bobby told Jack: "They can't do this to you." When he learned about missiles in Cuba, the president said Khrushchev "can't do this to me." The virile New Frontier comes over as downright nasty in Beschloss' retelling. Contending the State Department "really objects to me being president," Kennedy added, "They're not queer, but, well, they're sort of like Adlai." Secretary of State Dean Rusk is referred to by the president as "a good errand boy."

Beschloss has not been misled by the often deceptive oral histories, particularly Robert Kennedy's politically distorted account, and relies instead on documents and his own interviews. Thus, the taped accounts of the early Executive Committee meetings on the Cuban Missile Crisis "[do] not bear out the later claims made on his behalf that this was a president superbly in command of the crisis from the start."

ALTHOUGH newspaper accounts when the book was published stressed Kennedy's sexual escapades, that accounts for scarcely a dozen out of over seven hundred pages of text. More disturbing is Beschloss' account of the Vienna summit, based on transcripts he pried loose after four years of trying. "I have to show him I can be just as tough as he is," Kennedy told an aide before his only summit with Khrushchev. He gave just the opposite impression. To Khrushchev, according to his aide Fyodor Burlatsky, Kennedy had "more the look of an adviser, not a political decision maker or a president." He was self-deprecating, defensive, and guilty of "excessive candor" in Beschloss' view when he told Khrushchev that many U.S. obligations were made before he took office.

His greatest blunder at Vienna was telling Khrushchev that the United States and the Soviet Union were "more or less in balance" militarily—a statement both leaders knew to be untrue and which, according to Beschloss, "sent Khrushchev into near ecstasy" and gave him something to boast about the rest of his life.

State Department Kremlinologist Llewellyn Thompson had advised Kennedy to "avoid ideology, because Khrushchev will talk circles around you." Kennedy ignored the advice and, as the transcripts show, was a poor second in the debate between capitalism and communism. A sample: When Khrushchev ragged Kennedy about support from the business "monopolists," Kennedy noted that UAW leader Walter Reuther had supported him for president. "We *hanged* the likes of Reuther in Russia in 1917," Khrushchev shot back.

According to Beschloss, "The Chairman had the advantage of not only his half century as an agitator but of his overflowing idealism about Communism. . . . Against this, Kennedy the stereotypical pragmatist, armed mainly with speech material from the 1960 campaign, could not stand up." Though despised by the keepers of the JFK torch, Ronald Reagan would have had no trouble battling it out with Khrushchev in a war of words.

Michael Beschloss does not say so, but in his books and in his news analyses on CNN he leaves the impression that he is not keen on the intrusion of ideology into great power diplomacy. He appears to like Kennedy best when he is least ideological, and obviously prefers Eisenhower's matter-of-fact ap-

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proach. But Kennedy's problem was that his grandiloquent speeches, which stirred the nation and the world, bore little relationship to policy. Ideology plays no part in the internal deliberations because Kennedy in fact really did not believe or comprehend his own oratory about the vast differences between the two systems confronting each other from Cuba to Berlin.

The promise of the American University speech for the American Left was that it placed full emphasis on arms control, starting with a test ban. Thus, Kennedy was buying into the notion, which was firm U.S. policy until the Reagan administration, that what divided the United States and the Soviet Union was the arms the two nations possessed, not the reasons for possessing them.

Eighteen years before Reagan laid down his "evil empire" gauntlet, Kennedy at American University praised the Soviet Union's "many achievements." He is quoted earlier as telling peace activist Norman Cousins: "Mr. Khrushchev and I occupy approximately the same political positions inside our governments"—that is, both fighting off extremists. Equivalency for the Soviet Communist Party boss and the freely elected president of the United States is another notion characteristic of the flawed detente to come.

When John F. Kennedy is quoted here as saying privately, "It seems silly for us to be facing atomic war over a treaty preserving Berlin as the future capital of a reunited Germany when all of us know that Germany probably will never be united," he expresses the limited vision of the pragmatist who cannot dream. JFK's kingdom was not Camelot after all.□

Robert D. Novak is a syndicated columnist, a television commentator, and publisher of the Evans and Novak Political Report.

Our Woman in Manhattan

Arnold Beichman

Allan Gerson, *The Kirkpatrick Mission: Diplomacy Without Apology, America at the United Nations, 1981–1985* (New York: Free Press, 1991). 317 pp., $22.95.

SOME twenty-five years ago, Arthur J. Goldberg, then the United States ambassador to the United Nations, phoned me at home and asked me to prepare a speech for him dealing with the bleak Soviet history on human rights.

Goldberg, a one-time lawyer for the AFL-CIO, and I were old friends going back to my days as a labor reporter on the New York newspaper, *PM*. As I remember, he was much dissatisfied with his representative on the Human Rights Commission, who, under State Department orders, was responding to Soviet attacks with muffled cries of protest rather than the thunderous denunciation Goldberg would have preferred.

By the next morning Goldberg wanted a speech that would go all-out against the Soviet human rights record. As soon as I brought him the speech, he explained, he would read and edit it, and then, as he was supposed to, he would telefax it to the State Department assistant secretary for international organizations for a critique. Without waiting for a reply, he would then cross First Avenue to the UN General Assembly building and deliver the speech. That was Goldberg's way of dealing with a State Department that he knew would never approve the speech he wanted to make.

Things worked as planned. Goldberg had a great time delivering the speech, which, thanks to Drew Middleton, made page one of the *New York Times*. The following day, Goldberg called to thank me for my

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(unpaid) effort. He also told me that the morning after the speech, Charles Bohlen, former ambassador to the Soviet Union and then a high State Department official, had criticized the speech at the staff meeting in Washington which Secretary of State Dean Rusk presided over each morning. Bohlen believed that countering Soviet oratory served no purpose and irritated Third World countries. Soviet propaganda should, he believed, be treated with silent contempt.

Everybody knew that Goldberg had done an end run around State, but who would dare fire a former secretary of labor, a former associate justice of the Supreme Court whom President Lyndon Johnson had prevailed upon to take the UN post, and who, by virtue of that job, was also a member of the Cabinet and, in the event, the second ranking member of the State Department?

Moreover, Goldberg's subversion of State Department authority had ample precedent. UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge frequently defied State Department instructions—so much so that, on occasion, when John Foster Dulles wanted the U.S. vote to go a certain way he would personally come up from Washington to cast it. When Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy chided Lodge for ignoring voting instructions on a Belgian Congo resolution, Lodge told Murphy to take up his complaint with President Eisenhower. Lodge, who had helped Eisenhower win the 1952 GOP presidential nomination over the formidable Robert A. Taft, was rewarded not only with the UN appointment but also with Cabinet membership and an invitation to attend National Security Council sessions. This tradition ended with the current UN appointee, Thomas Pickering, a distinguished career diplomat.

Adlai Stevenson, twice the unsuccessful Democratic presidential candidate, was able as UN ambassador to turn a U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union around 180 degrees, and there was nothing anybody could do about it, even though it was a policy agreed on by Presidents Kennedy and Johnson—for example, during the 1964 controversy in the General Assembly over the Soviet right to vote while in nonpayment of peacekeeping dues. (Kennedy and LBJ laid down a hard line on the issue; off his own bat, and consulting nobody, Stevenson abandoned this position and prevailed.) UN Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan's flamboyant style became such a thorn in the side of his one-time admirer, Secretary of State Kissinger, who didn't like competition in flamboyance, that British Foreign Secretary James P. Callaghan took a Kissinger hint and got his own UN ambassador to mock Moynihan's debating style as that of an O.K. Corral gunslinger. And in case Moynihan still failed to get the picture, *New York Times* columnist James Reston published an article about how unhappy President Ford was over Moynihan's performance (Moynihan resigned on the double). Then there was Andrew Young, President Carter's appointee, who was fired as UN chief after violating a government ban against meeting with the PLO.

AND SO WE come to the Jeane Kirkpatrick story. It is told superbly by Allan Gerson, who was UN counsel during the four years of her mission and is now a professor of international law at George Mason University. I have spent a good deal of space on the historical aspect of the U.S. mission to the UN (USUN) since, without that background, Kirkpatrick—the first woman to be the United States permanent representative to the UN—might unjustly be represented as a sort of diplomatic termagant, always battling her superiors in Washington. But as I have shown, the fight between the USUN and State, which operated in an arena of multilateral and cyclical diplomacy, had a historic dimension (President Kennedy recognized it when he referred to the USUN as his "other State Department"). Gerson shows quite clearly that this conflict between the two institutions was built-in from the beginning because the ambassador, under the UN Participation Act, "had powers exceeding those of any other U.S. ambassador." When the USUN chief was someone with a personal constituency, whose career did not depend

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on State Department promotional boards, and when the Soviet Union had an automatic General Assembly majority against the United States, the battle for USUN home rule became inevitable.

Kirkpatrick had her own constituency, in her case not only anticommunist intellectuals of the Scoop Jackson wing of the Democratic Party but also Judge William Clark, President Reagan's first National Security Adviser, and President Reagan himself who used to refer to Kirkpatrick as his "heroine." Gerson shows how Kirkpatrick, without Secretary of State Alexander Haig's knowledge, enjoyed a back-channel line of communication to NSC adviser Clark, at least during the Falklands War (Washington is a rough town). With such a constituency Kirkpatrick had no difficulty in keeping Secretary Haig at bay until he was forced out by President Reagan. However, in General Haig's successor, George Shultz, she found her match. When she realized after the 1984 election and a thirty-five-minute private chat with the re-elected President Reagan that she could go no higher in appointive office, she resigned.

As Professor Gerson sees it, the Deaver cabal around the White House had already signalled an end to Kirkpatrick's influence because, he writes, she "was viewed as being in the confrontationalist camp, after it had ceased being politically fashionable to be in that position. She was warned to fall into line: confrontation had peaked." Professor Gerson does not say who gave the warning, and it would be nice to know.

Kirkpatrick, according to Professor Gerson, "wanted to shape U.S. foreign policy, not act under 'instructions.'. . . She believed that she understood the requirements of U.S. foreign policy as well as anyone else—better than Alexander Haig ever did, and probably better than George Shultz ever would." Career ambassadors may feel the same way—and probably do—but they would think twice, and more, before acting on those feelings. However, Kirkpatrick, like Goldberg and Lodge before her, was appointed because her primary loyalty was to the Chief Executive who had appointed her and because she was sure to encroach upon State Department turf, which didn't trouble her White House patron one bit. But while such appointees might have a temporary indispensability to the White House incumbent, in the end it was the State Department that remained and the UN chief who went—Lodge to run for vice president on the 1960 Nixon ticket, Goldberg to run unsuccessfully against Nelson Rockefeller for the New York governorship, Jeane Kirkpatrick back to the American Enterprise Institute, Georgetown University, and the lecture circuit.

What made USUN unique was the willingness of the United States to allow crises affecting American or allied security interests to become part of the Security Council (but not the General Assembly) agenda. The 1962 Cuban missile confrontation, the 1968 USS Pueblo seizure by North Korea, the Soviet shoot-down of KAL 007 in 1983 and, of course, the second war of the Persian Gulf and other international crises all moved automatically into the UN's Security Council chamber for debate and, when possible, action. World media attention, particularly television, focuses on the USUN chief and staff during a crisis. There are other U.S. representatives on international bodies but few if any get the continuing coverage of the USUN.

KIRKPATRICK'S tenure as UN ambassador got lots of coverage; much of it, by the liberal media, was critical. Many of her fights were over issues that our allies would have preferred to ignore. Professor Gerson spells out the behind-the-scenes intrigues, one of which involved weird accusations against Professor Gerson himself: that he had held meetings with PLO spokesmen and had had an affair with an Arab woman journalist. These charges against Professor Gerson were made by Yehuda Blum, then the Israeli ambassador to the UN. No such events ever took place. What Blum's motive was in trying to frame Gerson is not made clear, but it is shocking to read such an example of what we might today perhaps call diplomatic harassment.

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Today the UN is behaving more nearly as it was intended to when it was founded than at any time in its history. Cooperation, not confrontation, between the United States and the Soviet Union is now the behavioral norm. Without the USSR in opposition, the General Assembly, which means scores of Third World states, can no longer afford to antagonize the only authentic superpower. It would seem that the conditions of the early UN years, when the U.S. and its allies enjoyed an automatic majority, have returned. The U.S. is no longer the daily target of malicious lies by Third World ambassadors inspired by Soviet disinformation.

For this improved state of affairs, which began before the Gorbachev era, Kirkpatrick deserves a long round of applause because she established a rule that whenever the U.S. is attacked during a debate, whether in the General Assembly or in one of its many committees, a counterbarrage is to be mounted. What Arthur Goldberg had to do conspiratorially, Kirkpatrick was able to do in full daylight because she had the backing of Ronald Reagan. The earlier policy of "silent contempt" favored by Bohlen was out.

The book's primary value lies in the fact that one is reading history being made, documented history by a skillful observer-participant—the fight over Nicaragua, the fight over terrorism, the fight over Israel's UN membership, the Falklands War, the Grenada affair, and the beginnings of the Reagan Doctrine. But it is also the story of an undaunted statesman, Jeane Kirkpatrick, whose diplomatic behavior resembled that of an earlier statesman, as described by his biographer Duff Cooper:

> Talleyrand was not a convenient Ambassador from the point of view of the Government that he represented. An ambassador should be, in fact as in theory, the subordinate of his Minister for Foreign Affairs. When the Ambassador is a bigger man than the Minister the instrument becomes top heavy.

Clearly Duff Cooper did not approve of Talleyrand who "had his own particular methods of conducting business that were neither in accordance with diplomatic usage nor with democratic ideas." While it is true that the diplomatic methods of Kirkpatrick and some of her doughtier predecessors did not accord with diplomatic usage, they certainly accorded with democratic ideas. Too bad we shall not look upon their like again.□

Arnold Beichman, a research fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a columnist for the Washington Times. *He was a UN correspondent from 1953 to 1966 and is author of* The "Other" State Department: The United States Mission to the United Nations—Its Role in the Making of Foreign Policy.

Scandal Time

Tod Lindberg

Suzanne Garment, *Scandal: The Culture of Mistrust in American Politics* (New York: Times Books, 1991). 336 pp., $23.00.

A TERRIBLE question is looming over the horizon for policy-makers, politicians, and intellectuals of the conservative persuasion: what will political morality consist of, and what will constitute responsible decision-making, when the partisan balance shifts and the shoe is on the other foot?

Consider this scenario: President Tom Harkin has nominated Judge Lawrence Tribe to the Supreme Court. Before President Harkin named him to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Tribe was a professor at Harvard Law School. He is clever and capable. He is also perhaps the leading advo-

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cate of what the Republican majority (in this scenario) in the Senate has long denounced as judicial activism—the arrogant act of legislating from the bench in defiance of the wishes of the elected representatives of the American people. What to do, you Republican senators, you majority staffers on the Judiciary Committee, you members of conservative political organizations, you conservative ladies and gentleman of the press (I admit that my scenario here strains credulity)?

Will you say, well, President Harkin was elected having promised to appoint Supreme Court justices who would aggressively protect the rights of individuals whether or not those rights were specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and in the traditional advise and consent role of the Senate, the only pertinent issue is whether the nominee is competent to do the job (which he obviously is) and whether he is a man of good character (which he appears to be)? So "aye" it is.

Or will you say, forthrightly, that this man's politics are very left-wing, and that therefore conservatives in the Senate should not vote for him, presidential prerogatives notwithstanding? So the vote is "nay."

But the nays don't have it. Bear in mind that some conservative or at least moderate Republican senators are likely to vote for Tribe, citing the traditionalist grounds above—for example William Weld of Massachusetts, who (in one of the more agreeable parts of my scenario) has defeated Senator Edward M. Kennedy's 1994 bid for reelection. Confirmation, despite your genteel and principled opposition, is a near certainty.

So will you then conclude, perhaps, that Lawrence Tribe must be destroyed?

If so, then you will of course pore through Judge Tribe's writings, both before and after his elevation to the appellate court, in order to find sentences that can be wrenched out of context to place the nominee in as unflattering a light as possible. You will persuade your glitzy conservative Hollywood pals to descend on Washington to denounce Judge Tribe's left-wing politics (there's that credulity problem again). You will get your Madison Avenue friends to do a commercial: "In Judge Tribe's America, abortion is not only a right; it is mandatory in the case of babies the state regards as imperfect."

All of that will be helpful, but it may not be decisive. It may not have the effect of radicalizing the moderate Republicans in the Senate, or of prompting conservative Democrats to desert their president. Your best shot is to dig hard and fast and widely into Judge Tribe's life—everything from his club and organization memberships to his pro bono work on behalf of potentially dubious causes to his personal and family finances to his sexual appetites. Bear in mind the axiom of Robert Penn Warren's Willie Stark: "Man is conceived in sin and born in corruption and he passeth from the stink of the didie to the stench of the shroud. There is always something." You can find that "something." What you need to destroy Judge Tribe is a scandal.

UNLESS one is prepared to state unequivocally that the chances of a Democrat being elected president are nil, the issues and morals of "the Tribe nomination" are, in one form or another, certain to come up one day. Indeed, there is some possibility that they will arise even with the current balance of power in Washington. Suppose a Republican president decided that he had had enough of his foreign-policy nominees getting raked over the coals. So, in retaliation, he sets the Justice Department loose on a wide-ranging investigation of the majority staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in an effort to determine who has leaked classified information to the press. Or perhaps it's time for another ABSCAM-style sting operation aimed directly at members of Congress: The undercover FBI agent offers a little valuta to a dozen or so of them in exchange for their support for an inconsequential personal-relief bill.

There are more than a few people in Washington who would relish a greater willingness on the part of fellow conservatives to participate in mud fights, perhaps even by starting a few. The case they make comes in

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two forms. The more radical one holds that the liberals have it coming, that they truly are exemplary hypocrites and world-class traffickers in sleaze, that they have exploited a corrupt political process for the purpose of self-aggrandizement and deserve to be called on it. The more restrained case holds that the only way to stop the madness, to set limits to how far one can go in the pursuit of one's policy goals, is a balance of terror. You destroy one of mine; I destroy one of yours. "There is always something"—or at least there is always someone on whom there is something. There have been a few exceptions—the hounding of House Speaker Jim Wright out of town being the most conspicuous—but by and large the conservatives have not retaliated.

Suzanne Garment, whose *Scandal: The Culture of Mistrust in American Politics* could not have been better timed, would no doubt deplore this sort of retaliatory scandalmongering. And indeed, adopting the recommendations she makes in the course of this elegantly written, pellucid survey of Washington scandal politics would go far in restoring debates over policy to a higher plane. But the likelihood of that restoration in Washington's current climate of advanced partisan decadence is precisely the issue. Watching the Clarence Thomas sexual harassment tribunal, I for one thought I was seeing *Götterdämmerung*, that this could not go on, that some great revelation was at hand. Yet, bear in mind that in the Yeats poem, *nothing happens*. It is all expectation and tension and no fulfillment and release. We have to be careful not to underestimate our capacity to muddle along.

SCANDAL is a catalogue of horrors, yet it is rarely the behavior of those caught in a scandal that is horrifying. There are some criminals here, of course, and some whose morals aren't worth, in the words of Stephen Sondheim's Sweeney Todd, what a pig would spit. Mostly, however, the crimes are at worst petty, the behavior at worst venial. Yet these scandals hold the nation (or so it seems if you live in Washington) in their grip. They dominate the front pages of the newspaper and the evening news. Political figures rise to disgorge themselves of pronouncements on them. Special prosecutors are appointed, grand juries empaneled, defense counsels hired, committee staffs engaged. And in the end, it's all about—what? "Misleading Congress"? John Sununu's taste for military aircraft? It seems, in retrospect, so much smaller than life.

No, what is horrifying is the machinery of political scandal that Garment carefully details. Any person in Washington prominent enough to have acquired a few enemies can find himself in the crosshairs. A small army of congressional staff is in a protracted state of siege against the executive branch, and they are able and willing to turn policy disagreements into scandal hunts. The media are eager for sexy material, and that emphatically includes scandals (whether they are sex scandals or not). A little leak from a House subcommittee staffer to a friend in the press corps, and the scandal is up and running. Once it is in the air, the press can be counted on to report, investigate, and sensationalize it.

If allegations about someone in the executive branch are serious enough, the attorney general has to appoint an independent counsel. These special prosecutors, unlike other prosecutors, have an unlimited amount of money and as much time as they like to pursue one and only one target or set of targets. They, too, sometimes have friends in the media. And when they finish their work, they have to produce a report for public perusal even if they do not choose to pursue an indictment—a report that typically contains such statements as, "Although there is credible evidence that Mr. X committed what may have been a crime, no further pursuit of the matter is warranted." With exonerations like that, who needs convictions?

Executive branch agencies and departments also come equipped with scandal hunters of their own: quasi-independent auditors and inspectors. They too have friends in the

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media and on Capitol Hill. Congressmen, eager for the limelight, can take an auditor's report and turn it into an occasion for highly publicized hearings at which a designated executive branch official will get a very personal sense of what "oversight" has come to mean.

This apparatus, not all of which will necessarily come into play in every scandal, is in place and ready to be set in motion. Which takes us to the issue on which Garment sheds the most light, namely the motives of those who traffic in scandals. It is easy enough to see the vested interests: sexy stories sell more newspapers and get more viewers, congressional re-election campaigns benefit from favorable media coverage, etc. But vested interests are not enough by way of explanation. To put it another way, when you look at yourself in the mirror shaving, it's not your vested interests that you think about for self-justification. You need something higher than that (there is, after all, a razor at your throat). You need to feel—and contemporary scandal politics gives you the opportunity to feel—virtuous.

Defender of the public's right to know; ferreter out of wrong-doing; shiner of light into dark places; enforcer of the law; servant of the truth—these self-righteous justifications have been in high season since the days of the Watergate scandal. The essential premise is that corruption is endemic and that all's fair in rooting it out. Politics must be made pure, whatever the price. And in the "modern scandal-production system," Garment writes, the assumption is that "the job of restraint will be performed elsewhere." Everyone goes full tilt, which is acceptable in some cases but outrageous in others:

> This attitude among the scandal hunters is exactly as it should be when they are dealing with the Al Capones of modern politics. Such malefactors certainly exist: Even now they are concocting large and larcenous schemes to defraud the government or taking bribes or falsifying records in ways that directly endanger the health, safety and pocketbooks of their fellow citizens. But there are also the scandal targets who are moved simply by a more ordinary desire to cut a corner or who are in trouble mainly because of panic or gross imprudence. Each of these officials may well deserve some kind of sanction, but by no reasonable standard do such lapses merit application of the Capone rules.

Garment has interviewed a number of people to whom the Capone rules have been unjustly applied. They and their spouses tell wrenching tales of the havoc the scandal-hunters wreaked on their lives.

The Iran-*contra* affair, which takes up a chapter of its own in Garment's book, "was a scandal that had it all": the hungry press, the internal executive branch investigation, the inquisitorial Congress, the independent counsel. "The result of all this activity, though, was a succession of contradictions, collisions and confusions."

THERE IS no need to rehearse the details of Iran-*contra* here. Garment's point is that all the scandal-mongering associated with the affair served to obscure, not reveal, the central cause of the trouble, namely the war between the Reagan administration and left-wing Democrats in Congress over foreign policy in Central America. In Garment's telling, Congress' unwillingness to let the Republican administration pursue the Nicaragua policy it wanted and its simultaneous institutional inability to conduct a consistent policy of its own are the root causes of the collision. "The Iran-*contra* revelations showed us a Congress that had produced five different *contra* funding policies in four years yet insisted on the right to an equal role in the operational direction of our foreign policy."

With the appointment of Lawrence Walsh as independent counsel, this dispute over foreign policy was criminalized. His five years of investigation have produced few indictments and fewer convictions. More typical has been the guilty plea to relatively minor charges. Most of the defendants presumably believe they are innocent of wrongdoing, and their pleas seem to be a reflection

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of their desire to get the matter behind them and to avoid the ruinous costs of defending themselves. But criminals they are branded. Their reputations will never recover.

The way in which the "Iran" component of the Iran-*contra* scandal quickly receded into the background is an indication of the extent to which this controversy was driven by ideological considerations. The overture to the so-called Iranian moderates may have been foolish or may have been worth a try, but in neither case does the conclusion fall on one or the other side of the great ideological divide that separated left-wing Democrats in Congress from the policy-makers of the Reagan administration. In the case of Nicaragua, however, there is no more dramatic instance of this ideological divide.

There is a plausible case to be made that Nicaragua was the last battle of the Cold War. The Sandinista regime was bent on exporting Marxist revolution throughout Central America, and it was heavily financed and otherwise supported by the Soviet Union and its surrogates. Meanwhile, the critical question in the United States in the 1980s was what to do about Soviet expansionism. The Reagan administration's policy was to combat it whenever that course was practical. Left-wing Democrats on Capitol Hill, however, took an altogether different view. They were eager to avoid any policy that the Soviets might regard as provocative. And they often looked benignly on Soviet client regimes, including the one in Nicaragua, and believed their rulers' claims to have the best interests of their people at heart.

The fight over *contra* aid on Capitol Hill was a struggle for a handful of votes from middle-of-the-road congressmen. But it was fought, ultimately, between diehard apologists for the Sandinista regime and that regime's staunch opponents in the administration.

And that is where Iran-*contra* as a "scandal" becomes particularly chilling. The Reagan administration's policy was vindicated with the humiliation of the Sandinistas at the polls in February 1990. But the price of that vindication has been ferocious, as the Iran-*contra* scandal has wrapped its tentacles around virtually every major player who had a hand in that policy. At times, it seems as if Lawrence Walsh's office regards participation in the Reagan administration's Central America policymaking as *prima facie* evidence of wrongdoing.

In short, though the United States won this last battle of the Cold War, the process by which it won was subject to a systematic after-the-fact assault from ideological enemies. Now one comes to the awful question: Suppose Nicaragua had not been the last battle of the Cold War? Suppose, rather, that the Soviet Union had hung together longer. Given the successful criminalization of an anticommunist foreign policy in the case of Nicaragua, would another battle have been possible?

Fortunately, the collapse of the Soviet Union spares us the need to deal with that scenario. And in that sense, with the partisan stakes having subsided, we may expect the all-out assault politics of scandal to subside in relation to foreign affairs. *Götterdämmerung*, in this instance, has probably led to a more benign order. Whether that will be so on the domestic front—or whether too many people by now feel they have too many scores to settle—is something that remains to be seen.□

Tod Lindberg is editorial page editor of the Washington Times *and former executive editor of* The National Interest.

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

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

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Debasing the Philippines

Richard D. Fisher, Jr.

WASHINGTON has grown tired of waiting for the Filipinos to decide if they want the United States to have the use of Subic Naval Base, the last such base in the Philippines. Washington just might decide to accept the advice of Philippine Senator Rene Saguisag who, just before a majority of his colleagues rejected the ten-year Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Security, said, "Keep your money. That is our foreign aid to you."

Washington should be prepared to take his advice and depart from Subic—next year. But to do so before the May 11, 1992 Philippine presidential and senatorial elections would amount to the abandonment of a friend who will be gravely injured by our departure. It might also deprive the next U.S. administration of opportunities for a more balanced and productive relationship with the Asian island-nation.

In the days following the treaty rejection Manila was awash in nationalistic exhortations over its new "independence." Yet, looking more deeply, one could only conclude that too many important Filipinos remain burdened with a debilitating psychological "dependence" on the United States. With the number of columns and editorials that rang with Senate President Jovito Salonga's declaration that "we have finally summoned the political will to stand up and end 470 years of foreign military presence here in the Philippines," you might never know that America quite summarily gave the Philippines its independence in 1946. The September 16 speeches of the twelve "nay" senators dwelt mainly on historic *gravitas*, with little serious thought of how that would feed and employ the 40,000 Filipinos who depend on Subic for their livelihood.

The senators also chose to oppose overwhelming public opinion favoring the treaty; some polls cite 90 percent support. This is to be expected of career Manila-based lawyer-politicians; all senators not from Manila or the main island of Luzon (save one) voted for the treaty. To further illustrate Manila's intellectual insulation, it is instructive to cite Amando Doronila, the usually sober doyen of Manila-based newspaper columnists. He wrote in the *Manila Chronicle* that the "catalytic" nature of the treaty rejection was "something like the three days of the failed coup last August in the Soviet Union and the crumbling of the Berlin Wall in November 1989." The absurdity of even loosely comparing one American naval base to the long history of Soviet oppression is too obvious to belabor.

Perhaps the most curious irony is that Philippine President Corazon Aquino chose to make the fight for the treaty the defining

Richard D. Fisher, Jr., is a policy analyst with the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation. His latest visit to the Philippines was in September.

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contest of the twilight of her administration. After all, she signed an anti-bases political manifesto in 1985, made anti-bases statements during and after the 1986 presidential election, campaigned for a constitution that paved the way for the treaty's eventual rejection, stayed coldly aloof from the issue through most of her term, and appointed Raul Manglapus as foreign secretary and head of the Philippine bases negotiating panel.

Manglapus' strident and oft-repeated "slay the father-figure" rhetoric helped deflate Washington's 1986 euphoria over the Philippines' "People Power" democratic revolution, a euphoria that was capped by Aquino's triumphant October 1986 address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress. But Congress' new low opinion of the Philippines was fixed by, and has yet to recover from, Aquino's February 1990 snub of visiting Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney, a former member of Congress.

Yet, following the signing of the treaty last August 27, Aquino has spoken out for its ratification forcefully and often. In fact, on the eve of the vote, she invoked her much-faded "People Power" appeal to muster a 100–200,000 strong rally to sway Senate opponents. When this failed, she embarked on a strategy to delay the impact of the rejection. Although the outcome of her efforts is not clear at the time of this writing, it appears likely that she will be able to convince enough senators to agree to grant the United States three years to withdraw from Subic without obliging the United States to provide bases-related compensation. But Aquino is banking on the expectation that the next Philippine administration will settle the Subic issue on mutually acceptable terms, prompting Washington to continue to supply some aid.

Money and Politics

THE DIRE lack of money is the first of the two main reasons for Aquino's late awakening on the bases. Her country is falling apart and it can't afford to put itself back together. For three years—1987, 1988, and 1989—the GNP of the Philippines grew at a rate of 3 to 7 percent; not great, but a far cry from the 5 percent economic contraction of 1985, the last full year of Ferdinand Marcos' administration. After reaching a respectable plateau of 5 percent GNP growth in 1989, however, disaster struck. First came the nearly successful December 1989 military coup attempt, which touched off a stormy year of terrorism by communist and military rebels, and depressed investor confidence.

Then, in June 1990, a massive earthquake hit the north-central area of Luzon, the most populous region of the country, causing about $400 million in infrastructure damage alone. This was followed by Mt. Pinatubo's June 15, 1991 explosion, which has already displaced and left unemployed over 1.2 million people, swelling Manila with half a million refugees. Waves of volcanic debris, or lahars, threaten to lay waste to this area for another five to ten years. Controlling the lahars might cost $10 billion, which Manila does not have. Disease epidemics threaten refugee camps and one mayor of a major Central Luzon city told me that expects the region to fall into lawless "brigandage." The volcano has forced the United States to evacuate Clark Air Base, depriving the local economy of nearly $600 million a year.

In addition to problems of a rapidly deteriorating infrastructure, there are chronic electrical power shortages, 20 percent annual inflation, and 14 percent unemployment. Also troubling is a steep drop in foreign investment—approved equity investment for the first six months of 1991 dropped over 26 percent compared with the same period in 1990. For 1991, the government forecasts GNP will grow only 1/2 to 1 percent—which is a net contraction considering that the population of 66 million is growing at 2.5 percent a year. All the while, 40 percent of the government budget pays for servicing Manila's $30 billion debt.

These numbers make all the more astounding the Philippine Senate's rejection of

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the base treaty. Most of the opposing senators were outraged that the annual military and economic aid was only $203 million a year. They refused to credit U.S. Special Negotiator Richard L. Armitage with convincing the Pentagon to spend over $200 million annually in the Philippines to buy supplies and to give millions and millions of dollars annually in excess military equipment. Nor did they credit the United States with spending about $1 billion a year on the Philippines since 1987 in direct aid and bases-related local expenditures, convincing Japan to increase its aid to about $1 billion a year, organizing the seventeen-country Philippine Assistance Program which pledged $3.3 billion in 1991, or interceding on Manila's behalf during numerous debt rescheduling talks.

The treaty rejection threatens Washington's willingness to continue to mobilize such international support for Manila, as well as continued generosity with trade quotas. In 1991 the Philippines had 15.8 percent—the second largest share—of the quota set for U.S. sugar imports. This also amounted to about 15 percent of total Philippine sugar production, an industry that employs 1.2 million. In the right mood, Congress might award the Philippines' quota share to a future democratic Cuba. U.S. interest in continuing to assist Manila might have been preserved by the rejected treaty's provision for an annual Program Review Group. This would have allowed Philippine and U.S. officials to review all aspects of bilateral assistance and cooperation—a level of U.S. bureaucratic access granted only to Israel.

The second major reason Aquino chose to fight for the base treaty was to preserve her ability to influence the choice of her successor, critical to maintaining the influence of her Cojuangco family clan. Ten of the twelve opposing senators were hand-picked by Aquino and thus have declared their independence from her. The treaty rejection has also created a major fault line between political forces as they approach a potentially chaotic election.

This election will become an unofficial referendum on relations with the United States. It will also include contests for every post from president to city councilor, and may feature three or four presidential candidates. Ballots could feature multiple choices for as many as fifty offices. Unfortunately, this confusion may mean it will be a traditional Philippine three-Gs contest: who ever has the most goons, guns, and gold will win. Even more, the election will determine if the Philippines will be led by people who want to be part of the world, or apart from it.

The Mexican Model

FILIPINO voters will essentially choose between political alignments similar to those in Mexico, before and after the ascension of Mexican President Carlos Salinas. The pre-Salinas politics of collectivist, protectionist economic policies and anti-Western foreign policies are represented by the Liberal Party of Salonga, the Philippine Democratic Party led by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, and the new Party of the Masses, led by movie star-turned-Senator Joseph Estrada.

All three are fiery nationalists who need a U.S. "enemy" to help justify their leadership. Salonga and Pimentel are already accusing Washington of plotting to interfere in the election. Salonga, who has been active in the leftist World Council of Churches, led the Philippine Commission for Good Government before becoming a senator. Charged with regaining the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos, this group quickly became an instrument for the extortion and intimidation of the business community. As Aquino's original minister for Local Government, Pimentel undemocratically and summarily replaced thousands of elected local officials. Estrada, a loud Yankee-basher best known for his "John Wayne" screen image, wants to institute a policy of "national industrialization." All three have supported varying degrees of foreign debt repudiation and have opposed the liberalization of trade and foreign investment. In a two-way race, a Liberal-led coalition

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may lose. But in a three or four-way presidential contest, in which the Metro-Manila vote becomes critical, the Liberals may have a real chance to win.

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which has about 15,000 guerrillas and a bevy of fronts, will support this grouping as a means of gaining further access to power. Senator Wigberto Tanada, the president of the CPP front organization "BAYAN" (New National Alliance), has joined the Liberal Party, and the CPP front "Partido ng Bayan" (People's Party) has pledged its support to the three parties.

This is not to say that the Philippines will "go communist" if Salonga wins. But it may be the last country to join the Non-Aligned Movement and will be a font of anti-American rhetoric. The United States would have to leave Subic, and the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty would be jeopardized. This and expected protectionist trade and investment policies will cause what little investor confidence there is to plummet. After further economic decline, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), highly politicized over the last decade, may wrest control from the politicians. In turn, this would reverse the fortunes of the CPP, which in late 1991 was on the verge of major schisms due to infighting, the loss of popular and financial support, and the capture and defections of key leaders.

The other side of the political spectrum, to varying degrees, would lead the Philippines in the general direction of the path taken by Salinas: internal free market-oriented economic liberalization combined with a foreign policy characterized by free trade and closer relations with the West. In a recent speech before a major Manila business group, presidential candidate and former Defense Secretary Fidel Ramos suggested learning from Mexico's example. He and House of Representatives Speaker Ramon Mitra are contesting control of the Laban Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP-Struggle of Filipino Democrats) Party. Mitra is shepherding a major legislative reform of the Philippines' somewhat restrictive investment code. Both candidates, and younger potential candidates like former Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos and former Customs Secretary Miriam Santiago Defensor, prefer trade over aid to revive the Philippine economy.

These candidates, and Nationalista Party contender Vice President Salvador Laurel, would likely follow the example of the city of Cebu. Led by politicians of the Osmena clan, Cebu's economy may grow by 25 percent in 1991. This has been done largely in spite of

Yankee Panky

Inside accounts of sparring between the two countries' top negotiators, who themselves might have been issued straight from central casting, reveal the current U.S.-Philippine relationship in all its vestigial colonial shades. Armitage, easily twice Manglapus's girth and weight, is described by colleagues as a "bright, tough, blunt straight shooter" who "bench-presses 460 pounds before breakfast." His Philippine counterpart, a wiry, slightly precious 73-year-old, is a former CIA protege who spent many of the Marcos years in American exile, where he composed *Yankee Panky*, a musical satirizing U.S. policy toward the Philippines.

Every few months the shiny-pated American would barrel into town, raring for an agreement; each time, Manglapus demanded more money. No-nonsense "Rich" quickly tired of "Raul's" braying that America would have to cough up big bucks to keep its precious bases here, and accused Manglapus of "stooping to cash-register diplomacy." Manglapus bristled with the insult. . . .

Susan Blaustein,
"Steamrollered One More Time"
The Nation, September 9, 1991.

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Manila, through the energy of its Chinese business community and open arms extended to foreign investors.

Ramos, in particular, would use the talents of younger leaders like Negros Occidental Governor Daniel Lacson, who has been a champion of much needed government decentralization. He has reversed the fortunes of a province racked by insurgency and a near feudal economy dominated by sugar plantations, referred to by Filipinos in 1986 as "our Ethiopia." He did so by removing his province from the suffocating tentacles of Manila bureaucrats, promoting crop diversification, and taking a lead in both talking with and organizing against the CPP. Lacson now promotes Negros as the "next Cebu."

THIS GROUPING of Filipino politicians, which includes former top Marcos business associate Eduardo Cojuangco, shares a more positive concept of nationalism that does not require the alienation of the United States. They will most likely revisit the issue of Subic and come to a reasonable settlement. They may also follow the advice of a significant section of the military leadership which would like a military relationship similar to that which the United States has with Thailand: close service-to-service cooperation and exercises that determine the level of U.S. access to military facilities. One high Philippine Department of Defense official told me he wanted "a long-term partnership in defense but with a strong Philippine armed forces . . . that can contribute to stability of the region over the long term."

Today the AFP cannot rise to such a level of partnership because it lacks a credible air force and navy. But with an expected cornucopia of soon-to-be-retired military equipment, the United States will be quite able to assist the Philippines' military modernization. Such a course would help the AFP as it reorients its missions from counterinsurgency to external defense and maintain the professional influence of constant interaction with U.S. services. Thus engaged, the AFP should be able to undertake cooperation with its neighbors, becoming a more active element of the post-Cold War, U.S.-led defense network in Asia.

It behooves Washington, therefore, to wait until next summer before deciding to quit the Philippines. Despite the rejection of the base treaty, U.S.-Philippine relations have a reasonable chance of taking a turn for the better. The possibility of avoiding a costly evacuation of Subic and gaining a chance to build a better defense partnership with Manila is worth the wait.

But Washington should also be prepared to leave Subic and expect that its relations with Manila will become increasingly distant. Having imparted upon Filipinos a largely benign colonial experience for which it can be proud, the United States has had to wait through the Marcos and Aquino years for Filipinos to begin to solve their problems. Should Filipinos choose leaders next year who revel in blaming America for their ills instead of seeking real solutions to their myriad problems, Washington should wait no more.□

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Intelligence, Immaculately Conceived

Graham E. Fuller

BREATHTAKING public revelations about the inner workings of the Central Intelligence Agency have been part of the coinage of contemporary American politics at least since the 1960s. Clandestine support to the Nicaraguan *contras* and the Afghan *mujaheddin*, and cooperation with various pro-American dictators during the Cold War all involved controversial covert action operations carried out by the CIA's Directorate of Operations in fulfillment of specific policy directives of the White House.

But the recent televised hearings on the nomination of Robert Gates as director of the CIA suddenly revealed an entirely new facet of the Agency, the inner workings of the Directorate of Intelligence—involved in analysis, not operations. As the nation watched the confirmation hearings, a spectacle of passions, rivalries, ideologies, and—it was alleged—crass politics seemed to be part of the daily stuff of producing intelligence reports.

Even National Intelligence Estimates, the highest level of predictive analysis produced within the U.S. government, were portrayed as the subject of massive struggles between vying factions contending to place their stamp on the character of strategic intelligence. Much of the country reacted with fascination and considerable surprise that the work of producing finished intelligence was not more straight-forward, that it was not somehow a more "objective" process.

Our American culture, so deeply based on the ideals of the Enlightenment, the cult of progress, and the rule of the rational and the knowable, invariably seeks refuge in demonization when uncomfortable elements of uncertainty and uncontrollability rear their ugly heads in public life: National Estimates must be absolutely objective—if not, the guilty party must be chastised. We resist the unnerving thought that "objectivity" just may not exist in some activities, that the work of producing finished strategic intelligence is conducted within vast areas of gray, where the realm of subjective evaluation can hold powerful sway. Alas, there is no immaculately conceived intelligence.

A leitmotif of the Gates hearings was that major differences in outlook and even political philosophy should not exist, much less influence the finished product; that such differences can only represent a malign and deliberate attempt to "skew intelligence" or "politicize the product." Many of our political analysts may be victims of the belief that political science is actually a science, rather than the art that it is.

Of course, intelligence can be distorted and abused; indeed, the entire policy process is fraught with opportunity for ignorance,

Graham E. Fuller is the former vice-chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the CIA. The author testified on these issues before the Senate Intelligence Committee in September 1991.

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stupidity, short-sightedness, and even willful neglect of inconvenient facts. And intelligence officers and analysts, even with the best will in the world, often err—grandly—on the key issues of our time. So do their bosses.

Not all issues, of course, are grand. In fact, the narrower the scope of an intelligence judgment, the easier it is to reach basic consensus. The broader the scope of the judgment, the more subjective, interpretive, intuitive, and challengeable it becomes. This should come as no revelation: we all know in our daily lives that many basic facts can be readily established—the consumer price index, the ups and downs of the Dow Jones, and unemployment figures are part of our daily information feed. But whether the economy is heading for recession or pulling out, and whether the industrial basis of the national economy remains sound on a global level are themes subject to immense debate and range of opinion. Reasonable, informed people may differ sharply.

SO TOO in intelligence. The CIA and other key elements of the intelligence community, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency, all produce spot reports, tactical intelligence, "daily intelligence," and short-term analyses that fairly consistently avoid controversy. This type of intelligence is of special value to those with operational responsibilities, policy-makers, military planners, and negotiators. How many aircraft the Iranians can currently operate, the shipment of military equipment to Third World nations, the flow of certain types of monies from one organization to another, the whereabouts of guerrilla training camps—all of this can often be measured with some degree of precision, and is of critical importance to specific types of consumers. This type of data is often technically derived: from satellite photography, message intercepts of various kinds, other types of technical collection, or from plain old spies on the ground. Analysts usually love this type of data because it is relatively unambiguous; it can be forwarded to policy-makers without apology and taken at face value.

As intelligence grows broader, more strategic in nature, its susceptibility to interpretation, to controversy, to "politicization" grows. We may know what the Soviet GNP was last year, but will Gorbachev survive? Can the Soviet public get through the next winter without rioting? How long will the geriatric tyrants in Beijing retain power? Will Iraq split apart if Saddam's power is destroyed? Will Europe maintain NATO? Will South Africa be destroyed by racial civil war? Will the new European Economic Community seek to exclude the United States?

This is the stuff of strategic intelligence. Facts are important for the analyst to have, but in the end, judgment is required to attempt answers. It would be wonderful if the facts could speak for themselves. Sometimes, they can, when the issue is relatively concrete, or if basic new facts suddenly come to light to challenge old suppositions. But we would be living in a happy world indeed if the "facts" could resolve gut issues. We Americans know one of the classic signs of the political scoundrel is the opening, "Let's look at the facts." We write estimates precisely because the "facts" are usually insufficient to make clear judgment calls. An analyst, when confronted with a knotty issue of whether China is going to fall apart into ethnic separatism in the next decade, will naturally plead that "there is not sufficient evidence yet" to determine the question. Precisely. But the president wants the best judgment on this issue right now.

What, then, are the qualities that might lead to a judgment about such a question? Of course we will want to look at data, however sparse, on the incidence of disorders in various ethnic areas of China over the past few years and at the degree of central government control exerted over various provinces in recent times. But we will also be bringing a powerful body of "subjective" evaluations to bear as well in rendering our judgment. What is the "character" of Chinese history? How strong are separatist trends elsewhere in the

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world today? How deeply will the Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang come to see themselves as a "people"? How vigorous will Beijing be in maintaining communist power under threat in ethnic provinces? Indeed, what is the character of communist power? The intensity of the Cold War and the magnitude of the stakes involved created great passions of an ideological, even "theological," character in addressing such issues.

Answers to many of these questions are difficult to reach; they draw upon an individual's general sense of "the way the world works." An individual's judgments and understanding may be inherently quite shallow or quite profound. Experience also comes into play, as is implicitly acknowledged in a hierarchical system of junior and senior reviewers of intelligence papers. In principle, experienced senior managers should possess a slight edge in making broader judgments. Yet there is no guarantee that age and experience in themselves bring wisdom; the folly and inflexibility of the senior official is as well known as the naivete and shallowness of crass youth.

To possess a coherent view of international politics—a general sense of the interrelatedness of things—is a supreme political gift. It enables the finest political minds of our time to view the grand issues of the moment within a comprehensive framework, a tentative construct of analysis. This kind of understanding is inherently "ideological" in one sense or another because it imposes an order, an approach derived from a particular set of assumptions, on a highly diffuse body of data and events in order to bring some intellectual coherence to otherwise incoherent data. Nothing else can overcome the modern curse of information glut. And, like all great qualities, the mind that can think comprehensively has its equal and opposite downsides or disadvantages. Any developed intellectual construct will inevitably have its blind-spots; its weaknesses will only be corrected through some kind of analytical process of trial and error. Yet to lack this construct is to bring an immense shallowness of understanding to human affairs.

William Casey at the CIA embodied all the strengths and weaknesses of a strong, coherent mind. Casey had an extraordinary ability to grasp interrelationships among diverse events in order to create a coherent strategic picture. That is what analytic creativity is all about. Casey had his own clear vision of the character and dynamics of international politics, a responsiveness to analytical issues that made working for him a stimulating process. He relished a sharp debate with bright analysts.

BUT THIS creativity also had its price. He could be intimidating to many. He could be stubborn in his vision. He knew better than to impose his views, but one had to stand one's intellectual ground. And, most dangerously, he was deeply committed to the political success of the Reagan administration. In the end, Casey's commitment brought him to disaster in the Iran-*contra* affair that has significantly undermined his reputation.

But no director can come to the office without a strong sense of how the world works, if he or she is to be more than a symbol of an unengaged and "neutral" figure. "Neutrality" and aloofness in the end only relegate final substantive judgment calls on estimative work to the next echelon down. Indeed, the intelligence community structure today is headed by the National Foreign Intelligence Board where the senior figure of each intelligence agency passes judgment on the contents of every intelligence estimate, regardless of distance from the working level analyst who wrote it. Such a system, for better or worse, enshrines the (uncertain) principle that seniority will bring certain kinds of wisdom to bear on the critical intelligence of our day. The junior analyst is righteously indignant that those above, less close to the material, could possibly bring "value added" to the analyst's work. Thus, the dilemma at the higher levels of an intelligence organization—or any organization—between the risks of "politicization," on the one hand,

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and experience and insight, on the other, will never be resolved.

Policy-makers are no happier about the dilemmas of intelligence than are the analysts. In fact, most policy-makers hate intelligence. It is institutionalized intelligence, more than any other factor, that has the license to call into question the basic presuppositions of policy. Policy-makers indeed are fearful of long-range judgments for they tend to compete with the policy-maker's own vision of how the world works, and how it can be made to work.

I REMEMBER when, at one point as the national intelligence officer for the Middle East, I was taken down to Congress to testify on the issue of American policy (and Marines) in Lebanon, along with a senior State Department official—a political appointee. On our way he pointedly warned me that when answering questions on the course of events in Lebanon I must limit myself to discussion of only very current data and the prospects for the next few days. No long range views for him. Mercifully our system enabled me to tell him to shove off. But when policy-makers deal with intelligence, they often take refuge in the short-term assessments of "current intelligence." No searching questions about the why and wherefore of longer-term trends that might challenge the bases of policy.

But even the search for "objective analytic processes" can involve similar will-o'-the-wisps. Indeed, not only do different personalities bring differing political visions and interpretations to their work, but they differ in psychological attitudes toward understanding events. There are at least two types of analytical mentalities—quite different and complementary to each other. One is the "status quo mentality" that perceives there is little that is truly new in this world. This kind of mind excels in seeing *continuities* in all that happens: everything is just more of the same in one form or another. The opposite mentality excels in perceiving *discontinuities* and change in everything—the vision of angst, the "Chicken Little" view of the world.

Both are essential to good analysis. The advocate of continuity, in which nothing ever really changes drastically, provides a useful analytic ballast and keel; it is furthermore statistically safer, for continuity outweighs dramatic change on any given day. But this mindset will miss the grand turning points of history, when the Shah really does fall, or the Soviet Union really does change. The opposite mentality always sees portents of change everywhere and is sensitive to their potential implications in every twitch of history. No intelligence outfit should be without both types, to provide both steadiness of vision and critical sensitivity to sharp turning points down the road.

These dilemmas are not inherent in all elements of day to day intelligence work. The collection and analysis of tactical, daily intelligence, is the work of perhaps 95 percent of the CIA, and the Agency is rarely faulted on this kind of work. Daily data and analysis is generally well received by Washington's array of reluctant and nervous "customers." Furthermore, it is difficult to "politicize" this kind of basic intelligence. It is in the areas of broadest and longest-term judgments that "sudden death" lies. Indeed, fear of being wrong on the grand issues of the day, the failure to foresee a coup or an attack, predisposes the community to a certain worst-case tendency. The intelligence system—but probably not the policy-maker—forgives the one who incorrectly or prematurely cries wolf sooner than it does the one who failed to anticipate the wolf's visit altogether. Clearly any intelligence agency that cries wolf consistently will quickly lose its credibility. But the great looming horror for all analysts is the so-called "low-probability, high-impact" event that rescrambles the political or military map without warning—a product that the Middle East in particular excels in.

Finally, the notion of being "right" or "wrong" in estimative predictions is also poorly understood. National Estimates do not deliver some Cassandra-like pronounce-

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ment of the way the future will be. The process is far more complex. Any estimate worth its salt will identify the most likely course of events, and then discuss a few of the variables and the unknowns involved in making the judgment. The analysis should also contain some sense of how the outcome might differ if events should change, and should furthermore provide some "indicators" of what alternative courses of development might be in light of various future eventualities. Thus the reader should have not a "black box" prediction, but a do-it-yourself document that contains a roadmap to other alternatives if one or another set of indicators should become prominent in the ensuing months.

Last, any National Estimate can profit from some kind of "worst-case" analysis as a brief addendum to central analytic judgments. The purpose of this is not to "cover one's behind" but to suggest to policy-makers the potential range and dimensions of less likely events. The elaboration of worst-case scenarios, clearly identified as such, can be a powerful analytical tool to alert analysts and policy-makers alike to untoward change.

IN THE END, the success of the CIA at long-term intelligence will demand special sensitivity to cultures outside the American range of experience. Unfortunately, Americans tend to be dangerously chaste and naive when it comes to dealing with cultures and states that differ from this experience—i.e., most of the world. Even our educational system is disinclined toward pejorative descriptions of other cultures and their political and social weaknesses. Our political science education is heavy on numbers and "objective" data, sometimes with a dose of abstract theory.

Most Americans are innocent of the functional social realities and political facts of daily existence that inform life in most other societies. Only American political observers could have been mislead by the false statements of the man-in-the-street in Managua to CBS news interviewers that they were planning to vote for the Sandinistas; how much sophistication does it take to disbelieve public statements of citizens in a totalitarian society? Tendencies toward "rational actor" models are intensely dangerous and yet most of us operate from them in judging the world—thereby guaranteeing that we would not accurately predict the behavior of a Khomeini or a Saddam. We are poor at grasping the cultural rationales of other societies, rationales that are often better revealed through watching their films and reading their novels than by studying more "objective data."

If the CIA is to develop a better batting average—and we rarely hear of the hundreds of issues that the Agency gets right—it requires additional mechanisms designed to plumb the "what if" type of scenarios. There is a profound need for alternative ad hoc groupings of analysts to challenge suppositions, or even for institutionalized groups of devil's advocates to overcome institutional bias or complacency. None of these ideas is new to the CIA—they have all been discussed at one point or another, some even occasionally tested; they all have their drawbacks and problems as well. Their further institutionalization still would not be amiss.

Because strategic intelligence in the end is all about judgments, no institution is going to have a perfect batting average. The unpleasant fact is that no system can be made to work unfailingly "if only certain guidelines are followed." Success does not ride on the appointment of the ideologically correct, or the elusive search for the "objective" appointee. We are eternal prisoners of human preference, bias, and unique personal insight. To that degree political analysis is always susceptible to charges of "politicization."□

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Did God Save Israel?

Avigdor Haselkorn

WITH EVERY new revelation about Saddam Hussein's secret nuclear weapons program, Israel's intelligence failure in Iraq becomes clearer. Not only was the country about to face in a few short years the most serious challenge to its existence, but Israel might also have been taken by surprise. However, instead of facing mortal danger, Israel's strategic position has suddenly *improved* markedly and there are even new hopes for an Arab-Israeli peace today. This transformation is by no means self-explanatory. In fact, it is the result of an incredible sequence of events.

First, Saddam Hussein, instead of attacking Israel and achieving an unparalleled place in Arab history, decided to attack a "brotherly" Arab country—Kuwait. The unprecedented nature of Saddam's move may be gleaned from the fact that never before had one Arab country overrun and completely occupied another. Moreover, for some reason Saddam failed to press ahead with his attack. If the Iraqi army had gone on to invade Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states after Kuwait, the whole shape of the U.S.-Iraqi conflict would have been different. Had Iraq occupied Saudi ports and airfields, the allied build-up as we know it would have been impossible. Fears of losing the Gulf oil supplies, suddenly under Iraqi control, might have deterred the allies from considering the use of force altogether. Why Iraq did not press on to attack the other Gulf states is even harder to fathom if one accepts Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz's contention that "We expected a U.S. offensive on the morning of August 2."[1]

Second, for six long months Saddam refused to listen to pleas from virtually all the world's leaders, including his close Soviet allies, to withdraw from Kuwait. Saddam's obstinacy persisted in spite of extremely lucrative political pay-offs offered to him that would have left him in control of the Al-Rumailah oil field as well as some of the Kuwaiti coast, including the Warbah and Bubiyan islands. There was even talk of changing the structure of Kuwait's government to Iraq's liking.

Linkage with the Palestinian issue—a political bribe promising to elevate Saddam to an all-out leadership position in the Arab world—was offered, openly or implicitly, by many Eastern and Western politicians. But to no avail. Saddam did not heed the dire warnings of the coalition partners either and remained defiant even after Yevgeny Primakov, Gorbachev's special emissary, told him point-blank on October 28, 1991, that "An assault

Dr. Avigdor Haselkorn is a strategic analyst and defense consultant specializing in Soviet and Middle Eastern affairs. He has published widely in the U.S., Europe, Australia, and Israel. He considers himself non-religious.

[1]Interview in *Milliyet*, Istanbul, in FBIS (NES), May 30, 1991.

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against Iraq, a powerful one at that, is inevitable unless you announce your withdrawal from Kuwait and implement it."[2] It is as if "God has hardened Pharaoh's heart" once again.

Third, Saddam allowed the allied military build-up in Saudi Arabia to proceed unhindered. This took place in spite of the fact that Saddam's record, as proven in both Iran and Kuwait, indicates a clear preference for launching the first strike. U.S. commanders have admitted that in the early stages of the deployment they considered their position to be extremely vulnerable and exposed. In fact, on several occasions Saddam even threatened pre-emption. He never did. Instead, the allied troops had six months to settle in, train, and get ready.

FOURTH, prior to the commencement of hostilities Saddam had given up one of his strongest weapons—his "human shields." He thus made President Bush's decision to go to war easier and also facilitated the allied air campaign which assured victory. It is remarkable that the release of the hostages came when the chances of a U.S. military action were higher, rather than at the early stages of the conflict when the search for a "peaceful solution" was dominant.

Fifth, once the war started Saddam opted for the most misconceived and incompetent strategy imaginable. For example, he "stuffed," to use General Schwarzkopf's expression, almost all his troops in a "bag" inside the Kuwaiti territory or just north of the Iraq-Kuwait border. He thus invited the "closing" of this bag and the trapping of his army. Saddam was so preoccupied with the defense of Kuwait that he did not extend his defensive line of berms, razor wire, and mines more than a few miles west of the Kuwaiti frontier that faces Saudi Arabia, ultimately facilitating the envelopment of his army.

After losing 45 of his aircraft in air-to-air combat, Saddam grounded his 700-plane air force and eventually dispatched 137 top-of-the-line combat and transport aircraft to sanctuary in Iran. Allied planes flew 80,000 sorties virtually unopposed and lost only 75 aircraft, much less than the 200 the coalition command had braced for. General Schwarzkopf told *Time* magazine on March 11,

> Take Riyadh airbase—you know three good fighter planes making a run down there could have taken out huge assets. But once the air campaign started, [Saddam's] air force went away, so I no longer worried about Dhahran [where vast amounts of equipment were concentrated] and Riyadh.

With the exception of the attack on Khafji, Iraq's ground forces were committed to the static defense of Kuwait and simply had to dig in and take the terrible pounding. After six weeks of bombing, frontline units were isolated, mostly unable to communicate with Baghdad or one another, and were short of food and water. In addition to losing much of their equipment, they lost their will to fight.

Nor is it clear why Saddam refrained from attacking the allied troops with chemical weapons, even when faced with total defeat. Despite the fact that Iraq had solemnly declared that its strategy was to cause a "bloodbath," allied casualties remained minimal, leading even General Schwarzkopf to conclude that "God had to be" on his side. In turn, the low casualty rate disproved the dire predictions of the anti-war lobby in Washington, and allowed President Bush to pursue the war to final victory.

Sixth, the firing of Iraqi Scuds on Israel caused miraculously low casualties even though most missiles were aimed at Israeli population centers. It helped Israel stay out of the conflict despite the fact that the restraint ran counter to the Israeli Defense Force's (IDF) well-publicized military doctrine.

Seventh, when the Scuds failed to draw Israel into the war, Saddam did not resort to other means to provoke the IDF. For example, he did not send ground units into Jordan as

[2]Primakov's account in *Pravda*, March 1, 1991.

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many in Israel feared, nor did he fire chemically armed Scuds against Tel Aviv. Given that Iraq officially admitted to possessing thirty chemical warheads during the war, again in contrast to Israeli estimates, this is especially surprising. Reportedly, Saddam's last ditch effort to fire a salvo of twenty-six Scuds against Israel on the last day of the war was somehow intercepted by allied commando teams.[3]

Eighth, Israel's borders and population centers were mainly free of terrorism despite a feeble and belated PLO attempt to open a so-called "second front" in support of Saddam through Lebanon.

Ninth, despite the heavy blows inflicted on him by the allies, and the pressing urgings of Primakov that unless he announce the withdrawal of his forces "in the shortest time frame [possible]. . . the grouping of Iraqi forces in Kuwait would be crushed. You understand, would be crushed,"[4] Saddam continued to play for time. The delay allowed the allies to complete the destruction of a large part of the Iraqi army.

Tenth, the defeat of Israel's most dangerous enemy took place without the IDF firing a shot and, in all likelihood, with its intelligence and military establishments failing to realize the full extent of the Iraqi preparations against Israel. It was carried out by a coalition of states that included, incredibly enough, some Arab countries whose participation augmented the political viability of the war option. Moreover, the allies were headed by a U.S. president whose administration's main preoccupation in the Gulf until last August was the appeasement of Iraq. The same Mr. Bush is now orchestrating the dismantling of Saddam's secret nuclear weapons program, the existence of which became known only after an *Iraqi* defector had come forward, and which shortly could have threatened Israel's survival. Moreover, just when the UN nuclear inspectors were about to miss key parts of the secret Iraqi program, another defector with the most up-to-date information about the project showed up.

FOR EACH and every one of the ten steps of this scenario to have materialized, the unexpected, if not indeed the unimaginable, had to happen. For example, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait surprised most Western intelligence services, and possibly the Soviets as well. Similarly, the majority of the U.S. intelligence community reportedly estimated that "once Saddam realized the size of the force arrayed against him and the determination of the United States and the allies, he would withdraw."[5] Even more astonishing, in the eyes of many Israeli and other analysts, was the fact that the U.S. actually went to war over Kuwait. Naturally, the probability that the *entire sequence* would develop was simply nil. It is as if Saddam Hussein had deliberately opted for the worst-case strategy for himself and the best-case one for Israel. Therein lies the possibility of divine intervention as a *rational* explanation. While it cannot be proven that God saved Israel, the probability that this explanation holds true regarding the incredible scenario in the Gulf is as great, if not indeed greater, than any logical interpretation.

Somewhere in this story there is a lesson for Jews, Arabs, and indeed the rest of the world. They all ought to ponder it.□

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[3]*Newsweek*, June 17, 1991.

[4]Primakov's account in *Pravda*, March 2, 1991.

[5]Bob Woodward, *The Commanders* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991).

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Justice and the Gulf War

Francis X. Winters:

FIRING the opening salvo in the skirmish to fix for Americans "the lessons of the Gulf War," Robert Tucker has argued that the premier lesson to be drawn is an ethical one ("Justice and the War," Fall 1991). Whatever else may be concluded about history's inaugural one hundred-hour (land) war, conscience should conclude that the war was unjust. For the conscientious, then, the first lesson would be: "No more Operations Desert Storm."

The telling argument leading up to the corollary—that the rape of another Kuwait by another Saddam Hussein would have to be accepted without armed resistance—is a historical one. Tucker recalls the historical context that gave rise to the just war tradition: the medieval and early Renaissance world of Western Europe, where the belligerent princes and kings were nearly evenly matched in their resources for war and their shared chivalric code of conduct for armed hostilities. This symmetry of resources facilitated an ethos of self-restraint. Self-denial (in strategy and tactics) was thus a function of calculations of long-term self-interests. Statecraft in that era taught the prince when prudently to launch war, how to thrust and parry without perilous zeal, and when to quit the field of battle. Just war theory was a covenant among equals to defend their immediate interests without sacrificing the sanctuary of reciprocal limits on the use of force.

Trying to apply this antique code to justify the war in the Gulf, Tucker argues, represents an anachronistic illusion. For, in the recent war, there was neither parity of power between Iraq and the allied nations, nor any shared understanding of the notion of self-restraint in war. Bush's abdication of his constitutional responsibility as commander-in-chief to monitor the force of war unleashed tides of violence against a defenseless enemy trapped in the greatest military mismatch in memory. Trying to justify this manslaughter with the scholastic niceties of just war theory is an inexcusable exercise. For if, as Tucker argues, that tradition itself emerged in an era of rational and morally self-conscious statecraft, and if, as seems indisputable, Saddam Hussein is wholly innocent of statecraft, the application of this history-bound moral perspective to the recent conflict is futile and perhaps dangerous.

The alliance forces had three available options. The one they chose—namely, to use "as much destruction as possible" to dislodge Iraq swiftly from Kuwait—is criticized by Tucker because of the resultant body-counts. Sensitive to his charge that such a lopsided toll in lives makes mockery of the pretense of moral justification, others reconsider the alternative courses of action that were available to the alliance. The first, acquiescence to the "annexation" of Kuwait, is rejected implicitly by Tucker himself when he agrees that the defense of Kuwait was an indisputable just cause.

Two other available options remained to redress the aggression against Kuwait. The first was the open-ended exclusive reliance on sanctions. The argument for this course, which always appeared threadbare, is now in tatters. From the beginning, advocates of sanctions failed to put forward a single precedent for the effectiveness of sanctions to persuade a resolute aggressor to disgorge a nation already swallowed. Moreover, the specific context of the application of sanctions in the Gulf was complicated by the simultaneous necessity to deploy sizable allied forces in Saudi Arabia in order to prevent Iraq's

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assault on that nation. An indefinite military delay to test the effectiveness of sanctions would have put these forces at risk, allowing a period during which at any time Iraq could have struck Desert Shield forces with Scud missiles. Such a deliberate exposure of allied troops would have allowed Hussein to attack them at will, thus seizing the advantage of surprise and maximum readiness of his own forces. And such a posture by the allies would have been irresponsible both morally and militarily.

The widespread conviction among American elites (including many senior, and retired senior, military officials and, at the other extreme, many religious leaders) that sanctions constituted the maximum form of coercion morally permissible is puzzling. For, in order to reverse aggression, sanctions must be an excruciatingly punitive strategy, capable of transforming the intentions of the aggressor. Such efficacious sanctions might be preferable to the resort to force if they could be expected to spare civilians the sufferings inflicted by war. But as UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar remarked in April, one of the somber lessons of the Gulf Crisis is that sanctions struck hardest at the most vulnerable sectors of society, the women and children. The belief that sanctions are a form of coercion that can be applied without attacking civilians is a moral mirage.

FINALLY, only one further alternative to Operation Desert Storm seems remotely plausible—namely, the hypothetical decision by the alliance to wage war on Saddam Hussein's terms, by employing forces calibrated to match his own so as to avoid the disparity which led inexorably to the one-sided casualty rates. For example, to pursue this scenario, the alliance might have denied itself the air superiority it acquired when Iraq's air forces withdrew to Iran.

This whimsical scenario would have avoided the application of medieval standards once posited for struggle among equal powers to justify a war fought between exaggeratedly uneven forces. Such self-denial, however, would only have delayed the outcome, hardly reducing Iraqi casualties while surely increasing allied casualties. No moral argument can be made for this exercise in make-believe military logic. Its only appeal is the attraction of its archaism: conscience is not required to reconstruct a vanished universe for the sake of historical verisimilitude.

There was left, then, only one morally responsible option: something resembling Operation Desert Storm. Surely President Bush could have held the reins more tightly, perhaps even allowing a "bombing pause" for massive defections from the ranks of the reckless ruler. Even more exactingly, the alliance might have conscientiously waived its technological advantage by sparing Iraq's single national electric grid, whose destruction not only blinded the military but caused unconscionable destruction of civilian life.

But Tucker's implicit requirement that just wars in the future not go beyond a certain rough parity of casualties between the adversaries seems implausible. Nothing in the moral logic of limited self-defense can support this claim that great powers may justly fight only when they reduce themselves to functional equality with small powers.

What corollaries do, then, follow from the indisputable tragedy of the lopsided death tolls in the war? Only one presently comes to mind: the restoration of statecraft to the education of ambitious rulers. Tracing the moral principles of just war back to their historical roots, one discovers that it was a code of conduct among roughly equal rivals. In that distant era, this moral code of war was a tool of statesmen, who understood, quite apart from their moral culture, that the weak do not attack the strong with impunity. Conscience did not substitute for political common sense in the early days of natural law thinking. Rather, they were complementary characteristics of successful and just rulers.

If there is an axiom to be derived from the recent and lamentable contest of arms, it may be a simple truth about the relationship between morality and statecraft. That melancholy realization may be that what is lacking

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in the statecraft of an aggressor cannot be supplied by the virtue of the victim or of those who come to his rescue.□

Francis X. Winters is associate professor of ethics and international affairs at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University.

Gary Schmitt:

ROBERT Tucker's "Justice and the War," is an odd and disappointing piece.

Tucker begins his analysis of the justness of the Gulf War with a discussion of the war's end. More descriptive than judgmental, his comments on *jus ad bellum* in this particular instance reflect his long-standing concern that the rationale for going to war has become increasingly and problematically "limited to one of defense, individual or collective, against armed attack." Elliptically, he notes that "this far-reaching change in the right of recourse to war has not gone without dissent."

"Without dissent," indeed. It was Tucker's two essays in *Commentary* during the 1970s Arab oil embargo ("Oil: The Issue of American Intervention, January 1975; "Further Reflections on Oil and Force," March 1975) that raised the question of whether the use of American military force is "justified if vital interests are jeopardized." Without actually calling for armed intervention, he criticized the poverty of the public discourse which, without serious debate, had eschewed that option. Tucker reminded Americans that the use of military force could be justified for more than collective or self-defense and that a decent and civilized state had every right to defend its interests when they were truly vital.

Tucker, however, is not interested in pursuing the issue of the Gulf War's end in light of this previous debate. This is too bad; rhetoric which focused on Iraq's violation of the "international order" rang a bit hollow in this instance given the obvious and very real threat Iraq posed to Saudi oil. Professor Tucker, more than any other scholar, had every right to challenge the administration to speak clearly and instructively about the ends which justified putting so many in harm's way.

But this is not his focus. Rather, Tucker takes aim at how the war was waged. "That a war is undertaken in a just cause does not. . . ensure. . . a just war." Properly, he notes that the classic just war theory requires not only that the ends for which military force is used correspond with what is right, but that the means be proper and in proportion with the ends themselves. Hence, a war whose purpose is "essentially defensive" in nature is "limited to repelling the aggressor, not to destroying him."

By his questions and statements, Professor Tucker implies that the allied effort largely failed in this regard. According to Tucker, the war was "waged with extraordinary ferocity." Its legacy: combatant and non-combatant deaths that "may well number several hundred thousand" and "vast destruction of industrial plants in Iraq." In short, force was employed (intentionally or not) in an indiscriminate (i.e., unjust) manner.

That the war was waged with ferocity is obviously true; that it was conducted with "extraordinary" ferocity is not. There have been no tales told of troops gone mad or mass destruction for destruction's sake; there were no My Lais, no Dresdens. Nor was there even a general bombing campaign designed to weaken the enemy population's will or support for the war. And there has been no charge that the Iraqi troops who surrendered were mistreated. As for casualties, even with non-combatants included, they range in the tens of thousands, not in the hundreds of thousands wildly suggested by Tucker. And Iraq's civilian industrial infrastructure, contrary to Tucker's remarks, is largely intact. Today, a year after the war began, Baghdad is a functioning, albeit somewhat hobbled, city. By any traditional accounting, this was a war waged within the bounds of correctness.

The heart of Tucker's complaint, however, concerns the "disproportionality that marked the conduct of the war." The "mel-

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ancholy conclusion" is that the "consequences" of the way the war was fought have "seriously tainted" judgments about its justness. Specifically, was "proportionality violated" when the U.S. was willing to take "a multitude of the enemy's lives in order to save, or simply not to put at risk, a few of [our] own?" "At some point," Tucker concludes, "the imperious claims of military necessity must yield to the claims of humanity." Put bluntly, too many Iraqis were killed, too few Americans died, and for what reason? We in the U.S. "would not tolerate another Vietnam." The war had to be fought with force "on a massive scale" and with "a modest price in American lives."

THERE IS more than a little Monday morning quarterbacking in Tucker's analysis. He speaks of a "vast disparity" in the opposing forces that did not exist. While the allied effort held what turned out to be key advantages in the air and in tactical intelligence, the core of its force was not clearly superior in terms of men, tanks, or artillery tubes. Indeed, it was *because* the Iraqis were battle-tested and dug in defensively that it was assumed an extended air campaign was not only desirable but necessary to prevent thousands of American casualties on the ground. Even then, most "expert" commentators thought the assault would be a bloody and costly effort. Fortunately, this assessment was wrong—yet it was a view driven by accounts of past, mass tank-infantry engagements, not memories of Vietnam. This may say something about the quality of our military analysis, but it does not reflect an intent to wage war in an especially vicious manner.

Of course, as it turned out, the bombing the allied forces engaged in actually saved thousands of lives—not only American but Iraqi as well. Mass desertions and quick surrenders from the latter's defensive lines meant that the kind of brutal fighting that typically marks ground warfare was almost entirely absent from this engagement.

Professor Tucker's suggestion that the moral issue here is hidden behind an allied rhetoric of "military necessity" as opposed to the substantive "claims of humanity" is itself an obfuscation. Surely, a concerted effort to lessen allied deaths—i.e., men and women engaged in righting a wrong—has as great a claim to the imperatives of "humanity" as saving the lives of Iraqi soldiers supporting the conquest and destruction of Kuwait.

For Tucker, the bottom line is that this was a defensive war whose end was limited but whose actual conduct was far from it. Yet, the facts speak otherwise. The Gulf War was waged with an economy of force, discrimination with respect to targets, and mercy toward the vanquished. If the administration's "larger objective" had been, as Tucker suggests it was, "eliminating Baghdad as a regional power," the allied effort would not have been stopped precisely when it had Iraq's Republican Guard—the cornerstone of Saddam's power—surrounded and in its sights. If anything, criticism about the war should focus not on how it was waged, but on the ends pursued. Tucker would have been on firmer ground if he had questioned the policy of not removing Saddam from power. Abiding by the principle of *status quo ante bellum*—leaving Saddam in control with his Republican Guard intact—was akin to giving Willie Horton a weekend pass.

In truth, there is a fine fit between the way the war was conducted, its consequences, and the limited goals set out by the UN and the Bush administration. For someone as conscious of the need to match ends and means in foreign and defense affairs as Tucker has been over the years, it is odd that he would fail to see it in this instance. This is not to deny that Tucker has asked some interesting questions. But so distant from the facts is his analysis that there is an appearance of asking questions for questions' sake, a kind of intellectual contrariness befitting neither Tucker the scholar, nor the war's evident justice.□

Gary Schmitt is a Washington-based consultant on national security affairs.

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Robert W. Tucker Replies:

WHAT IS common to both Francis Winters' and Gary Schmitt's responses is a refusal to confront the issue of proportionality. Winters argues that just war doctrine presupposed that political leaders had at least an elementary grounding in statecraft. This Saddam Hussein presumably did not have, failing even to understand that "the weak do not attack the strong with impunity." But Saddam Hussein attacked the weak, not the strong. He thought, not without reason, that the strong would not defend the weak. Those who led him to believe this seem no less in need of instruction in statecraft. Saddam Hussein may be a moral idiot but he is not a political idiot. Even if he were the latter, it would not relieve us of the obligation to conduct wars with due regard to the principle of proportionality. To suggest, as Winters does, that Hussein's political idiocy cannot be compensated for by the virtue of those resisting him is to come close to granting moral license for doing as one pleases when dealing with an aggressor.

Schmitt simply asserts that the manner in which the war was fought and the destruction that it wrought were well within the bounds of just war requirements. On combatant casualties, he confidently states that they were in the "tens of thousands." If it turns out that he is right in this, my reflections on justice and the war would have to be changed. In this respect, quantitative considerations are crucial. It remains the case, however, that we do not *know* what the quantities are, though what has filtered through to date strongly suggests that the quantities are higher than Schmitt asserts. This issue apart, it is apparent that Schmitt, no less than Winters, does not really wish to come to grips with the issue of proportionality. He leaves the distinct impression that no disproportion in deaths between those engaged in righting a wrong and those supporting an aggressor's designs can be deemed morally offensive.

Neither of these views, it seems to me, can be reconciled with traditional just war doctrine.□

Robert W. Tucker is a contributing editor of The National Interest.

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E.H. Carr: The Realist's Realist

THE ARTICLE on the late E.H. Carr by Bruce Miller is an interesting reminder of the career of someone once regarded as a major interpreter of the Soviet Union.

It does, however, contain some errors of chronology. He did not leave the foreign office for a professorship during the war, as Miller states, but in 1936. At the beginning of the war, Carr took a post in the new Ministry of Information but also began his connection with the *Times*, becoming deputy editor in 1941. He retained that post before returning once more to academic life in 1946.

I think that Miller himself underestimates the reaction against Carr's work later on; it was by no means confined to those keen on a more moral approach to international affairs. His writings for the *Times* together with those of Lewis Namier to whom he was close at that time tended to play down the reality of Soviet ambitions and conduct in Eastern Europe and minimize the obstacles of an ideological kind to Soviet collaboration with the Western powers.

As an historian of the Soviet Union, Carr consciously limited himself to such official documentation as the Soviet authorities allowed to be published and rejected the evidence of the regime's critics on the ground that history is only concerned with victors.

Carr's approach inevitably led to giving a more benign picture of the Soviet regime and Lenin and Stalin than was consonant with the facts as they are now being revealed by Soviet historians with more access to the archives. To eliminate morality in favor of "realism" from the study of international relations may prevent some *real* factors from becoming apparent—there are wicked men and wicked regimes—Hitler, Stalin and the monstrous engines they constructed. Carr could never fully allow for that.□

Lord Beloff
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Lower Case

The Third World, R.I.P.

Owen Harries

THE RECENTLY founded National Review Institute held its first conference on international affairs—"The World After Communism"—in October. It took place at Stapleford Park, an architecturally eclectic but beautiful stately home assembled over several centuries and now converted into an outstanding hotel, in Leicestershire, England. The first thing to say is that if you ever get invited to one of these events, drop everything and go. The whole occasion—the setting, the hospitality, the company, the discussion—was splendid.

The second thing to say is that, in the face of stiff competition—including, among others, Henry Kissinger, Robert Conquest, Alistair Horne, Karen Elliott House, Norman Stone, and Bill Buckley himself—the undoubted star of the conference was Margaret Thatcher. This remarkable woman, who had her sixty-sixth birthday during the weekend we met, arrived at 1 a.m. on the first night, stayed up talking until 3 a.m., and then chaired all the sessions the next day; and for Mrs. Thatcher, it should be emphasized, chairing is a strenuous activity, involving much positive guidance and firm correction of error. So much for the image of a broken and demoralized figure promoted by her enemies (promoted, that is, in those interludes when they are not exhibiting extreme fear of what she might do next).

Owen Harries is editor of *The National Interest*.

In her opening remarks, Mrs. Thatcher identified as a central theme of the times "the disintegration of artificial groupings constituted earlier in this century." This suited me fine, for while Mrs. Thatcher had principally in mind the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union itself (as well, perhaps, as her expectations concerning the European Community), the phrase sums up very well what is happening to the Third World, which is what I had been asked to speak about.

THE THIRD World is dying, if not dead. One may still, I suppose, use the term in lower case to designate a rather vague socio-economic category. But in its upper case sense of a militant ideological and political grouping, it is finished. The response of nearly all conservatives to this will be, "And a very good thing too." Conservatives have usually been contemptuous of the Third World, and there has been much about it that deserved contempt—its pretentiousness and hypocrisy, its cynicism, its corruption, and, not least, its cruelty.

Still, it has to be conceded that for a couple of decades the entity that went by that name served rather well the leaders of the new states that came into existence with the collapse of European empires. Individually, those states lacked power, wealth, status, experience, and confidence. How to make up for their weakness, to make their presence felt on the international stage, to make the pow-

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erful pay attention to them—these were real problems. And the answer was the invention of the Third World.

Conceptually, Third Worldism combined two distinct ideas—that of a "third force" and that of a Have/Have Not division of the world. The notion of a third force was pinched from those English and French social democrats and radicals, like George Orwell, who in the 1940s envisaged a democratic, socialist Europe as a force separate from both American capitalism and Soviet totalitarianism, and holding the balance between the two. When, with NATO, Western Europe became committed to the American camp, the idea languished for a few years, before being picked up and appropriated by the ex-colonies.

The Have/Have Not distinction was older and, on the face of it, did not fit in well with a tripartite division of the world; but it was an essential part of Third Worldism, with the Soviet bloc being accommodated as a kind of non-exploitative, semi-Have. (Later on, the terminology North/South gained favor to describe Haves and Have Nots.)

Operationally, Third Worldism had three components: First, the playing off of one superpower against the other, and the exploitation of one's status as the uncommitted—the hearts and minds that were being struggled over—to initiate a bidding war for one's favors. Second, the exploitation of Western humanitarianism and liberal guilt about the colonial past in order to extort political and economic concessions, a.k.a. retroactive justice. Third, the exploitation of the quasi-democratic nature of the UN system, which put a premium on voting and therefore on numbers, one of the few political assets the new states collectively possessed. Hence the ideology's strong emphasis on solidarity, to exploit their numerical strength to the fullest.

For a couple of decades all this worked pretty well. In the 1970s, in particular, a Third World backed by OPEC's oil power, and tilting hard toward the Soviet bloc, was very assertive, and had considerable success in imposing itself on a demoralized West.

In the 1980s things worked less well. Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher were not good at feeling guilty and not amenable to moral blackmail. OPEC's power broke. And, as Henry Kissinger had warned its leaders, the Third World's flagrant abuse of the UN system ended up by destroying most of what authority that institution possessed, thus diminishing its utility as an instrument.

Still, as long as the Cold War was a going concern, the essence of the Third World game remained intact. Grenada, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia—local conflicts in such normally inconsequential countries continued to engage the great powers, as long as they saw themselves involved in a single over-riding global struggle in which *everything* counted.

NOW, AT the beginning of the 1990s, the end of the Cold War has knocked the remaining struts out from under the Third World edifice. In the absence of a competition between—or indeed the existence of—two other blocs, it makes no conceptual sense to postulate a third force. The tactic of playing one side against the other is not available in the absence of such a competition. Third World countries no longer have a ready-made, automatic way of linking themselves to the central issues of world politics—as counters in a game, as trophies to be won, or as reluctant neutrals to be seduced.

So one can anticipate a reparochializing of Third World politics into third world politics, with local and regional factors determining how things go. Without the controlling and distorting effects of great power intervention on the one hand, and the internal pressure for solidarity on the other, disputes concerning ethnic and tribal minorities, artificial boundaries, religious differences, and the like are certain to multiply. But the importance of such disputes in the total scheme of things will be much diminished. Except where some special factor operates—oil, say—the hearts and minds and territories of most of the third world will become essen-

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tially irrelevant to the great powers. In this respect, the Gulf War was atypical and not a sign of what is to come.

These changes may take a little time to sink in on both sides—in the West and the third world—because old habits are well ingrained. But they will come.

IF THE END of the Cold War invalidates the notion of a third force, what about the other conceptual ingredient of Third Worldism—the division between Haves and Have Nots? Will this be a goer in the post-Cold War world?

Well, unlike the "third force" idea, it at least has the advantage of not being logically dependent on the prior existence of a two-camp conflict. It will certainly be pushed—is already being pushed, not only by third world spokesmen but by the Jacques Attalises of the world. But in several respects new conditions do not favor it.

First, and as already noted, Western liberal guilt has been eroded by time and abuse. Pop singers and actresses will continue to mimic it, engaging in what James Coleman has called "conspicuous benevolence," but the game of moral blackmail is essentially up. Second, given the state of the U.S. economy and the need to attend to its own ills, America is unlikely to be in the giving vein. Third, Eastern Europe and what was the Soviet Union are going to offer serious competition for what European aid and investment capital are available, and they are likely to be given preference over the third world.

Fourth, the world's main aid giver and source of investment capital is already, and will continue to be, Japan, and the Japanese—strangers to humanitarianism and guilt—are not a soft touch. They put a premium on self-reliance and self-generated strength, both in themselves and in others. Professor Takashi Inoguchi of the University of Tokyo expresses it this way:

> Giving grants in too large amounts spoils recipients. If they cannot manage loan repayments by industrializing the economy rapidly and thus generating enough surplus through self-discipline, then self-strengthening will not be achieved.

Last and crucially, the aid industry will no longer be underpinned and reinforced by geopolitical considerations, as it was throughout the Cold War. For a combination of reasons, then, the Have-Nots are not likely to be very successful.

After the Gulf War, many see the revitalization of the UN as a feature of the post-Cold War order, and as the UN has been the Third World's preferred forum it might be thought that this will be in its favor. But, again, it will not work that way. The Third World's manipulation of the UN depended on the Cold War's stalemating of the Security Council, and the consequent shifting of the action to the General Assembly where Third World numbers could prevail. But what is happening now is that, with the end of the Cold War, the Security Council is being unfrozen and reactivated. For the first time the Council is working more or less according to the manual, and the action, such as it is, is moving back there. But the Security Council is the instrument of the great powers, not of the Third World. (I leave aside in this context the important question of whether it will prove wise in the long run for the United States to play up the importance of the Security Council.)

HOW, THEN, if at all, will third world countries impinge seriously on the wider international system in the new era?

Two ways suggest themselves. First, proliferation—proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and of the ballistic missiles to launch them over great distances. Ironically, the post-Cold War era may actually see that extensive proliferation that many predicted and feared during the Cold War, but which did not happen. Then, the superpowers were able to maintain some discipline and control, and also to discourage proliferation by providing their nuclear um-

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brellas as protection. But even then it was difficult to hold the line in the face of the ambitions of some Third World countries and the greed of Western suppliers. In a more volatile, complex, and unpredictable world, several threshold states are certain to do what Saddam Hussein has been caught doing. Indeed, we should assume that they are already doing it. For startling evidence of their chances of success, consult the article by Tom Clancy and Russell Seitz in this issue. It appears that not only is the genie out of the bottle, but the bottle is shattered.

A SECOND looming issue is migration—the real prospect of large-scale, sustained, and uncontrolled migration from third world countries to the developed industrialized ones, with all the tension and hostility that would entail.

Unless third world countries make remarkable economic progress, or unless the developed countries can seal their doors very effectively, and both things are very improbable, millions will migrate—driven by misery at home and drawn by the good life that television, and the increasing number of friends and relatives who have gone ahead, will tell them about.

When this happens it can be expected that America, with its tradition of accepting immigrants, will cope reasonably well. Indeed, it *is* already coping well—for the U.S. already took in more immigrants in the 1980s than in any previous decade in its history, and ninety percent of them were from third world countries.

On the other hand, a Japan that sets great store by racial purity will continue to exclude immigrants virtually completely, and will solve its labor problems by moving factories to the third world, rather than letting immigrants come to Japan.

As Graham Fuller observes in this issue, the region that will be hit hardest by the influx will be Europe, traditionally and until very recently a huge exporter of people, not an importer, and a continent of comparatively homogeneous nationalities. Europe will neither be able to keep immigrants out nor to cope with them when they are in place.

The strains are already clearly evident as a result of the relatively modest numbers—ten million or so—who have already arrived there. Most of these are Muslim and they are not being absorbed into the general population. As the French historian Jean Marie Domenach puts it, "Even as we are integrating all Europe, we can see a Muslim community that cuts across European lines, a sort of thirteenth nation of the European Community." That thirteenth nation will grow rapidly, both because of high birth rates and further heavy immigration. Indications of the politically explosive character of this process are already being given by those leading French politicians from both Left and Right who have decided there are votes in exploiting racial resentment and hatred. And in Germany, the first anniversary of unification in September of this year was marked by widespread riots directed against migrant hostels. The problems will be all the worse, and will be made more complex, because of the virtual certainty that mass South-North immigration will be combined with mass East-West flows.

Both proliferation and mass migration mean that third world countries and peoples will have a significant impact on international affairs. But they will not have it as "the Third World." In the case of nuclear proliferation, the weapons in question have most significance in terms of international conflicts *among* third world countries themselves. In the case of mass migration, this will not be a consequence of a Third World policy or strategy, but of the individual decisions of millions of people seeking relief from a misery largely created by inept and corrupt third world politicians. As the lachrymose Kenneth Kaunda finally falls and Mobutu Sese Seko totters, the interlude during which such politicians had to be paid serious attention by statesmen like Kissinger and Thatcher is over.□

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

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